This paper focuses on the research field of machine ethics and how it relates to a technological singularity—a hypothesized, futuristic event where artificial machines will have greater-than-human-level intelligence. One problem related to the singularity centers on the issue of whether human values and norms would survive such an event. To somehow ensure this, a number of artificial intelligence researchers have opted to focus on the development of artificial moral agents, which refers to machines capable of moral reasoning, judgment, and decision-making. (...) To date, different frameworks on how to arrive at these agents have been put forward. However, there seems to be no hard consensus as to which framework would likely yield a positive result. With the body of work that they have contributed in the study of moral agency, philosophers may contribute to the growing literature on artificial moral agency. While doing so, they could also think about how the said concept could affect other important philosophical concepts. (shrink)

The article consists of a re-examination of Marcuse’s Eros and Civilization in the light of continuing interest in that work. After a brief consideration of Marcuse’s attempt to use Freud to indict contemporary civilization, focusing on the concepts of surplus repression and guilt, the article turns to his utopian sketch of Eros as a culture builder and the reconciliation of reason and instinct. These themes, which form the focus of recent interest, are explored by examining Marcuse’s interpretation of Kant and (...) Schiller as well as Freud. In all cases Marcuse’s interpretation is shown to be flawed. The conclusion is that Marcuse’s attempt to indict established reason in the light of instinct and yet to hold out the prospect of a reconciliation of reason and instinct leads to an impoverished concept of both. (shrink)

Nos anos 1930 e 1940, Max Horkheimer investigou as origens da agressividade manifesta na vida social, sobretudo na forma do antissemitismo. Suas referências ao conceito de pulsão de morte divergem nestes contextos, uma distinção que se relaciona estreitamente a mudanças consideráveis em sua filosofia. A princípio, este conceito é preterido por reproduzir uma concepção ideológica que justifica e hipostasia o vínculo da civilização com a repressão pulsional, vínculo supostamente necessário em vista da ameaça de suas manifestações destrutivas para a vida (...) em sociedade. Posteriormente, no entanto, foi compreendido como sintoma do retorno do impulso mimético recalcado, em uma investigação sobre o estatuto da subjetividade desde a sua formação arcaica. Este artigo analisa as premissas destas interpretações da pulsão de morte e os conflitos em sua recepção pela teoria crítica, que lançaram as bases para uma discussão ainda em andamento sobre a sua apropriação pela teoria social. (shrink)