Richard Hare argues that the fundamental assumptions of Kant's ethical system should have led Kant to utilitarianism, had Kant not confused a norm's generality with its universality, and hence adopted rigorist, deontological norms. Several authors, including Jens Timmermann, have argued contra Hare that the gap between Kantian and utilitarian/consequentialist ethics is fundamental and cannot be bridged. This article shows that Timmermann's claims rely on a systematic failure to separate normative and metaethical aspects of each view, and that Hare's attempt to (...) bridge the gap between Kantian and consequentialist ethics is immune to Timmermann's criticisms. Furthermore, the term “Kantian ethics” is often misleading, and should typically be qualified as either “Kantian rationalism” or “Kantian deontology” in order to avoid confusions of the sort Timmermann falls into. (shrink)

Nach Parfit konvergieren die systematisch stärksten Versionen von Kantianismus, Regel-Konsequentialismus und Kontraktualismus in einer Triple Theory. Ich konzentriere mich auf eine der zentralen Schwierigkeiten, Kantianismus und Konsequentialismus zusammenzubringen: die Rolle von Zustimmung, welche ihren deutlichsten Ausdruck in Kants Zweck-an-sich-Formel findet. Ich zeige zunächst, wie die Einführung unparteilicher, nichtmoralischer Gründe, auf der viel Gewicht in Parfits Zustimmungsprinzip liegt, in einigen Fällen die Zweck-an-sich-Formel zu dem intuitiv richtigen Ergebnis führen kann. Anschließend wende ich mich kritisch gegen Parfit. Ich diskutiere zwei Einwände gegen (...) Parfits Zustimmungsprinzip: Das Zustimmungsprinzip ist unterbestimmt und daher nicht relevant für die Fälle, die Kantianismus und Konsequentialismus unterscheiden. Zudem lässt das Zustimmungsprinzip, wie Parfit es versteht, mehr Instrumentalisierung zu, als Parfit selbst bereit ist einzuräumen. (shrink)

Kantian respect for persons is based on the special status and dignity of humanity. There are, however, at least three distinct kinds of interpretation of the principle of respect for the dignity of persons: the contractualist conception, the substantive conception and the direct conception. Contractualist theories are the most common and familiar interpretation. The contractualist assumes that some form of consent or agreement is the crucial factor that is required by respect for persons. The substantive conceptions of dignity, on the (...) other hand, treat the concept of dignity as a substantive value that justifies a deontological conception of respect for persons. A third conception of respect for the dignity of persons, the conception that I favor, focuses directly on the special value of our rational nature. According to this consequentialist conception, we respect the dignity of persons by promoting the flourishing of rational nature. (shrink)

Abstract: This article addresses a foundational issue in Kant's moral philosophy, the question of the relation of the Categorical Imperative to value. There is an important movement in current Kant scholarship that argues that there is a value underlying the Categorical Imperative. However, some scholars have raised doubts as to whether Kant has a conception of value that could ground the Categorical Imperative. In this paper I seek to add to these doubts by arguing, first, that value would have to (...) be of a particular kind in order to be the foundation of Kant's moral philosophy. Second, I argue that Kant does not have such a conception of value, and that his arguments rule out that value could ground his moral philosophy. I then outline an alternative reading of how Kant uses ‘inner value’. My conclusion will be that Kant does not derive the Categorical Imperative from an underlying value. While some of his passages could also be read as if value were foundational for Kant, a close look at these passages and his arguments point away from this conclusion. (shrink)