This paper addresses the role of disagreement in relation to the goals of metaphysical inquiry. In particular, I will discuss two reactions to Kant’s initial observation that metaphysics does not make any lasting progress: Kant’s own demand for a critical revision of metaphysics and Schelling’s ideas as presented in his 1821 lecture On the Nature of Philosophy as a Science. Kant’s account allows for an appreciation of metaphysical conflict as a necessary precondition for a critically revised system of pure reason. (...) However, he thinks that such a system will ultimately replace all previous ones and thereby make further development of metaphysics obsolete. Although Schelling appropriates Kant’s notion of systematicity, he arrives at a positive evaluation of metaphysical disagreement as an expression of freedom which articulates itself within the history of metaphysics. I argue that Schelling’s view also entails that the history of metaphysics is an ongoing process rather than terminating in an ultimate system or a withdrawal from metaphysical inquiry. Thus, we get to see a) that Kant himself (not just his post-Kantian successors) entertains an account of the essential historicity of reason and b) how Schelling both preserves and transforms the Kantian legacy of a philosophical history of metaphysics. (shrink)