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  1. Destabilizing Social Communication Theory.Colin B. Grant - 2003 - Theory, Culture and Society 20 (6):95-119.
    An interaction paradigm continues to predominate in social communication models to this day and yet often tends to be heavily intuitive, epistemologically conservative and acritical. This article seeks to examine some of the implications for our intuitive understanding of interaction when greater instability is introduced into social communication theory where communication is conceptualized as a complex uncertainty. The theoretical architecture of this undertaking is in itself interdisciplinary, comprising concepts from the fields of social theory, logic, information theory and constructivism. In (...)
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  • Réponse a mes critiques.François Recanati - 2006 - Philosophiques 33 (1):275-288.
    Réponse à trois études critiques de mon livre Literal Meaning à paraître dans la revue Philosophiques (Montréal).
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  • L'arrière-plan de l'intentionnalité selon John Searle.Denis Sauvé - 2006 - Dialogue 45 (1):3-27.
    John Searle upholds the idea of a “background” of intentionality. In his view there is an ensemble of non-representational (or non-intentional) mental capacities that make every form of intentionality possible (that is to say, without these mental capacities there would not be any beliefs, desires, intentions, etc.). I examine both his reasons to believe that there are non-representational mental capacities and the arguments he gives in support of the most important claim (according to him) that an intentional state cannot be (...)
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  • Quel Arrière-plan pour l'esprit?Pierre Steiner - 2006 - Dialogue 45 (3):419-444.
    This article analyzes the notion of background capacities as developed by John Searle during the last twenty years in philosophy of mind. Broadly construed, this notion designates non-representational mental capacities as the means by which mental representations are given a precise semantic content and thus are able to be expressed. Though novel and relevant, I intend to show that, according to Searle's description, this notion proves inadequate to attain its descriptive and explicative goals. I go on to regard background capacities (...)
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