_The first book-length philosophical study on the Presocratic influences in Plotinus’ Enneads._.

The first book-length philosophical study on the Presocratic influences in Plotinus’ Enneads.

In this paper I consider the thought of two Jewish existentialists from the first half of the 20th century, showing how their critique of pantheistic and panentheistic thinking grounded novel ideas about politics, history and human thought. In place of a concept of history directed towards a teleological redemption of suffering in the future, Lev Shestov (1866–1938) and Benjamin Fondane (1898–1944) abandoned notions of philosophical rationality in order to avow a ‘reversal’ of history according to which historical suffering could be (...) expiated through the unforeseeable powers of the divine. From here, I look at the work of a contemporaneous philosopher – Walter Benjamin (1892–1940) – for the way in which his own conception of history as ‘rescuing’ the past provides an alternative panentheism, one according to which political responsibility derives from a need to redeem God whose existence has been exiled throughout the mundane world. (shrink)

In this paper, I argue that the term kinêsis bears different connotations when associated with two different Plotinian hypostases in the Enneads: Intellect and Soul1. I propose an interpretation of this term as intellectual movement when it is associated with the Intellect and spatial movement when it is associated with the Soul.In the first section, I evaluate the meaning of kinêsis in reference to the hypostasis Intellect. In the second section, I turn to a critical examination of kinêsis associated with (...) the hypostasis Soul, emphasising the conceptual complexity of the term. I develop my interpretation on the distinction between kinêsis tês ousias and kinêsis pros ousias, translating the former as ‘movement of the hypostasis’ and the latter as ‘movement from the hypostasis.’ On this revised reading, I conclude that kinêsis in Plotinus is a context-dependent concept that alters its significance according to the hypostasis and introductory locution (‘tês’ or ‘pros’) with which it is associated. I conclude by linking Plotinian henology with Platonic and Aristotelian doctrines to illuminate an ongoing conversation between Plotinian metaphysics and Platonic and Aristotelian concepts of movement. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to examine whether and, if so, how far, the Augustinian notion of pulchrum is related to Plotinus’ concept of beauty, as it appears in Ennead I. 6. The Augustinian notion of beauty will be analyzed by focusing on the De natura boni, considering plurality and unity in Augustine’s identification of bonum with esse, both in their ontological and axiological dimensions. Topics selected for special consideration will be, first, beauty as outcome of modus, species and (...) ordo naturalis, and, secondly, corruptio as cause of deformitas. The first part of the paper will attempt to explain the Augustinian identification of esse with bonum and pulchrum.The second part will analyze Plotinus’ notion of beauty, as spelled out in Ennead I. 6, considering the Plotinian identity of to kalon and to agathon. Topics selected for analysis will be, first, the concept of form as cause of beauty, and secondly, the notion of to aischron as partial or absolute lack of form. The second part of the paper will attempt to explain Plotinus’ concept of good as yielding the nature of beauty through an analysis of Plotinus’ reflections on being and unity. The third part of this paper will consider the differences between Plotinus’ and Augustine’s identity of ugliness and non-being, as related to the notion of matter. Topics selected for analysis will be, firstly, Plotinus’ identity of matter and to aischron, and, secondly, Augustine’s concept of matter as capacitas formarum. The conclusion will prove how Plotinus’ concept of matter as coinciding with ugliness shows a wide theoretical difference between Augustine’s and Plotinus’ ontological-axiological patterns. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to focus on the reception of Plotinus’ concept of matter in the Renaissance philosopher Giordano Bruno and his early Italian dialogue De la causa, principio et uno. I argue that Bruno’s concept of materia in De la causa, principio et uno reflects Plotinus’ theory of intelligible matter in Ennead ii 4 [12] 2–5 as well as Plotinus’ positive view of the perceptible world in Enneads ii 9 [33] and iv 8 [6]. It is suggested (...) that Bruno interprets Plotinus as an ancient philosopher who supported the unity and homogeneity of matter. Giordano Bruno’s reception of Plotinus in De la Causa, principio et uno could enlighten contemporary discussions in Neoplatonic studies concerning the question of matter in the Enneads. (shrink)

In his Commentary on the Timaeus Proclus says that in some occasions Plato speaks of a model (from which the world is created) that is identical to the Demiurge while in other occasions he suggests that the model is distinct from the Demiurge. Here, identity and difference refer to the similarity with or dissimilarity from the intelligible One, identified with eternity (stability; fixedness). However, Plato also speaks in the Timaeus that the Cosmos is pretty and its Constructor (the Demiurge) is (...) good inasmuch as He fixed his sight in the perpetual model. If we ask what is produced when the Demiurge fixed his sight in a model that it is not identical to Himself, we find the reply in the Timaeus: envy, defects, disorder, limitation regarding intelligence and the soul, incompleteness, ugliness, and imperfection. Plotinus, on his turn, mentions (Enneads, II.4) the existence of two types of matter, intelligible and sensible. The intelligible or divine matter is equivalent to the "indefinite Dyad", identified with the procession of the Noûs. For Plotinus, though the intelligible matter is eternal and invariant, its archê is constituted by difference and movement - conditions that prepare the naturation of sensible matter. For Proclus, the Soul, an unfolding of the Noûs, mediates between the Intellect, intelligible matter and sensible matter. Many interpreters seem to have understood inteligible matter as the matter of the Soul, and to explain the interaction between the intelligible and the sensible many theories have appeared regarding the constitution of intelligible matter and about the nature of the "vehicle" or "vehicles" that would be associated with the Soul's "descent" and incarnation. (shrink)

At the core of Plotinus’ exploration of human selfhood, lies a reference to the myth of Dionysus-Zagreus and his mirror, one of the toys the Titans used to seduce the young Dionysus. In interpreting the myth within this context, the mirror has been invariably regarded by scholars as a symbol for matter, an external surface on which the soul is projected and becomes embodied as a human individual by dispersing in the material depths. This paper challenges this established view and (...) advances a new interpretation of Plotinus’ allusion to the myth and its philosophical significance. It argues that the mirror is not a symbol for matter, but rather a symbol for the soul itself, for its power to transform itself and retain its identity in the process of becoming a human individual. The function of the mirror is thus both deceptive and protective. While the desire that the soul, deceived by the mirror, feels for its own image guides it to leave behind its original condition and unity, it is this same desire that keeps the soul within itself: protected by the Dionysian mirror, even the most dispersed soul cannot desire anything other than what it takes to be itself, hence rather than disappearing in the radical alterity of matter, soul reaffirms its identity as an individual human self. (shrink)

Les rapports de la philologie et de l'herméneutique ont toujours constitué un problème d'une redoutable complexité. Ce sont en effet les mêmes textes qui ont engendré à la période moderne le développement de la pensée de l'interprétation et les méthodes de la critique. L'espoir de parvenir à la formulation satisfaisante et définitive du sens d'un texte se trouve constamment différé par la production incessante d'interprétations nouvelles, qui utilisent souvent les ressources de la philologie pour se constituer et qui entrent en (...) rivalité avec les précédentes. On peut se réjouir de ce caractère immarcescible du procès de l'interprétation, on peut aussi déplorer les échecs répétés de la philologie à le freiner. Il y a en effet quelque légitimité à affirmer que la philologie travaille ultimement contre l'herméneutique, c'est-à-dire contre le déploiement infini de l'interprétation. (shrink)