This article reviews Charles Danten’s Slaves of Our Affection: the Myth of the Happy Pet, outlining and evaluating Danten’s arguments for the abolition of the pet trade. The review delineates Danten’s main points; that the commodification of companion animals is antithetical to their welfare, that veterinarians, pet food manufacturers and breeders serve the dictates of the economic bottom line rather than the interests of animals, and that the majority of pet owners, while well-intentioned, are ill-equipped to meet the physiological and (...) psychological needs of their animal companions. The reviewer asserts that Danten’s arguments are generally successful, but suggests that the text might have benefited had the author engaged more with the work of other animal ethicists, particularly when making potentially controversial claims about the moral acceptability of euthanizing healthy, but unwanted, animals. (shrink)

In Putting Humans First: Why We Are Natures Favorite, Tibor Machan argues against moral perspectives that require taking animals' interests seriously. He attempts to defend the status quo regarding routine, harmful uses of animals for food, fashion and experimentation. Graham and Nobis argue that Machan's work fails to resist pro-animal moral conclusions that are supported by a wide range of contemporary ethical arguments.

Global estimates suggest that more than 100 million non-human animals are used for scientific purposes each year. The nature of the research, teaching, and testing conducted on these animals can be very invasive, painful, and fatal. Should we care? To discontinue these practices in some cases may result in human suffering. Should any human benefits of research, teaching, and testing outweigh the resultant animal suffering? This paper begins with an analysis of some of the most popular theories on the moral (...) status of animals. From this analysis it is argued that mere species membership is not a morally relevant characteristic, and that non-human animals can have moral status and moral rights. A deontological approach to adjudicating moral claims across species is presented to overcome some of the challenges typical of utilitarian and rights-based approaches. This approach is used to sketch a general framework for evaluating which types of scientific animal use ought to be permitted. It is argued further that, while some forms of scientific animal use may be permitted at present, we ought to strive for the elimination of the practice. The focus will then shift to an analysis of Canada’s regulatory system for the scientific use of animals, identifying shortcomings of this system. The Canadian approach to regulation in this area will be compared against approaches that are taken in the UK and the Netherlands which are more closely aligned with the moral arguments made in the first section. There are opportunities for Canada to learn from these countries, and remarks will be made on how and why Canada should improve the regulation of animals in research, teaching, and testing. Such changes have the potential to improve the wellbeing not only of the animals used in science, but for humans as well. Finally, expected costs and benefits that would accompany the implementation of the recommendations are considered with comments on how costs can be alleviated and why they should be incurred. (shrink)

The performance of natural behavior is commonly used as a criterion in the determination of animal welfare. This is still true, despite many authors having demonstrated that it is not a necessary component of welfare – some natural behaviors may decrease welfare, while some unnatural behaviors increase it. Here I analyze why this idea persists, and what effects it may have. I argue that the disagreement underlying this debate on natural behavior is not one about which conditions affect welfare, but (...) a deeper conceptual disagreement about what the state of welfare actually consists of. Those advocating natural behavior typically take a “teleological” view of welfare, in which naturalness is fundamental to welfare, while opponents to the criterion usually take a “subjective” welfare concept, in which welfare consists of the subjective experience of life by the animal. I argue that as natural functioning is neither necessary nor sufficient for understanding welfare, we should move away from the natural behavior criterion to an alternative such as behavioral preferences or enjoyment. This will have effects in the way we understand and measure welfare, and particularly in how we provide for the welfare of animals in a captive setting. (shrink)

In this article, I follow up on a suggestion made by Josephine Donovan that a Hume-inspired ethic of sympathy would be a better foundation for an animal ethic than more rationalistic approaches of both utilitarianism and deontology. I then expand on Donovan’s suggestion by further suggesting that Hume’s “sentiment of humanity” could easily be expanded to include other animals. Hume’s ethic of sympathy, I argue, answers the need for an ethic that is at once both personal, contextual, and sufficiently universalizable (...) to incorporate the political need for something like justice. I say, “something like justice,” because animals are explicitly ruled out of justice relationships by Hume due to his more narrow definition of that term. What I mean by “something like justice” is a more impersonal and objective element that transcends exclusively personal or private interests. (shrink)

A combined psychological-epistemological study of the human blocks that stand in the way of the recognition of the sentience and legal rights of non-human animals. This is a German translation of the original paper, "Roots of Human Resistance to Animal Rights: Psychological and Conceptual Blocks," published by the Lewis and Clark law journal, Animal Rights, in 2002.

