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  1. Explaining Games: The Epistemic Programme in Game Theory.Boudewijn de Bruin - 2010 - Dordrecht, Netherland: Springer.
    Contents. Introduction. 1. Preliminaries. 2. Normal Form Games. 3. Extensive Games. 4. Applications of Game Theory. 5. The Methodology of Game Theory. Conclusion. Appendix. Bibliography. Index. Does game theory—the mathematical theory of strategic interaction—provide genuine explanations of human behaviour? Can game theory be used in economic consultancy or other normative contexts? Explaining Games: The Epistemic Programme in Game Theory—the first monograph on the philosophy of game theory—is an attempt to combine insights from epistemic logic and the philosophy of science to (...)
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  • The Backward Induction Argument.John W. Carroll - 2000 - Theory and Decision 48 (1):61-84.
    The backward induction argument purports to show that rational and suitably informed players will defect throughout a finite sequence of prisoner's dilemmas. It is supposed to be a useful argument for predicting how rational players will behave in a variety of interesting decision situations. Here, I lay out a set of assumptions defining a class of finite sequences of prisoner's dilemmas. Given these assumptions, I suggest how it might appear that backward induction succeeds and why it is actually fallacious. Then, (...)
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  • Dependency Equilibria and the Causal Structure of Decision and Game Situation.Wolfgang Spohn - unknown
    The paper attempts to rationalize cooperation in the one-shot prisoners' dilemma (PD). It starts by introducing (and preliminarily investigating) a new kind of equilibrium (differing from Aumann's correlated equilibria) according to which the players' actions may be correlated (sect. 2). In PD the Pareto-optimal among these equilibria is joint cooperation. Since these equilibria seem to contradict causal preconceptions, the paper continues with a standard analysis of the causal structure of decision situations (sect. 3). The analysis then raises to a reflexive (...)
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  • (2 other versions)Common Knowledge.Peter Vanderschraaf - 2022 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    One does not simply predict where the other will go, which is wherever the first predicts the second to predict the first to go, and so ad infinitum. Not "What would I do if I were she?" but "What would I do if I were she wondering what she would do if she were wondering what I would do if I were she...?".
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  • Common Knowledge of Rationality in Extensive Games.Boudewijn de Bruin - 2008 - Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 49 (3):261-280.
    We develop a logical system that captures two different interpretations of what extensive games model, and we apply this to a long-standing debate in game theory between those who defend the claim that common knowledge of rationality leads to backward induction or subgame perfect (Nash) equilibria and those who reject this claim. We show that a defense of the claim à la Aumann (1995) rests on a conception of extensive game playing as a one-shot event in combination with a principle (...)
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  • (2 other versions)Common knowledge.Peter Vanderschraaf - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
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  • (2 other versions)A centipede for intransitive preferrers.Wlodek Rabinowicz - 2000 - Studia Logica 67 (2):167-178.
    In the standard money pump, an agent with cyclical preferences can avoid exploitation if he shows foresight and solves his sequential decision problem using backward induction (BI). This way out is foreclosed in a modified money pump, which has been presented in Rabinowicz (2000). There, BI will lead the agent to behave in a self-defeating way. The present paper describes another sequential decision problem of this kind, the Centipede for an Intransitive Preferrer, which in some respects is even more striking (...)
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