This paper defends the thesis that counterfactuals are strict conditionals. Its purpose is to show that there is a coherent view according to which counterfactuals are strict conditionals whose antecedent is stated elliptically. Section 1 introduces the view. Section 2 outlines a response to the main argument against the thesis that counterfactuals are strict conditionals. Section 3 compares the view with a proposal due to Aqvist, which may be regarded as its direct predecessor. Sections 4 and 5 explain how the (...) view di ers from the theories of counterfactuals advocated by Stalnaker and Lewis, and from some contextualist strict conditional accounts of counterfactuals that have emerged recently. Finally, section 6 addresses the thorny issue of disjunctive antecedents. (shrink)

Why Theories of Concepts Should Not Ignore the Problem of Acquisition.

Carey’s (2009) account of bootstrapping in developmental psychology has been criticized out of a lack of theoretical precision and because of its alleged circularity (Rips et al. 2013, Cognition 128 (3): 320–330; Fodor 2010, Times Literary Supplement, 7–8; Rey 2014, Mind & Language 29 (2): 109–132). In this paper, we respond to these criticisms by connecting the debate on bootstrapping with recent accounts of conceptual creativity in philosophy of science. Specifically, we build on Nersessian’s (2010) hybrid-models-based theory of scientific conceptual (...) change to develop a refined model of bootstrapping. The key explanatory feature of this model, which we will call hybrid bootstrapping, is the iterated hybridization of different representational domains. We show how hybrid bootstrapping can answer two major critiques that have been leveled against Carey’s account: the circularity challenge and the specification challenge. (shrink)