The primary aim of biomedical research is to discover and develop new knowledge to advance human medicine. Frequently a ‘mouse model’ is taken to be a necessary step towards understanding a disease, biological mechanism or intervention. We argue for caution with respect to the mouse model: theoretical reasons, meta-analyses of empirical data, and viable alternatives all support a more restricted use of animals in laboratories than is current practice. On its own terms, a utilitarian scientific justification for using animals in (...) biomedical research converges more closely with welfarist claims than is usually recognised. (shrink)

In the present super-aging society, issues concerning what treatment should be given for incapacitated patients have become more important than ever before. This paper discusses whether or not an incapacitated patient’s refusal of treatment should be respected. The authors present a complete hypothetical scenario involving a 75-year-old moderately demented man suffering from malignant lymphoma. Of primary importance are the respect for patient dignity and the protection of human rights. Acts such as coercion, disregard, restriction, and surveillance can be unethical in (...) many situations. The effectiveness of chemotherapy for malignant lymphoma and its adverse outcomes could offset each other, leaving no net benefits for the patient. The patient is vulnerable and this very vulnerability requires the utmost protection and care. However, protection must be sensitive and comprehensive and the protection of his life at the expense of many other valuable factors is not justifiable. Coercing unwanted treatment would be intrusion, not protection, because of the physical and psychological suffering. When the refusal is explicit, consistent, and stable enough, it should to be viewed as true and current desire. Due to moderate dementia, the patient has lost his rational capacity, but his emotional capacity remains. If the remaining portion of his personality is rooted in his feelings, these feelings should be respected as much as possible. Those involved in the care of the patients who refuse treatment should not force them to undergo it simply on the grounds that it may be an established standard in their own country. What must be asked first is whether or not forced treatment would promote the patient’s subjective well-being. Additionally, treatment decisions should not be distorted due to the selfishness or discriminatory feelings of those involved in his care. In situations in which patients lack decisionmaking capacities, overriding the patients’ refusals of treatment should be regarded as an exception, rather than a standard course of action. Even in patients who are incapacitated, treatment refusal could stem from the feelings of the individual. Their subjective wellbeing would not be improved through close observation, restraint, denial, and coercion, the purpose of which they does not understand. (shrink)

Que lugar os animais não-humanos devem ocupar em um sistema moral aceitável? A teoria dos direitos de Regan aponta para a coerência como expressão de uma exigência racionale fundamenta os direitos morais de animais humanos e não-humanos a partir do princípio de igualdade. O que todos os seres humanos e alguns animais possuem em comum é o fato de serem sujeitos de uma vida, i. e., indivíduos sensíveis e conscientes de si mesmos. A partir desta condição de fato, Regan postula (...) o igual valor inerente de todos os sujeitos de uma vida, convertido em direito de ser respeitado . Os animais ainda existem na fronteira de nossos conceitos morais; sua inclusão na comunidade moral é o cerne da postura abolicionista sustentada por Regan.What place should non-human animals have in an acceptable moral system? Regan’s rightsview points out to coherence as expression of a rational demand and grounds moral rights ofhuman and non-human animals on the principle of equality. What all human beings andsome animals have in common is the property of being a subject-of-alife,i. e., of being sensitive self-conscious individuals. From this property Regan requests theequalinherent value of all subjects-of-a-life; such value will be converted into a right of berespected. Animals still exist on theborderlineof our moral concepts. Given these considerations, Regan concludes that we mustradicallyalter the ways in which we treat animals. (shrink)

In this paper I explore a new approach to the ethics of animal experimentation by conceiving of it as a form of rescue. The notion of rescue, I suggest, involves some moral agent performing an action or series of actions, whose end is to prevent or alleviate serious harm to another party, harm that otherwise would have occurred or would have continued to occur, had that moral agent not intervened. Animal experiments that are utilized as a means to alleviate human (...) illnesses mirror the structure of rescue cases and this means that we can and should apply principles of rescue to illuminate the moral status of animal experimentation. To do this I consider various principles of rescue that might justify animal experimentation. I’ll argue that all of these rescue principles are either not independently plausible, or else they fail to imply that animal experimentation is morally justified. This suggests that it is quite difficult to morally justify animal experimentation when conceived as a form of rescue. (shrink)

