(2001). The Care-Based Ethic of Nazi Medicine and the Moral Importance of What We Care About. The American Journal of Bioethics: Vol. 1, No. 1, pp. 64-74.

The clinical application of the concept of patient autonomy has centered on the ability to deliberate and make treatment decisions (decisional autonomy) to the virtual exclusion of the capacity to execute the treatment plan (executive autonomy). However, the one-component concept of autonomy is problematic in the context of multiple chronic conditions. Adherence to complex treatments commonly breaks down when patients have functional, educational, and cognitive barriers that impair their capacity to plan, sequence, and carry out tasks associated with chronic care. (...) The purpose of this article is to call for a two-component re-conceptualization of autonomy and to argue that the clinical assessment of capacity for patients with chronic conditions should be expanded to include both autonomous decision-making and autonomous execution of the agreed-upon treatment plan. We explain how the concept of autonomy should be expanded to include both decisional and executive autonomy, describe the biopsychosocial correlates of the two-component concept of autonomy, and recommend diagnostic and treatment strategies to support patients with deficits in executive autonomy. (shrink)

The current time is witnessing a vast expansion in the range and influence of medical systems over the provision of care. Real care, however, is not an outcome of systems, but of ancient traditions governing medical practice.

About 1970, Van Rensselaer Potter coined the term bioethics to bring under one heading broad questions of human survival, environment, and biology. In 1971, Potter outlined a statement of principles that linked the ethics of the biological sciences with the ethics of environmental concern. Regrettably, the field that adopted his rubric bioethics immediately diverged from Potter’s interests. Bioethics has become for the most part identified with medical ethics or health care ethics and in so doing has developed few ethical principles (...) and analyses in relationship to environmental ethics. Similarly, environmental ethics seldom touches on clinical or health care issues, even though the field of environmental health has grown greatly in recent decades. It is the purpose of this article to indicate briefly some of the topics that could be treated effectively as part of a project to reconnect medical ethics and environmental ethics into what may be called sustainable bioethics. (shrink)

Two hundred years after it was first published, Mary Shelley’s Frankenstein; or, the modern Prometheus remains relevant. This novel has endured because of its literary merits and because its themes lend themselves to analysis from multiple viewpoints. Scholars from many disciplines have examined this work in relation to controversial scientific research. In this paper, we review the academic literature where Frankenstein is used to discuss ethics, bioethics, science, technology and medicine. We searched the academic literature and carried out a content (...) analysis of articles discussing the novel and films derived from it, analyzing the findings qualitatively and quantitatively. We recorded the following variables: year and language of publication, whether it referred to the novel or to a film, the academic discipline in which it was published, and the topics addressed in the analysis. Our findings indicate that the scientific literature on Frankenstein focuses mainly on science and the personality of the scientist rather than on the creature the scientist created or ethical aspects of his research. The scientist’s responsibility is central to the ethical interest of Frankenstein; this issue entails both the motivation underlying the scientist’s acts and the consequences of these acts. (shrink)

There are several key differences between the codes of ethics developed by the American Psychological Association and the Canadian Psychological Association. This paper tells the story behind the key differences between the U.S. and Canada codes. It starts with an introduction to the two countries and a brief history of what led up to the American Psychological Association’s (APA) decision to develop the world’s first ethics code for psychologists. This is followed by a description of the development process used by (...) APA, and the reasons why the Canadian Psychological Association (CPA) originally adopted the APA code but subsequently chose to develop its own “made-in-Canada” code of ethics. The key differences of the CPA code, the cultural, legal, and philosophical contexts that help explain the rationale for those differences, and why the differences have been maintained are discussed. In particular, attention is given to the CPA code’s strong focus on: (a) the concept of a contract with society; (b) aspiration vs. enforcement; (c) ethical reasoning and decision making; and (d) organizing standards around ethical principles. (shrink)

The evident remoteness between the religious postulates and the secular activity has led us to spiritual disorder and the oblivion of the authentic needs and aspirations of the human being. The current mentality and practice, towards what is considered merely useful or verifiable, has led us to this antinomy of polarized extremes, either towards an anthropocentrism that survives in a paradoxical happiness, disproportionate in the search for the strictly tangible, or towards an economic or ecological discourse that forgets the ontological (...) idea, and the authentic value and meaning of the human being. From a positive and normative analysis, this study aims to emphasize the importance of the so-called 'Integral Training’, taught by some university centers, as a promoter of the psychological and spiritual well-being, as well as the attitudes of sustainable entrepreneurship, in an ethical way and responsible. (shrink)

