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The paradox of knowability and the mapping objection

In Joe Salerno (ed.), New Essays on the Knowability Paradox. Oxford, England and New York, NY, USA: Oxford University Press (2008)

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  1. The Ontology of Justifications in the Logical Setting.Sergei N. Artemov - 2012 - Studia Logica 100 (1-2):17-30.
    Justification Logic provides an axiomatic description of justifications and delegates the question of their nature to semantics. In this note, we address the conceptual issue of the logical type of justifications: we argue that justifications in the logical setting are naturally interpreted as sets of formulas which leads to a class of epistemic models that we call modular models . We show that Fitting models for Justification Logic naturally encode modular models and can be regarded as convenient pre-models of the (...)
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  • Intuitionistic epistemic logic.Sergei Artemov & Tudor Protopopescu - 2016 - Review of Symbolic Logic 9 (2):266-298.
    We outline an intuitionistic view of knowledge which maintains the original Brouwer–Heyting–Kolmogorov semantics for intuitionism and is consistent with the well-known approach that intuitionistic knowledge be regarded as the result of verification. We argue that on this view coreflectionA→KAis valid and the factivity of knowledge holds in the formKA→ ¬¬A‘known propositions cannot be false’.We show that the traditional form of factivityKA→Ais a distinctly classical principle which, liketertium non datur A∨ ¬A, does not hold intuitionistically, but, along with the whole of (...)
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  • Discovering knowability: a semantic analysis.Sergei Artemov & Tudor Protopopescu - 2013 - Synthese 190 (16):3349-3376.
    In this paper, we provide a semantic analysis of the well-known knowability paradox stemming from the Church–Fitch observation that the meaningful knowability principle /all truths are knowable/, when expressed as a bi-modal principle F --> K♢F, yields an unacceptable omniscience property /all truths are known/. We offer an alternative semantic proof of this fact independent of the Church–Fitch argument. This shows that the knowability paradox is not intrinsically related to the Church–Fitch proof, nor to the Moore sentence upon which it (...)
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