If we find life on another world, it will be an extremely important discovery and we will have to take great care not to do anything that might endanger that life. If the life we find is sentient we will have moral obligations to that life. Whether it is sentient or not, we have a duty to ourselves to preserve it as a study object, and also because it would be commonly seen as valuable in its own right. In addition (...) to this we would also have a duty to our fellow humans and other earthly life forms not to expose them to danger by advertently or inadvertently exposing them to potentially harmful space organisms. When space exploration turns into exploitation it will therefore be important to be able to show that a world that is up for exploitation is uninhabited before the exploitation starts. Showing that a world is uninhabited is, however, a different kind of task than showing that it is inhabited. The latter task can be accomplished through one positive finding but it is not clear how to go about the former task. In this paper I suggest that it is a gradual process asymptotically approaching certainty rather than a discovery in the traditional sense of the word. It has to be handled in two steps. The first is to connect degree of certainty with research setup. The second is to decide how certain we need to be. The first step is about the number, diversity and quality of observations. The second step is a decision we have to make based on the purpose of the investigation. The purpose and therefore the degree of certainty needed to establish that a world is uninhabited will be different for a world that is up for exploitation than for a world that is not. In the latter case it is only a matter of epistemic values. In the former case also ethical values have to be considered. (shrink)

While concerned with how man achieves his status as a moral being, Friedrich Schiller develops a concept of play that serves as a bridge between our sensuous existence to the rational, realizing moral freedom. In what ways might we extend this concept to the non-human animal? Current research by play theorists and ethologists has shown that play behaviour in animals is both complex and crucial in determining social patterns, and Schiller’s account may have anticipated these observations. I argue that through (...) Schiller’s theory of play and our current research on animal play, it is possible to undermine the systematic removal of the animal from the moral realm that happens in modern philosophy. Through play theory, there is a possible way to undermine the assumption that animals are incapable of achieving the status of moral agents, providing an alternate route to the standard view of animals as moral patients. (shrink)

If one believes that vegetarianism is morally obligatory, there are numerous ways to argue for that conclusion. In this paper, classic utilitarian and rights-based attempts to ground this obligation are considered, as well as Cora Diamond’s reframing of the debate in terms of the proper way to view other animals. After discussion of these three ways to ground the obligation and their problems, an attitude-based approach inspired by Diamond’s view is advanced. It is argued that such a view, by focusing (...) moral attention on the attitudes of agents as opposed to the actions they undertake, captures the important insights of all three views, while offering a better grounding for the obligation. This view is superior in that it succeeds in explaining the wrongness of a problem case, without committing one to rights or to a troublingly subjective understanding of moral concepts. (shrink)

It’s widely agreed that animal pain matters morally – that we shouldn’t, for instance, starve our animal companions, and that we should provide medical care to sick or injured agricultural animals, and not only because it benefits us to do so. But do we have the same moral responsibilities towards wild animals? Should we feed them if they are starving, and intervene to prevent them from undergoing other forms of suffering, for instance from predation? Using an example that includes both (...) wild and domesticated animals, I outline two contrasting ways of thinking about our moral responsibilities with respect to assisting animals that are apparently in need. One approach is based entirely around animals’ capacities; the other takes context and historical relations into account as well. While not attempting to adjudicate between these views, I’ll point out the advantages and difficulties of both. (shrink)

Even though the 3Rs are widely accepted as ethical standards when evaluating research projects using animals as experimental subjects, the ethical status of the 3Rs still remains to be clarified. The 3Rs were not derived from any ethical theory, but they represented an attempt to increase humanity to animal experimentation and at the same time to improve validity of scientific data . The aim of the present article was to provide an ethical analysis of the 3Rs through Engelhardt's bioethics theory (...) . The analysis revealed the 3Rs fitted to some extent Engelhardt ethical values. But the analysis also revealed some internal contradictions between the 3Rs and Engelhardt's ethical vaules. Although the 3Rs are still valuable tools in animal ethical evaluation, the present analysis suggests that some ethical issues still remain to be clarified. (shrink)

A combined psychological-epistemological study of the blocks that stand in the way of the human recognition of the sentience and legal rights of non-human animals. Originally published in the Lewis and Clark law journal, Animal Law, and subsequently translated into German and into Portuguese.