In 1927, Fritz Jahr coined the term “bioethics” to indicate an “environmental ethics based on biopsychics”. In 1970, Van Rensselaer Potter also coined the term “bioethics” to indicate a “new global ethics based on biology”. As the same Potter wrote, after 1971 “in the USA there was an immediate explosion of the use of the word bioethics” but with a completely different meaning which became dominant and spread worldwide. He went on to say, “their [the public's] image of bioethics delayed (...) the [global] emergence of what now exists”. Elsewhere I have analyzed how this happened, here I analyze why. (shrink)

The subject-matter of this essay is the moral status of nature. This subject is dealt with in terms of normative reasons. The main question is if there are direct normative reasons to care for nature in addition to the numerous indirect normative reasons that there are for doing so. Roughly, if there is some such reason, and that reason applies to any moral agent, then nature has direct moral status as I use the phrase. I develop the notions of direct (...) normative reason and direct moral status in detail and identify and discuss the two main types of theory according to which nature has direct moral status: analogy-based nature-considerism and non-analogy-based nature-considerism. I argue for the plausibility of a particular version of the latter, but against the plausibility of any version of the former. The theory that is representative of AN claims that nature has direct moral status in virtue of possessing interests. Proponents of this theory fail to show that nature has interests of the kind that they reasonably want to ascribe to it, and that interests of this kind are morally significant. In contrast to AN, NN comes in a variety of different forms. I elaborate a version of NN according to which there are direct normative reasons to care for nature in virtue of its unique complexity, and its indispensability. I argue that even if these reasons should turn out not to apply to any moral agent, they are still genuine direct normative reasons: there is nothing irrational or misdirected about them. Finally, I show how the question of whether there are direct normative reasons to care for nature is relevant to private and political decision-making concerning nature. This is exemplified with a case from the Swedish mountain region. (shrink)

Edgar Morin’s thought provides us with some clues on understanding the relation between bioethics and ecology. The first one is ethics of life. The second is science of ecosystems –living units. Basically, both have life as their object, but from different perspectives. Edgar Morin is able to relate them thanks to his complex thought, which shows the necessity of departing from systemic thinking. This study thereby presents some of the conceptual difficulties that appear when examining the relationship between these two (...) sciences: the question of anthropocentrism. (shrink)

Kevin T. Fitzgerald, S.J.; Knowledge Without Wisdom: Human Genetic Engineering Without Religious Insight, Christian bioethics: Non-Ecumenical Studies in Medical.

The human individual has been preoccupied with the phenomenon of death since death expresses the end of the existence on earth. The issue of life and death has not lost its actuality, whereas nowadays life extension is considered the ultimate goal of scientists. The aim of this article is to highlight the problems that will arise along with the achievement of eternal life. In this regard, I shall focus on human enhancement and the principle of procreative beneficence as means of (...) achieving this objective. In addition, I shall bring into question the fact that the principles of bioethics are being violated along with human enhancement: the principle of respect for autonomy and beneficence, avoiding harm-causing behaviours and the principle of justice. Given that the researchers in the field of transhumanism argue that the penetration of the new technologies into the private sphere of the individual is inevitable, I shall present arguments that prove the fact that the principles of bioethics are being violated along with the achievement of eternal life, given that human enhancement is only accessible for an elite both in terms of costs as well as in terms of the Christian values. (shrink)

Gender greatly impacts access to opportunities, potential, and success in corporate leadership roles. We begin with a general presentation of why such discussion is necessary for basic considerations of justice and fairness in gender equality and how the issues we raise must impact any ethical perspective on gender in the corporate workplace. We continue with a breakdown of the central categories affecting the success of women in corporate leadership roles. The first of these includes gender-influenced behavioral factors, such as the (...) requirements and expectations of gendered verbal and nonverbal communication styles as well as appearance. We move on to address the impact of family on corporate leadership opportunities and success, discussing the asymmetrical evaluation of an individual’s potential, authority, and competence based on gender stereotypes of familial obligations and expectations. Finally, we address how gender impacts access to networking and sponsorship opportunities and the long-term effects of systematic limitations on women’s inclusion in the upper echelons of corporate leadership. We conclude with a summary of the questions and issues raised by our discussion and direct individuals to consider how different ethical systems and moral requirements might influence their interpretations of gender and leadership in the corporate workplace. (shrink)

