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Robert Baker and Rosamond Rhodes each argue against the universality “common morality,” the approach to ethics that comprises four fundamental principles and their application in various settings. Baker contends that common morality cannot account for cultural diversity in the world and claims that a human rights approach is superior in the context of global health. Rhodes maintains that bioethics is not reducible to common morality because medical professionals have special privileges and responsibilities that people lack in everyday life. Baker fails (...) |
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Rosamond Rhodes makes a persuasive case for the view that medical ethics does not derive from common morality.1 Rhodes identifies the challenge that immediately arises and its corollary: Whence the origin of medical ethics? And, should we understand medical ethics as autonomous? From the perspective of professional ethics in medicine, the first question can now be restated: Whence the origin of the ethical concept of medicine as a profession, the basis of the ethical obligations of physicians in patient care, research, (...) |
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One of the fundamental challenges in any field of practical ethics is to articulate a framework for deliberation and decision making that is capable of providing warranted guidance about contentious ethical questions.1 Such a framework has to function effectively in the face of empirical uncertainty and what Rawls refers to as the fact of reasonable pluralism—the fact that individuals often differ in their ideals, ambitions, preferences and conceptions of the good life. One of the perennial questions in normative and metaethics (...) |
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In a recent paper, Doernberg and Truog identify that physicians must routinely navigate a set of distinct “moral spheres”—clinical care, research, population health and the market.1 While the conce... |
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I published my first article in the Journal of Medical Ethics back in 2007 as an (almost) newly minted PhD. It was a proud moment. I respected the JME as a journal where I had read some of the most tightly argued and challenging essays in the literature. They inspired me to specialise in medical ethics and rethink some of my fundamental positions on various topics. This has been the case since, and I am proud now to join the editorial (...) |
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Rhodes seeks to defend her ‘conclusion that everyday ethics and medical ethics [are] incompatible’.1 She challenges ‘views that medical ethics is nothing more than common morality applied to clinical matters’ (Rhodes, p2).1 Beauchamp and Childress explicate the term ‘common morality’ at length.2 Nowhere do they claim that medical ethics is ‘nothing more than common morality applied to clinical matters’. Here is what they do say: “The origin of the norms of the common morality is no different in principle from the (...) |
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In her paper ‘Why Not Common Morality?’, Rosamond Rhodes argues (1) that medical ethics cannot and should not be derived from common morality and (2) that medical ethics should instead be conceptualised as professional ethics and the content left to the medical profession to develop and decide.1 I have considerable sympathy with the first claim and have myself argued along somewhat similar lines.2 I am, however, very sceptical about elements of the second claim and will briefly explain why (see my (...) |
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In responding to my critics, James Childress, Tom Beauchamp, Soren Holm, and Ruth Macklin, I reprise my arguments for medical ethics being an uncommon morality. I also elaborate on points that required further clarification. I explain the role of trust and trustworthiness in the creation of a profession. I also describe my views on the relationship of the medical profession to the society in which medicine is practiced. Finally, I defend my claim that medical ethics “is constructed by medical professionals (...) |
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To inform the ongoing discussion of whether claims of conscientious objection allow medical professionals to refuse to perform tasks that would otherwise be their duty, this paper begins with a review of the philosophical literature that describes conscience as either a moral sense or the dictate of reason. Even though authors have starkly different views on what conscience is, advocates of both approaches agree that conscience should be obeyed and that keeping promises is a conscience-given moral imperative. The paper then (...) |
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I am grateful to the esteemed commentators for their critiques of my paper, ‘Why Not Common Morality’.1 As I read through their remarks, however, they seemed to be talking past my arguments. Their criticisms nevertheless make it clear that I need to explain myself better. I am therefore grateful to the editor for allowing me this opportunity to clarify my position. My paper presented two arguments for concluding that common morality is untenable as an account of medical ethics. First, I (...) |
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The JME editorial team selects its feature articles from the best papers accepted for publication based on their quality, novelty and capacity to move debate forward on a specific issue. Feature articles are made freely available and are published alongside reviewed and submitted commentaries. We do this partly to promote and acknowledge excellent work in medical ethics, but also to encourage authors to submit their best papers to the JME. JME feature articles have deepened the analysis of some central issues (...) |
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I heartily agree with Sam Doernberg and Robert Troug’s claims that there are important differences between “general morality” and medical ethics, and that in some instances they issue contradictory... |
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Rosamond Rhodes has written a welcome, clear, and expansive yet precise book that challenges the hegemonic influence of principlism in biomedical ethics and presents a viable alternative. At the outset, Rhodes critiques the idea of common morality underpinning the four principles from Tom Beauchamp and James Childress's Principles of Biomedical Ethics and ten rules from Bernard Gert, Charles Culver, and K. Danner Clouser in Bioethics: A Systematic Approach. Rhodes not only argues for why medicine is unlike everyday practices and requires (...) |
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