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  1. When Words Fail: “Miscarriage,” Referential Ambiguity, and Psychological Harm.Jessalyn A. Bohn - 2023 - Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 48 (3):265-282.
    Despite significant efforts to support those bereaved by intrauterine death, they remain susceptible to avoidable psychological harm such as disenfranchised grief, misplaced guilt, and emotional shock. This is in part because the words available to describe intrauterine death—“miscarriage,” “spontaneous abortion,” and “pregnancy loss”—are referentially ambiguous. Despite appearing to refer to one event, they can refer to two distinct events: the baby’s death and his preterm delivery. Disenfranchised grief increases when people understand “miscarriage” as the physical process of preterm delivery alone, (...)
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  • Ectogestation and the Problem of Abortion.Christopher M. Stratman - 2020 - Philosophy and Technology 34 (4):683-700.
    Ectogestation involves the gestation of a fetus in an ex utero environment. The possibility of this technology raises a significant question for the abortion debate: Does a woman’s right to end her pregnancy entail that she has a right to the death of the fetus when ectogestation is possible? Some have argued that it does not Mathison & Davis. Others claim that, while a woman alone does not possess an individual right to the death of the fetus, the genetic parents (...)
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  • Rethinking Abortion, Ectogenesis, and Fetal Death.Christine Overall - 2015 - Journal of Social Philosophy 46 (1):126-140.
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  • Investigating the other side of agency: A cross-disciplinary approach to intentional omissions.Kaisa Kärki - 2019 - Dissertation, University of Jyväskylä
    This study develops conceptual means in philosophy of agency to better and more systematically address intentional omissions of agents, including those that are about resisting the action not done. I argue that even though philosophy of agency has largely concentrated on the actions of agents, when applying philosophy of action to the social sciences, a full-blown theoretical account of what agents do not do and a non-normative conceptual language of the phenomena in question is needed. Chapter 2 aims to find (...)
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