This article considers the evolution of Feigl's attempt at establishing a stable form of scientific realism. I will argue that Feigl's work in that area should be appreciated for two reasons: it represents a telling case against the view of there being an unbridgeable ‘analytic-continental divide’ in the context of twentieth-century philosophy; it contradicts the idea that scientific realism is at odds with logical empiricism. It will be shown that Feigl developed his scientific realist position from within the logical empiricists’ (...) Vienna Circle. This, in turn, necessitates a fresh approach toward the contemporary scientific realism debate. (shrink)

In her 1921 book, The Space-Time Problem in Kant and Einstein, Ilse Schneider examines the foundations and consequences of the theory of relativity from an epistemological perspective. Beyond addressing detailed questions of early 1920s physics, it is a programmatic attempt to reconcile Kant’s transcendental idealism with Albert Einstein’s physics. The Kantian background puts the book in direct competition with Ernst Cassirer’s book Einstein’s Theory of Relativity, published in the same year. Schneider’s approach was largely ignored in the research compared with (...) Cassirer’s. What has not been considered so far is that Schneider and Cassirer represent two different interpretations of Kant, which they apply to Einstein’s physics. Recent Kant scholarship has differentiated these interpretations into the “metaphysical” and “epistemological dual-aspect” views. The former view can be found in the work of Schneider’s academic supervisor, Alois Riehl, and clearly distinguishes Schneider’s realist-inspired approach from Cassirer’s idealism. Given these differing views, it is necessary to be more precise when speaking of “immunization strategies” in the context of neo-Kantianism in order to make the differences between Schneider and Cassirer clear. Cassirer immunizes philosophy from the results of physics. In contrast, Schneider exposes philosophy much more strongly to physics. (shrink)

With the first edition of the Philosophical Criticism, published in the 1870s and 1880s, Alois Riehl became the founder and most important representative of Realistic Criticism, and emerged as one of the leading figures in German-speaking philosophy at the turn of the century. In 1901, he applied for a chair at the Faculty of Philosophy at the University of Vienna. In the appointment procedure for the succession to Ernst Mach, he was chosen by the committee with the recommendation unico loco, (...) and also confirmed by the faculty. Nevertheless, the Minister of Education, Wilhelm von Hartel, rejected the recommendation for political and ideological reasons. Using previously unpublished archival sources, the present study reconstructs Riehl’s academic career, the conditions of the appointment procedure, the internal decision-making processes, and the reasons that ultimately led to his rejection. The aim of the article is to develop a case study that, first, makes educational policy in Austria visible and, second, critically evaluates the term Austrian Philosophy that dates back to this time. (shrink)

The author analyzes the views of Friedrich Nietzsche and Karl Jaspers on the essence and goals of science. According to Nietzsche, scientific interest has no clear goal and ultimately leads to nihilism. Nietzsche criticizes science for the limitless accumulation of information, which blinds and prevents the evaluation of the achieved results. For Jaspers, the desire for knowledge, rooted in human nature, not only has unforeseen consequences, but also does not provide an answer to the question of the essence of science (...) from an internal perspective. The author points out the risk of believing that science can create or transform a person, and considers this belief a scientific superstition. He warns against elevating science to the level of a worldview, and also points to the potential threats of genetic engineering. (shrink)

This paper looks at the neo-Kantian response to Darwinism as a historical science. I distinguish four responses to this aspect of Darwin’s thought from within the neo-Kantian tradition. The first line of response, represented by August Stadler and Bruno Bauch, views Darwin’s model of historical explanation as a fulfilment of Kant’s criteria of scientific intelligibility. The second, represented by Otto Liebmann, regards historical explanation as intrinsically limited, because it cannot tell us why nature develops as it does. The third line (...) of response questions whether we can give a historical account of qualitative change. Friedrich Lange expresses this scepticism in general terms, while Alois Riehl and Ernst Cassirer extend it to human beings specifically. A fourth line of response, represented by Heinrich Rickert, challenges the misperception that Darwinian explanatory principles such as natural selection have normative or socio-political significance. (shrink)