O conceito freudiano de impulso ou instinto é reconhecidamente um dos conceitos mais fundamentais da psicanálise. No entanto, seu sentido ainda é objeto de controvérsia. Originalmente definido por Freud num sentido biológico ou quase biológico, sua recepção em muitas das diversas tradições pós-freudianas tendeu, frequentemente, a recusar essa filiação epistemológica inicial. Um dos sinais dessa reorientação doutrinária é a recusa da tradução de Trieb por "instinto" e a preferência pelo neologismo "pulsão", de origem francesa e comum na literatura psicanalítica escrita (...) em várias das línguas neolatinas, inclusive em português. O objetivo deste artigo é criticar essa tendência. Para tanto, são examinados os principais argumentos normalmente apresentados contra uma visão biológica do Trieb freudiano, a saber: 1) a alternativa terminológica entre os termos alemães Trieb e Instinkt e o modo como estes são utilizados por Freud; 2) a crítica freudiana de uma redução da sexualidade humana à função reprodutiva; 3) o conceito de Todestrieb formulado por Freud por volta de 1920 e central na etapa final de seu pensamento. Procura-se argumentar que essas formulações não impedem uma interpretação biológica do conceito de Trieb. Essa interpretação, por sua vez, abre uma via de diálogo entre a psicanálise e a biologia, a qual é também enfática e explicitamente defendida por Freud. Uma série de formulações - oriundas, sobretudo, do campo da biologia evolucionária de orientação neodarwinista e da sociobiologia - são discutidas, com o intuito de argumentar pela sua compatibilidade, se não pela sua convergência, com as teses freudianas. A primeira parte deste trabalho introduziu a questão e também abordou o problema da relação entre sexualidade e reprodução na psicanálise e na biologia. Esta segunda parte está dedicada ao problema da agressividade e da autodestrutividade nessas duas áreas do conhecimento. Freud's concept of drive or instinct has been widely acknowledged as one of psychoanalysis' most fundamental concepts. However, its meaning is still a matter of controversy. It was originally defined by Freud in a biological or quasi-biological sense, but its reception in many different post-Freudian traditions has often tended to reject this early epistemological affiliation. One sign of this theoretical reorientation has been to refuse the translation of Trieb as "instinct" and to favor instead the neologism "pulsion", which has French origins and became common in the psychoanalytic literature written in many neo-Latin languages, including Portuguese. The objective of this paper is to criticize this trend. For that, the main arguments usually presented against a biological view of Freud's Trieb are discussed, namely: 1) the terminological alternative between the German words Trieb and Instinkt and how these terms are employed by Freud; 2) Freud's critique of the reduction of human sexuality to the reproductive function; 3) the concept of Todestrieb , formulated by Freud around 1920 and central in the last stage of his thought. It is argued that these formulations do not preclude a biological interpretation of the concept of Trieb. Such interpretation, in turn, opens the way for dialogue between psychoanalysis and biology, a dialogue which was also emphatically and explicitly supported by Freud. Some hypotheses in the field of neo-Darwinian evolutionary biology and sociobiology are discussed and it is argued that they are compatible, if not convergent, with Freud's views. The first part of the paper was an introduction to this issue and also approached the problem of the relationship between sexuality and reproduction in psychoanalysis and biology. This second part is dedicated to the problem of aggression and self-destructiveness in these two fields of knowledge. (shrink)

At the beginning of the 1950s most students of animal behavior in Britain saw the instinct concept developed by Konrad Lorenz in the 1930s as the central theoretical construct of the new ethology. In the mid 1950s J.B.S. Haldane made substantial efforts to undermine Lorenz''s status as the founder of the new discipline, challenging his priority on key ethological concepts. Haldane was also critical of Lorenz''s sharp distinction between instinctive and learnt behavior. This was inconsistent with Haldane''s account of the (...) evolution of language, and, according to Haldane, inconsistent with elementary genetics. British attitudes to the instinct concept changed dramatically in the wake of Daniel S. Lehraman''s 1953 critique of Lorenz, and by the 1960s Lorenz drew a clear distinction between his own views and those of the English-speaking ethologists. The inconsistencies between Lorenz''s ideas and the trends in contemporary evolutionary genetics that are reflected in Haldane''s critiques may help to explain why the Lorenzian instinct concept was unable to maintain itself in Britian. (shrink)

Cognitive scientists often employ the notion of innateness without defining it. The issue is, how is innateness defined in biology? Some critics contend that innateness is not a legitimate concept in biology. In this paper I will argue that it is. However, neither the concept of high heritability nor the concept of flat norm of reaction define innateness. An adequate account is found in developmental biology. I propose that innateness is best defined in terms of C. H. Waddington's concept of (...) canalization. (shrink)

Patterns in the data on human sexuality support the hypothesis that the bases of sexual emotions are products of natural selection. Most generally, the universal existence of laws, rules, and gossip about sex, the pervasive interest in other people's sex lives, the widespread seeking of privacy for sexual intercourse, and the secrecy that normally permeates sexual conduct imply a history of reproductive competition. More specifically, the typical differences between men and women in sexual feelings can be explained most parsimoniously as (...) resulting from the extraordinarily different reproductive opportunities and constraints males and females normally encountered during the course of evolutionary history. Men are more likely than women to desire multiple mates; to desire a variety of sexual partners; to experience sexual jealousy of a spouse irrespective of specific circumstances; to be sexually aroused by the sight of a member of the other sex; to experience an autonomous desire for sexual intercourse; and to evaluate sexual desirability primarily on the bases of physical appearance and youth.The evolutionary causes of human sexuality have been obscured by attempts to find harmony in natural creative processes and human social life and to view sex differences as complementary. The human female's capacity for orgasm and the loss of estrus, for example, have been persistently interpreted as marriage-maintaining adaptations. Available evidence is more consistent with the view that few sex differences in sexuality are complementary, that many aspects of sexuality undermine marriage, and that sexuality is less a unifying than a divisive force in human affairs. (shrink)