Challenges of applying universal ethics principles in research practice are widely discussed among educational researchers. Scholars have suggested different approaches to improve research practices, including acknowledging cultural relativism and practicing situated ethics. This article argues that more meaningful research processes and outcomes may be achieved by responding to three similar, yet potentially different “sets” of ethical principles: a) institutions’ (universal) research ethics; b) participants’ ethics and; c) researchers’ personal ethics. We discuss and present our exploration of these three aspects through (...) an approach which enables more flexibility for education researchers in practice. Responsive Ethics embraces the interplay of these three aspects. We suggest that the “research ethics space” generated from response to and negotiation among these three aspects has potential for more meaningful and transparent education research outcomes. By establishing a comfortable middle ground between sometimes extreme positions of the ethical principles of the participants, researcher, and the institution (universal research ethics), Responsive Ethics contributes to discussions on improving ethical research practices in education contexts. (shrink)

There are a number of ethical issues that may arise in the care of patients with epilepsy. One approach, when attempting to summarize such information, may be to first carry out a systematic review...

Although scholars in bioethics usually consider the exclusion of migrants from basic healthcare as unjust, it remains unclear how health professionals should ethically deal with policies restrictin...

Dealing with errors in psychotherapy is challenging, both ethically and practically. There is almost no empirical research on this topic. We aimed (1) to explore psychotherapists’ self-reported ways of dealing with an error made by themselves or by colleagues, and (2) to reconstruct their reasoning according to the two principle-based ethical approaches that are dominant in the ethics discourse of psychotherapy, Beauchamp & Childress (B&C) and Lindsay et al. (L).

Providing patients with information is fundamental to respecting autonomy. However, there may be circumstances when information may be withheld to prevent serious harm to the patient, a concept referred to as therapeutic privilege. This paper provides an analysis of the ethical, legal and professional considerations which impact on a decision to withhold information that, in normal circumstances, would be given to the patient. It considers the status of the therapeutic privilege in English case law and concludes that, while reference is (...) made to circumstances when information (primarily in relation to risk disclosure) may be withheld, further clarification is required on the status of therapeutic privilege. I suggest there has been shift in English law relating to the standard of information disclosure towards one set by the test of the reasonable, prudent patient. It is this shift that necessitates the existence of a therapeutic privilege which enables doctors to withhold information that would usually be given to the patient in order to prevent serious harm. I then explore the professional guidance in relation to information disclosure and how this relates to the legal position. There are strong ethical arguments in favour of disclosure of information to patients. In light of these, further clarification is required to identify and define the grounds on which this exception exists, the information that could lawfully be withheld and how this exception extends to rest of the health care team, particularly nurses. As such, explicit ethical and legal scrutiny of therapeutic privilege is needed in order to consider how this concept might be articulated, constrained and regulated. (shrink)

Communicating an unfavourable prognosis while maintaining patient hope represents a critical challenge for healthcare professionals. Duty requires respect for the right to patient autonomy while at the same time not doing harm by causing hopelessness and demoralisation. In some cases, the need for therapeutic privilege is discussed. The primary objectives of this study were to explore HPs’ perceptions of hope in the prognosis communication and investigate how they interpret and operationalise key ethical principles. Sixteen qualitative semistructured interviews with HPs from (...) different positions and experience, including doctors and nurses in four different departments, were conducted in the Ticino Cantonal Hospital, Switzerland. The interviews were recorded, transcribed verbatim and analysed using thematic analysis. HPs defined prognosis and patient hope as interdependent concepts related to future perspectives for subjective quality of life. Two main factors allow HPs to maximise the benefits and minimise the harm of their communication: respecting the patient’s timing and sharing the patient’s wishes. Time is required to reframe needs and expectations. Furthermore, communication needs to be shared by HPs, patients and their relatives to build common awareness and promote a person-centred approach to prognosis. In this process, interprofessional collaboration is key: doctors and nurses are complementary and can together guarantee that patients and relatives receive information in the most appropriate form when they need it. Organisational aspects and the HPs’ emotional difficulties, particularly in coping with their own despair, are barriers to effective communication that need further investigation. (shrink)

The shape and function of ethical imperatives may vary if the context is an interaction between strangers, or those who are well acquainted. This idea, taken up from Stephen Toulmin’s distinction between an “ethics of strangers” and an “ethics of intimacy”, can be applied to encounters in healthcare. There are situations where healthcare personnel (HCP) know their patients (corresponding to an “ethics of intimacy”) and situations where HCP do not know their patients (corresponding to “an ethics of strangers”). Does it (...) make a difference for normative imperatives that follow from central concepts and principles in medical ethics whether HCP know their patients or not? In our view, this question has not yet been answered satisfactorily. Once we have clarified what is meant by “knowing the patient”, we will show that the distinction is particularly relevant with regard to some thorny questions of autonomy in healthcare (e.g., regarding advance directives or paternalism in the name of autonomy), whereas the differences with regard to imperatives following from the principles of justice and beneficence seem to be smaller. We provide a detailed argument for why knowing the patient is ethically valuable in encounters in healthcare. Consequently, healthcare systems should provide fertile ground for HCP to get to know their patients, and structures that foster therapeutic continuity. For this to succeed, a number of questions still need to be clarified, which is an important task for medical ethics. (shrink)