This paper explains how to obtain quantification over times in a tense logic in which all temporal distinctions are ultimately spelled out in terms of the two simple tense operators “it was the case that” and “it will be the case that.” The account of times defended here is similar to what is known as “linguistic ersatzism” about possible worlds, but there are noteworthy differences between these two cases. For example, while linguistic ersatzism would support actualism, the view of times (...) defended here does not support presentism. (shrink)

This article surveys some of the key issues that arise when one tries to use tense logic as a metaphysical theory of the nature of time. Topics discussed include basic tense logic, tense logic and verb tense, the structure of the time series, instants of time, quantified tense logic, and the expressive resources of tense logic.

This article argues that the causal loops that occur in some time-travel scenarios and in certain solutions of the theory of relativity are no more mysterious than the infinitely descending causal chains familiar from Newtonian mechanics.

A conjecture of Gabbay (1981) states that any class of flows of time having the property known as finite H-dimension admits a finite set of expressively complete one-dimensional temporal connectives. Here we show that the class of 'circular' structures refutes the generalisation of this conjecture to Kripke frames. We then construct from this class, by a general method, a new class of irreflexive transitive flows of time that refutes the original conjecture. Our paper includes full descriptions of a method for (...) establishing finite H-dimension for a class of structures and of the technique for extending finite H-dimension to other classes, and an introduction surveying the area of expressive completeness. (shrink)

ABSTRACT We critically review two extant paradigms for understanding the systematic interaction between modality and tense, as well as their respective modifications designed to do justice to the contingency of time’s structure and composition. We show that on either type of theory, as well as their respective modifications, some principles prove logically valid whose truth might sensibly be questioned on metaphysical grounds. These considerations lead us to devise a more general logical framework that allows accommodation of those metaphysical views that (...) its predecessors rule out by fiat. (shrink)