A sudden paradigm shift has resulted in governmental measures that greatly impact the scope in which the ethics committees in Germany can perform their task of providing expert opinions for clinical research. The so-called “revaluation” of the Medical Device Law Deutsches Medizinproduktegesetz—MPG) is, in our opinion, not based on sound political and professional judgment. In accordance with the changed regulations, ethics committees are now seen as being sub-organs of the state medical associations or the medical faculties and are therefore official (...) authorities. It follows that the votes of ethics committees are then “sovereign acts” or authoritative measures! However, equality and justice speak against this misleading conclusion and its resulting consequence that an ethics committee’s vote is a sovereign act. This has, in turn, resulted in the public ethics committees obtaining their long-sought goal of having a state-sanctioned monopoly. The private ethics committees are not recognized as being authoritative bodies, nor are they to be seen as such in the future (i.e. such a status has been denied the Freiburg Ethics Commission International (FEKI) in Baden-Württemberg). This political mistake must be corrected, otherwise, conducting clinical research will become increasingly difficult. (shrink)

(2005). Between Morality and Repentance: Recapturing “Sin” for Bioethics. Christian Bioethics: Vol. 11, No. 2, pp. 93-132.

: Its promises to the contrary notwithstanding, bioethics is plural. There is a diversity of content-full moral understandings of the good and the right. Moreover, there is no secular means in principle to set this diversity aside without begging the question. This moral diversity exists both as a sociological condition and as a moral epistemological constraint. Without succumbing to a metaphysical scepticism or moral relativism, the bioethics of the future, if it is to be honest, should learn how to live (...) with robust moral diversity. (shrink)

This collection of papers were originally presented during conferences on ethics in science and technology that UNESCO’s Regional Unit for Social and Human Sciences (RUSHSAP) has been convening since 2005. Since intercultural communication and information-sharing are essential components of these deliberations, the books also provide theme-related discourse from the conferences.

Again and again utopian hopes are connected with the life sciences (no hunger, health for everyone; life without diseases, longevity), but simultaneously serious research shows uncertain, incoherent, and ambivalent results. It is unrealistic to expect that these uncertainties will disappear. We start by providing a not exhaustive list of five different types of uncertainties end-users of nutrigenomics have to cope with without being able to perceive them as risks and to subject them to risk-analysis. First, genes connected with the human (...) body or nutrients can have different functions in interaction with their environment (for instance, one nutrient can be healthy for the heart, but can also be a high risk in relation to cancer). Secondly, uncertainties are formed by risk analyses. Will it be possible to calculate a certain risk of getting a certain condition with a certain lifestyle? Will it be difficult to separate the genetic component and the lifestyle component? How high will these risks be? How will these risks be handled by the actors? In the case of personal genotyping, it is unclear how frequent an adverse polymorphism will occur. Will every individual have a certain vulnerability to a certain disease or will it only be applicable to a small group of the population or particular populations? Thirdly, dietary advices are subject to uncertainties and still to be developed professional standards: some will have adverse outcomes, some will not delay the disease, and some will assume uncertain associations between nutrients, lifestyle, and genetic vulnerabilities. Fourth, with regard to the usefulness of tests it is uncertain to what extent risks indications about obesity and diabetes and other vulnerabilities really influence people to live healthier and therefore will help to prevent these conditions. Fifth, it is uncertain how and what nutrigenomics products will be developed and used. Will it be possible to develop more effectively health improving products? Or is this too difficult and will nutrigenomics continue to be used in not always justified health claims as a commercial and marketing tool? Present-day ethics and theories of responsibilities presuppose that uncertainties will disappear and concentrate on what seems to be fixed and stable in science. We develop provisional thoughts that assume that the dynamic of science to produce uncertainties and dilemmas is endemic, and we stress the need for consumers to institutionalize value searching, exploring, and deliberating devices in the health and food sector to find out the most important uncertainties and correspondingly socially desirable research priorities. (shrink)

For ten years, 1971–1981, the Institute onHuman Values in Medicine (IHVM) played a keyrole in the development of Bioethics as afield. We have written this history andanalysis to bring to new generations ofBioethicists information about the developmentof their field within both the humanitiesdisciplines and the health professions. Thepioneers in medical humanities and ethics cametogether with medical professionals in thedecade of the 1960s. By the 1980s Bioethics wasa fully recognized discipline. We show the rolethat IHVM programs played in defining thefield, training (...) faculty and helping schools todevelop programs. We review the beginnings ofthe IHVM in the crucible of social andtechnological change that led to theestablishment of the IHVM's parentorganization, the Society for Health and HumanValues. We then turn to the IHVM programsthrough which Faculty members receivedfellowships to explore new crossovers betweenthe humanities and the health professions. Wehave not only described the Fellows Program asit existed in 1973–1980, but have completed asurvey of the fellows a quarter of a centuryafter they held their fellowships. We describeother IHVM programs designed to facilitate theinitiation and development of new humanitiesprograms, to explore conceptual issues betweenmedicine and five humanities fields, to conductissue driven or educational method conferencesand to advance humanities programs intograduate education through the Directors ofMedical Education. (shrink)