Against the view that symbol-based semiosis is a human cognitive uniqueness, we have argued that non-human primates such as African vervet monkeys possess symbolic competence, as formally defined by Charles S. Peirce. Here I develop this argument by showing that the equivocal role ascribed to symbols by “folk semiotics” stems from an incomplete application of the Peircean logical framework for the classification of signs, which describes three kinds of symbols: rheme, dicent and argument. In an attempt to advance in the (...) classifying semiotic processes, Peirce proposed several typologies, with different degrees of refinement. Around 1903, he developed a division into ten classes. According to this typology, symbols can be further analysed in three subclasses (rheme, dicent, argument). I proceed to demonstrate that vervet monkeys employ dicent symbols. There are remarkable implications of this argument since ‘symbolic species theory’ fails to explore the vast Peircean semiotic philosophy to frame questions regarding the emergence and evolution of symbolic processes. (shrink)

Este artigo foi composto a partir da comunicação apresentada no Ciclo de conferências "Humanos e animais: os limites da humanidade", promovido pelo IEA/USP. Já bastante modificado desde então, o texto incorpora ainda comentários de interlocutores de diferentes áreas ou perspectivas de conhecimento, de modo a explicitar tanto as dificuldades quanto o caráter promissor de tais esforços interdisciplinares. No mesmo passo, as reflexões do artigo emergem do exame de uma bibliografia heterogênea, mas que, conforme o tratamento aqui despendido, converge para a (...) urgência contemporânea de se conceber e praticar um outro pacto entre os humanos modernos e os animais, sem o qual o próprio humanismo ver-se-á ameaçado. Para outro humanismo, outra natureza insiste em pedir passagem. This article was composed from a communication presented in the cycle of conferences "Humans and animals: the limits of humanity", promoted by IEA/USP. Amply modified since then, the text incorporates commentaries of interlocutors from different areas or perspectives of knowledge, so as making explicit both the difficulties and the promising character of such interdisciplinary efforts. In the same time, the reflections of the article emerge from the use of a heterogeneous bibliography, but that, in conformity with the treatment here used, converges to the contemporary urgency of conceiving and practicing another pact between modern humans and the animals. Without this pact humanism itself will be menaced. For other humanism, another nature insists in asking its place. (shrink)

Mimicry and deception are two important issues in studies about animal communication. The reliability of animal signs and the problem of the benefits of deceiving in sign exchanges are interesting topics in the evolution of communication. In this paper, we intend to contribute to an understanding of deception by studying the case of aggressive signal mimicry in fireflies, investigated by James Lloyd. Firefly femmes fatales are specialized in mimicking the mating signals of other species of fireflies with the purpose of (...) attracting responding males to become their prey. These aggressive mimics are a major factor in the survival and reproduction of both prey and predator. It is a case of deception through active falsification of information that leads to efficient predation by femmes fatales fireflies and triggered evolutionary processes in their preys’ communicative behaviors. There are even nested coevolutionary interactions between these fireflies, leading to a remarkable system of deceptive and counterdeceptive signaling behaviors. We develop here a semiotic model of firefly deception and also consider ideas advanced by Lloyd about the evolution of communication, acknowledging that deception can be part of the explanation of why communication evolves towards increasing complexity. Increasingly complex sign exchanges between fireflies evolve in an extremely slow pace. Even if deceptive maneuvers are played out time and time again between particular firefly individuals, the evolution of the next level of complexity—and thus the next utterance in the dialogue between species—is likely to take an immense amount of generations. (shrink)

Based on formal-theoretical principles about the sign processes involved, we have built synthetic experiments to investigate the emergence of communication based on symbols and indexes in a distributed system of sign users, following theoretical constraints from C.S.Peirce theory of signs, following a Synthetic Semiotics approach. In this paper, we summarize these computational experiments and results regarding associative learning processes of symbolic sign modality and cognitive conditions in an evolutionary process for the emergence of either symbol-based or index-based communication.

This chapter presents a detailed explanation of Peirce’s early and late views on semiotic indeterminacy and then considers how those views might be applied within biosemiotics. Peirce distinguished two different forms of semiotic indeterminacy: generality and vagueness. He defined each in terms of the “right” that indeterminate signs extend, either to their interpreters in the case of generality or to their utterers in the case of vagueness, to further determine their meaning. On Peirce’s view, no sign is absolutely determinate, i.e., (...) every sign is indeterminate to at least some degree and so exhibits some degree of generality or vagueness. If Peirce was right about this, then no instance of biosemiosis is completely determinate—every biosign must be general or vague to some degree. I show that on Peirce’s view, whether a sign is general or vague depends on its immediate object, “the idea which the sign is built upon,” and I explain how Peirce would go about identifying the immediate object of a sign lacking both a minded utterer and a minded interpreter—an identification that must be possible if any biosign is indeterminate. (shrink)

Biosemiotics is a growing fi eld that investigates semiotic processes in the living realm in an attempt to combine the fi ndings of the biological sciences and semiotics. Semiotic processes are more or less what biologists have typically referred to as “ signals, ” “ codes, ”and “ information processing ”in biosystems, but these processes are here understood under the more general notion of semiosis, that is, the production, action, and interpretation of signs. Thus, biosemiotics can be seen as biology (...) interpreted as a study of living sign systems — which also means that semiosis or sign process can be seen as the very nature of life itself. In other words, biosemiotics is a field of research investigating semiotic processes (meaning, signification, communication, and habit formation in living systems) and the physicochemical preconditions for sign action and interpretation. -/- (...). (shrink)