In this paper, I set out to defend the claim that a central principle in democratic theory, the all-subjected principle, applies not only when one is subject to a rule by a state but also when one is subject to a rule by a ‘non-state’ unit. I argue that self-government is the value underlying the all-subjected principle that explains why a subjected individual should be included because she is subjected. Given this, it is unfounded to limit the principle to the (...) state, as subjection which threatens self-government occurs in non-state units such as corporations and families. This means that following the all-subjected principle surprisingly implies that we ought to have family and workplace democracy. (shrink)

Workplace democracy is often advocated on two intertwined views. The first is that the authority relation of employee to firm is akin to that of subject to state, such that reasons favoring democracy in the state may likewise apply to the firm. The second is that, when democratic controls are absent in the workplace, employees are liable to objectionable forms of subordination by their bosses, who may then issue arbitrary directives on matters ranging from pay to the allocation of overtime (...) and to relocation and promotion. Daniel Jacob and Christian Neuhäuser have recently submitted these views to careful criticism. They argue that the parallel between firms and states is unwarranted. For, unlike managerial authority, state authority is final. The state grants firms their legal status and subjects their authority to its regulations, which citizens in democracies already control. And they also argue that suitable workplace regulation alongside meaningful exit options may suffice to prevent, with no need for democratization, objectionable forms of workplace subjection. Neither view offers, they resolve, compelling reasons to believe that justice requires that firms be democratic. I here inspect these criticisms in turn, and offer reasons for skepticism. (shrink)

The article aims to bridge divides between political theory and management and organization studies in theorizing workplace democracy. To achieve this aim, the article begins by introducing a new definition of democracy which, it is contended, is better suited than mainstream accounts to highlight the democratizing potential of employee involvement. It then defines employee involvement as an offshoot of early twentieth-century humanistic psychologies, from which it inherits an emancipatory ambition. In a third step, the article presents employee involvement as a (...) set of organizational practices liable to transform dominant patterns of authority and social interaction in the workplace. The article concludes by contending that, apart from representation/participation and the employee’s voice, employee involvement must be considered the third necessary pillar of workplace democracy, endowed with distinctive normative features that neither representation/participation nor voices can aptly capture. (shrink)

Journal of Social Philosophy, EarlyView.

Political theorists frequently utilize the ‘firm–state analogy’ (FSA) to support the arguments for democratic governance in firms. This article presents the FSA as an analogy with both justificatory and epistemic functions. Its justificatory function provides valid justificatory strategies for workplace democracy, while its epistemic function offers models that shape the understanding of corporate power. In this article, four limitations of the justificatory function of the FSA are identified: (i) the problem of ambiguity, (ii) the boundary problem, (iii) the issue of (...) normative redundancy, and (iv) the universality problem. Furthermore, the article argues that the epistemic function of the FSA fails to adequately address some of the most concerning forms of corporate power wielded by large, particularly multinational, corporations in the realm of international trade. As a result, the FSA misses crucial reasons for the normative desirability of democracy in corporate governance. (shrink)

Apoyándose en el análisis crítico de discusiones clásicas y contemporáneas sobre democracia laboral, el artículo examina, en primer lugar, los argumentos que pueden formularse para sostener que la democratización del trabajo es posible y deseable, o, por el contrario, que es imposible o ilegítima. Se distinguen a continuación dos escenarios de democratización del trabajo: el primero piensa la democratización del trabajo como una democratización del gobierno corporativo; el segundo la concibe como una democratización de la participación en la actividad colectiva (...) del trabajo. El artículo defiende que la radicalización de la democracia exige democratizar los entornos laborales y comprender el trabajo como un espacio de formación de hábitos democráticos como la autonomía, la cooperación y la deliberación colectiva. (shrink)

L’objectif de cet article est de montrer que le républicanisme d’entreprise développé par Hsieh ne protège pas les travailleurs contre l’ensemble des interférences arbitraires. Comme ils sont fondés uniquement sur la contestation des décisions, les arrangements institutionnels que Hsieh propose n’arrivent pas à saisir l’ensemble des formes que peut prendre la domination. Pour ce faire, nous utiliserons la critique développée par McCormick des institutions républicaines. Pour exploiter cette critique et l’appliquer au contexte d’entreprise, nous aurons besoin de présenter les arguments (...) en faveur du parallèle État-entreprise. Nous verrons ensuite que la critique de McCormick appliquée à l’entreprise nous permet de défendre l’idée selon laquelle il est nécessaire d’aller plus loin que le républicanisme d’entreprise pour réaliser la liberté républicaine. (shrink)