ABSTRACTThe article compares Rousseau’s and Wollstonecraft’s views on the imagination. It is argued that though Wollstonecraft was evidently influenced by Rousseau, there are significant differences between their views. These differences are grounded in their different views on the faculty of reason and its relation to the passions. Whereas Rousseau characterizes reason as a derivative faculty, grounded in the more primary faculty of perfectibility, Wollstonecraft perceives reason as the faculty defining human nature. It is argued that contrary to what is often (...) assumed, Wollstonecraft’s conception of the imagination is not primarily characterized by its Romantic features, but rather by the close affinity she posits between reason and the imagination. This close affinity has several consequences. One consequence is that she is less worried than Rousseau about the imagination wandering without external constrains, because she believes in reason’s ability to guide the imagination by choosing its objects. Ultimately the difference between Rousseau’s and Wollstonecraft’s views on the imagination helps us understand why she was a passionate philosopher of the Enlightenment while he was one of its first, perceptive and most articulate critics. (shrink)

Rousseau's conception of virtue is puzzling, for he sometimes defines virtue as self-mastery and sometimes as patriotism. The prevailing Kantian interpretation emphasizes the first definition with its man-citizen thesis, while attributing the latter to Rousseau's inconsistency. This article challenges this reading and argues that Rousseau intentionally operates with two conceptions of virtue: political virtue as love of fatherland and moral virtue as love of humanity. While the former relies on a state-level amour-propre that draws motivation from the division between nations, (...) the latter hinges on conscience—an intelligent form of amour de soi—that reaches universal humanity. Underlying the two virtues is the irreconcilable tension between nature and politics. Where nature demands universal happiness incorporating all humans, politics necessitates passions that entail division. Retrieving Rousseau's dual conception of virtue highlights Rousseau's fundamental pessimism toward human politics, which has been blurred in the emerging Kantian-liberal scholarship. (shrink)

Over the last decade, philosophers of education have begun taking a renewed interest in Rousseau’s educational thought. This is a welcome development as his ideas are rich with educational insights. His philosophy is not without its flaws, however. One significant flaw is his educational project for females, which is sexist in the highest degree. Rousseau argues that females should be taught to “please men…and make [men’s] lives agreeable and sweet.” The question becomes how could Rousseau make such strident claims, especially (...) in light of his far more insightful ideas concerning the education of males. This paper attempts to make sense of Rousseau’s ideas on the education of females. While I maintain that Rousseau’s project for Sophie ought to be rejected, I argue that we should try to understand how this otherwise insightful thinker could make such surprising claims. Is it a bizarre inconsistency in his philosophical reasoning or an expression of his unabashed misogyny, as so many have claimed? I argue that it is neither. Rather, it is a product of his conception of human happiness and his belief in the irreducible role human sexual relations has in achieving and prolonging that happiness. For Rousseau, sex, love and happiness are inextricably connected, and he believes that men and women will be happiest when they inhabit certain sex roles—not because sex roles are valuable in themselves, but because only through them can either men or women hope to be happy. (shrink)

The following is a reflection on the possibility of teaching by example, and especially as the idea of teaching by example is developed in the work of Jean-Jacques Rousseau. My thesis is that Rousseau created a literary version of himself in his writings as an embodiment of his philosophy, rather in the same way and with the same purpose that Plato created a version of Socrates. This figure of Rousseau—a sort of philosophical portrait of the man of nature—is represented as (...) an example for us to follow. This would appear to have been dangerous and destabilizing work, given the mental distress that it caused Rousseau in striving to live up to his fictional self. Rousseau's own ideas on the nature of teaching by example are presented in a discussion of the section in ‘Emile’ which Rousseau takes from an incident in his own life—the story of his meeting with a young Savoyard priest who befriended him and influenced him through the power of his example. (shrink)

Rousseau insisted that his First Discourse, the Discourse on the Sciences and Arts, was chronically misread. This essay suggests that readers have tended to interpret the Discourse too narrowly. While Rousseau did link popular enlightenment with the corruption of virtue, he defined virtue as the combination of two qualities that are both separable from moral integrity and good citizenship: strength and vigor of soul. Clarifying the definition of virtue in the Discourse helps clarify Rousseau’s philosophical “system that is true but (...) distressing.” It also adds to the plausibility of Rousseau’s argument. (shrink)