In "Public Health and Precarity," Michael Doan and Ami Harbin have done important work extending Sherwin's concept of relational autonomy to encompass relational agency—including agents such as communities and states. This opens up new ways of thinking about responsibility for public health in long-standing debates about the role of the state in public health.The case studies Doan and Harbin analyze are also important for thinking of the account of relational solidarity that Sherwin developed together with Baylis and Kenny, one element (...) of relational public health. The discussion may even open the space for a reformulation of relational solidarity. I will use the... (shrink)

Systems of universal health coverage may aspire to provide care based on need and not ability to pay; the complexities of this aspiration call for normative analysis. This special issue arises in the wake of a judicial inquiry into preferential access in the Canadian province of Alberta, the Vertes Commission. I describe this inquiry and set out a taxonomy of forms of differential and preferential access. Papers in this special issue focus on the conceptual specification of health system boundaries and (...) on the normative questions raised by complex models of funding and delivery of care, where patients, providers, and services cross system boundaries. (shrink)

In bioethics and health policy, we often discuss the appropriate boundaries of public funding; how the interface of public and private purchasers and providers should be organized and regulated receives less attention. In this paper, I discuss ethical and regulatory issues raised at this interface by three medical practice models in which physicians provide insured services while requiring or requesting that patients pay for services or for the non-insured services of the physicians themselves or their associates. This choice for such (...) practice models is different from the decision to design an insurance plan to include or exclude user fees, co-payments and deductibles. I analyze the issues raised with regards to familiar health care values of equity and efficiency, while highlighting additional concerns about fair terms of access, provider integrity, and fair competition. I then analyze the common Canadian regulatory response to block fee models, considering their extension to wellness clinics, with regards to fiduciary standards governing the physician–patient relationship and the role of informed consent. I close by highlighting briefly issues that are of common concern across different fundamental normative frameworks for health policy. (shrink)

In this paper, I argue that addressing the medical needs of older persons warrants expanding the array of insured services as described by the Canada Health Act to include home care. The growing importance of chronic care supports my call for federally regulated home care services as the nature of disease management has changed significantly in the last decades. In addition, if the values of equity, fairness and solidarity, which are the keystone values of the CHA, are to be upheld (...) within the current social and demographic context, then Canada’s health care system should adapt accordingly. I focus my argument on the services provided to older persons for two main reasons. First, the changing nature of disease management is best seen in this population. If it is to be successfully argued that the transformations in medicine warrant an expansion of insured services covered by the CHA, it will be best illustrated by looking at the needs of older persons. Second, with the demographic shift looming large in the policy agenda, an exploration of this issue is not only crucial but timely. (shrink)

Principles of need are constantly referred to in health care priority setting. The common denominator for any principle of need is that it will ascribe some kind of special normative weight to people being worse off. However, this common ground does not answer the question how a plausible principle of need should relate to the aggregation of benefits across individuals. Principles of need are sometimes stated as being incompatible with aggregation and sometimes characterized as accepting aggregation in much the same (...) way as utilitarians do. In this paper we argue that if one wants to take principles of need seriously both of these positions have unreasonable implications. We then characterize and defend a principle of need consisting of sufficientarian elements as well as prioritarian which avoids these unreasonable implications. (shrink)