The kind of self-knowledge at issue in the eye-soul analogy of the Alcibiades is knowledge of one’s epistemic state, i.e. what one knows and does not know, rather than knowledge of what one is. My evidence for this is the connection between knowledge of one’s epistemic state and self-improvement, the equivalence of self-knowledge to moderation, and the fact that ‘looking’ into the soul of another is a metaphor for elenctic discussion. The final lines of the analogy clarify that the part (...) of the soul one ‘looks’ into and the part one learns about when learning about one’s epistemic state is divine. (shrink)

In this paper I argue that in the digression in Plato’s Theaetetus godlikeness may be construed as Socrates’ ethical achievement, part and parcel of his art of mental mid­wifery. Although the philosophical life of contemplation and detachment from earthly affairs exemplifies the human ideal of godlikeness, Socrates’ godlikeness is an inferior but legitimate species of the genus. This is the case because Socratic godlikeness abides by the two requirements for godlikeness that Socrates sets forth in the digression: first, it is (...) a kind of escape from the phenomenal world; and second, it allows Socrates to become just and pious with wisdom. The crucial difference between Socrates and the philosopher that prevents the former from being as godlike as the latter is his epistemic barrenness, on account of which he cannot define the constitutive virtues of godlikeness, i.e., justice, piety, and wisdom. As a barren midwife of the intellect, Socrates practices godlikeness but does not have a philosophical understanding of its nature. Nevertheless, by extolling the life of the philosopher he urges others to aspire to what he can never attain, philosophical godlikeness. (shrink)

In the Alcibiades I, Socrates argues for the importance of self-knowledge. Recent interpreters contend that the self-knowledge at issue here is knowledge of an impersonal and purely rational self. I argue against this interpretation and advance an alternative. First, the passages proponents of this interpretation cite—Socrates’ argument that the self is the soul, and his suggestion that Alcibiades seek self-knowledge by looking for his soul’s reflection in the soul of another—do not unambiguously support their reading. Moreover, other passages, particularly Socrates’ (...) cross-examination of Alcibiades, suggest the contrary reading, that self-knowledge includes knowledge of qualities peculiar to the individual. (shrink)

Self-knowledge occupies a central place in the thought of the Socratics. As he makes it the characteristic feature of the figure of Socrates and of his search for the good life, Plato develops in his own right Socrates’ views on self-knowledge in a variety of ways, all of which incorporate the intuition that proper awareness of ourselves is determined, at least partly, by factors external to the individual. The aim of the pre­sent paper is to substantiate precisely this claim.The first (...) part outlines an interpretation of certain features of the Apology, where Plato appears convinced that full knowledge of oneself involves ele­ments of objectivity. The second and the third sections are devoted, respecti­vely, to the Charmides and to the first Alcibiades, both of which imply that the individual needs to turn away from himself and towards objective facts and values in order to acquire complete understanding of his own self. The fourth part applies that conclu­sion to a puzzle raised by the metaphor of the Cave in the seventh book of the Republic and proposes a tentative solution to that puzzle. The last part compares Plato’s account to that of another group of Socratics, the Cyrenaics, who hold that self-knowledge is achieved introspec­tively through inner sense. The paper ends with a few remarks concerning the importance of self-knowledge for morality and the pertinence of Plato’s account to contemporary ethics and philosophy of mind. (shrink)

Socrates’ inquiry into the nature of the virtues and human excellence led him to experience Socratic ignorance, a practical puzzlement experienced by his recognition that his central life commitments were conceptually problematic. This practical perplexity was not, however, an epistemic weakness but a reflection of his wisdom. I argue that Socratic ignorance, a concept that has not received scholarly attention in business ethics, is a central aim that business practitioners should seek. It is what a truthful, thorough, and courageous inquiry (...) into their professional roles and commitments leads to. It wakes them up from the moral complacency engendered by organizations, forcing them to become much more critical of their day-to-day activities and more intentional about living virtuously. It curbs the corrupting potential of authority positions and prevents the tendency of subordinates to routinely conform to sanctioned norms and expectations. Finally, it opens up novel and creative moral avenues and provides a promising model to deal with the conflicts posed by our globalized and increasingly polarized world. (shrink)

Roger Bacon’s On the Multiplication of Species is an attempt to analyze efficient causality in terms of forces that are multiplied from agent to patient. This essay argues that this has significant implications for the traditional distinction between appearance and reality in that Bacon refuses to think efficient cause in terms of some other reality that does not appear and yet is the ground of appearance.