In this paper I problematise quite a simple assertion: that the two major frameworks used in assessing consent to post-mortem organ donation, presumed consent and informed consent, are procedurally similar in that both are ‘default rules.’ Because of their procedural common characteristic, both rules do exclude marginalized groups from consent schemes. Yet this connection is often overlooked. Contract theory on default rules, better than bioethical arguments, can assist in choosing between these two rules. Applying contract theory to the question of (...) post-mortem organ donation suggests that the default rule should be one that goes against the wishes of the stronger party in consent decisions. (shrink)

The notion of the ‘reasonable expectations of the parties’ plays an important justificatory role in contract law, yet the notion has not been subjected to any sustained analysis in the contract law literature. This article examines the various roles that reasonable expectation plays in contract law and explores the different understandings of the notion that are revealed. It identifies three possible bases for reasonable expectations—an institutional basis, an empirical basis and a normative basis—and examines how reasonable expectations arguments in contract (...) reflect each of these differing justificatory bases. This makes appeals to reasonable expectation in contract law problematic since the differently grounded expectations of the contracting parties are usually the precise site of conflict between them. It is therefore doubtful that conflicts between contracting parties can be resolved solely by identifying and protecting their ‘reasonable expectations’. In the conclusion some speculative comments are offered as to why, given its limited explanatory power, the notion has proved attractive in attempts to explain contract law. (shrink)