Switch to: References

Add citations

You must login to add citations.
  1. Recanati on the Semantics/pragmatics Distinction.Manuel García-Carpintero - 2006 - Critica 38 (112):35-68.
    One of the hottest philosophical debates in recent years concerns the nature of the semantics/pragmatics divide. Some writers have expressed the reserve that this might be merely terminological, but in my view it ultimately concerns a substantive issue with empirical implications: the scope and limits of a serious scientific undertaking, formal semantics. In this critical note I discuss two arguments by Recanati: his main methodological argument --viz. that the contents posited by what he calls 'literalists' play no relevant role in (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   16 citations  
  • Pluralistic skepticism: Advertisement for speech act pluralism.Herman Cappelen - 2005 - Philosophical Perspectives 19 (1):15–39.
    Even though the lines of thought that support skepticism are extremely compelling, we're inclined to look for ways of blocking them because it appears to be an impossible view to accept, both for intellectual and practical reasons. One goal of this paper is to show that when skepticism is packaged right, it has few problematic implications (or at least fewer than is often assumed). It is, for example, compatible with all the following claims (when these are correctly interpreted).
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   12 citations  
  • Weak speech reports.Martín Abreu Zavaleta - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (8):2139-2166.
    Indirect speech reports can be true even if they attribute to the speaker the saying of something weaker than what she in fact expressed, yet not all weakenings of what the speaker expressed yield true reports. For example, if Anna utters ‘Bob and Carla passed the exam’, we can accurately report her as having said that Carla passed the exam, but we can not accurately report her as having said that either it rains or it does not, or that either (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   7 citations  
  • Content Relativism and Semantic Blindness.Herman Cappelen - 2008 - In G. Carpintero & M. Koelbel (eds.), Relative Truth. Oxford University Press. pp. 265-86.
    For some relativists some of the time the evidence for their view is a puzzling data pattern: On the one hand, there's evidence that the terms in question exhibit some kind of content stability across contexts. On the other hand, there's evidence that their contents vary from one context of use to another. The challenge is to reconcile these two sets of data. Truth relativists claim that their theory can do so better than contextualism and invariantism. Truth relativists, in effect, (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   27 citations  
  • Meaning theory and communication.Claire Horisk - 2004 - Mind and Language 19 (2):177–198.
    Strawson contends that the proper subject matter of a theory of meaning includes what is meant on an occasion of utterance. If his contention is correct, it rules out a recent proposal that Davidsonian semantic theory should limit its scope so that it does not capture the extension of what is meant or what is said. In this paper, I reject Strawson's arguments for his contention. Despite the persuasive ring of his claim that the essential character of linguistic rules is (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Testimonially based knowledge from false testimony.Sanford C. Goldberg - 2001 - Philosophical Quarterly 51 (205):512-526.
    Philosophical Quarterly 51:205, 512-26 (October 2001).
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   15 citations  
  • Bivalence and what is said.Manuel García-Carpintero - 2007 - Dialectica 61 (1):167–190.
    On standard versions of supervaluationism, truth is equated with supertruth, and does not satisfy bivalence: some truth-bearers are neither true nor false. In this paper I want to confront a well-known worry about this, recently put by Wright as follows: ‘The downside . . . rightly emphasized by Williamson . . . is the implicit surrender of the T-scheme’. I will argue that such a cost is not high: independently motivated philosophical distinctions support the surrender of the T- scheme, and (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   12 citations