If Wolff from the very beginning was strongly influenced by Cartesianism, and his concept of system was guided by the geometric model of scientific method, Leibniz relies on the German tradition of “methodological thinking”, originated by Joachim Jung. Leibniz’s conception of sys-tem focuses mainly on algebraic analysis. The application of the term “system” mainly to meta-physics can be explained by the fact that it is this science that deals with synthetic principles and is designed to develop a rational view of (...) the world. Based on the idea of “real metaphysics”, Leibniz justifies these principles as such that make possible the laws of physics and rational discourse in general. Leibniz does not provide a system of philosophy in the sense of traditional school philos-ophy. He considers metaphysics as the most consistent expression of a systematic mind and indi-cates heuristic principles for the construction and improvement of reasonable hypotheses. (shrink)

This dissertation examines Locke's and Leibniz' explanation of the origin and nature of the world. As Leibniz writes in his "De Rerum Originatione Radicali," which is used as a guide to the issues addressed, this project involves answering two questions: "Why is there a world at all?" and "Why is the world the way it is?" Both Leibniz and Locke answer the first question by way of a cosmological argument for the existence of God as the first cause of the (...) world. I explicate and criticize these arguments. I also examine the metaphysical and theological presuppositions of the arguments. Leibniz's and Locke's views on the structure and intelligibility of the world answer the second question. (shrink)

En sus últimos años, Leibniz emplea el concepto de necesidad moral para cualificar la elección divina de lo óptimo. Sin embargo, Leibniz no explica este concepto con precisión. El presente trabajo intenta mostrar que la necesidad moral leibniziana no puede entenderse como una modalidad puramente deóntica, porque ello contraría los fundamentos metafísicos que hacen al carácter teleológico de su ética. El artículo propone también una interpretación del contenido alético de tal noción, basada en la conexión necesaria que Leibniz parece atribuir (...) a la relación entre la voluntad y la tendencia al bien. Dicha necesidad afirmaría que, aun cuando toda elección es contingente, en tanto entraña una infinidad de consideraciones, el Dios leibniziano está metafísicamente necesitado a seguir el criterio de lo mejor. In his last years, Leibniz employs the concept of moral necessity to qualify God's choice of the best. However, he doesn't explain this concept accurately. This paper intends to show that leibnizian moral necessity cannot be conceived as a purely deontic modality, because it would be contrary to the metaphysical grounds which make Leibniz's ethics strictly teleological. This paper also proposes an interpretation of the alethic content of this concept, based on the necessary connection that Leibniz seems to assign to the relationship between free will and the tendency towards good. What this necessity entails is that, for Leibniz, even though the infinity of reasons involved makes every choice contingent, God is metaphysically necessitated to follow the rule of the best. (shrink)

The proposition "God chooses the best" is for Leibniz an undeniable truth, as well as a fundamental premise in both his explanation of this world's existence and his theodicy. Leibniz thought it was necessary to clarify its modal status, in virtue of this matter's connection with God's freedom. Nevertheless, while dealing with this problem, he was led to violate his own modal theory's principles, in order to sustain the contingency of that proposition. This paper intends to show that Leibniz's main (...) view regarding the modality of this proposition represents a sort of exception in the framework of his modal conception, and that this uncertainty reveals the profound reasons of his numerous textual hesitations on the subject. (shrink)