This article critically considers Castoriadis’ central concept of creation ex nihilo. It does so in two ways. It first draws on recent research to suggest that the historical inauguration of the project of autonomy in ancient Greece - in both its political and philosophical aspects - was more complex and contextually anchored than Castoriadis acknowledges: it did not surge forth out of nothing. Second, it considers the idea of creation from a theoretical perspective. Here the idea of creation as contextual (...) rather than absolute is offered. Within this suggested qualification, two lines of discussion - drawn from the hermeneutical and phenomenological traditions - are broached. (shrink)

The article reconstructs the unfinished dialogue between Arnason and Castoriadis, with a particular emphasis on the problematic of world articulation. Arnason’s thought is situated as reconfiguring classical sociological constellations, especially as they pertain to the revitalization of the civilizational problematic and the emphasis on the philosophical dimension of sociological investigation. His interpretative framework is located within the nascent field of post-transcendental phenomenology, which he elaborates via the overlapping problematics of cultural articulations of the world as an inter-cultural horizon, and the (...) human condition as various modes of being-in-the-world. Arnason’s encounter with Castoriadis is considered. Despite the many points of fruitful contact, Castoriadis’ neglect of the phenomenological question of the world as a ‘shared horizon’ is, in Arnason’s view, too great to overcome; Arnason looks instead to Weber, Merleau-Ponty and, more recently, Patočka for interpretative resources. Although Castoriadis’ elucidation of the world proceeds ‘in fragments’, the article contends that hermeneutical reconstruction of his thought reveals openings onto the problematic of elemental world orders that can further the dialogue with Arnason. (shrink)

Preface -/- This volume was published in 2000 by Jaca Book under the title Ethics of Reason. La filosofia dell'uomo nell'epoca del nichilismo e del confronto interculturale (The Philosophy of Man in the Age of Nihilism and Intercultural Confrontation) and is now long out of print. I gladly republish it online because, for the most part, I still recognize myself in what was written. The book had required considerable work and had been prepared by many years of study at a (...) time when I had the opportunity to study intensively and continuously. It benefited from the encounter that took place for me in those years between the continental tradition (with particular attention, in addition to the classics, to twentieth-century Christian thought of Thomasian and Augustinian inspiration) and contemporary Anglo-American philosophy. Exceeding 350 printed pages and dealing with various themes, albeit interrelated, and much metaphysics, it was certainly not a work suited to the new cultural trends. I have subsequently deepened and modified individual aspects in other publications, but the overall itinerary in the volume remains valid for me. Even the title is for me still valid, although today I would prefer Ethics of Rationality. The challenges of nihilism and interculturalism (to which the subtitle refers) remain valid, albeit in new forms, even if they are generally talked about less than they once were and take on new configurations. But the fact that something is talked about less or should be talked about less does not mean that the problem does not exist or has been philosophically overcome. To these can be added other challenges such as the ecological issue or the application of technology to mankind with biotechnology, challenges that have long been present in our culture. Some in-depth examinations of individual anthropological and ethical themes as well as philosophy of religion can be found in the volume L'uomo. Lineamenti di antropologia filosofica (Rubbettino 2013) and in the essays collected in the two volumes entitled L'esperienza integrale. Philosophy of Man, Morals and Religion (Orthotes 2016). In particular, the themes of Virtue ethics and Natural law have been re-proposed and explored in more recent essays (some of which are present in this collection). Certain themes such as those present in the central chapter precisely on the Ethics of Reason (where ample space is devoted to John Henry Newman) and other more exquisitely metaphysical ones such as those present in Chapter IV devoted to the classical transcendentals (ens, unum, verum, bonum, etc.) are only to be found in this volume. The volume, in fact, defends a realist conception of rationality that is inspired by Thomas Aquinas' conception of being, taken up with an existential accentuation, and which opposes the rationalist, immanentist and scientist turn of part of modern thought that according to many 20th century authors (such as Heidegger, but also Gilson and Fabro) would logically lead to nihilism. For this realist accentuation, too, it seems to me useful to republish the volume online. I therefore republish it with a few minor modifications and a few caveats. The overall itinerary of the volume was recently reproposed in a more summary and fragmentary form in the volume Etica del filosofare. Frammenti ironici, Il Melangolo 2020 and in my afterword to Virtù, legge e fioritura umana. Essays in honour of Angelo Campodonico, Mimesis 2022. First of all, in the new text that I am reproposing here, I have changed the term integrity (principio d'integrità) to integralità (principle of wholeness), which in the Italian language seems to me to be more in keeping with what is meant, even if it is more used and abused especially in the past decades in certain contexts. This was the reason why I had avoided using it. The last two chapters, concerning the theme of God, would deserve revision, although I agree with the general structure. Perhaps today I would always stress the centrality of theological personalism (the great contemporary alternative between theism and evolutionary Spinozism), but in a more relational key and open to Trinitarian theology. -/- Angelo Campodonico Chiavari, 25 August 2022 . (shrink)

Guillaume St-Laurent | : Le projet philosophique central de Charles Taylor se présente comme une critique de l’« image épistémologique » (epistemological picture) de la raison, critique qui se déploie au nom d’une compréhension de la rationalité humaine plus sensible à sa finitude transcendantale et historique. L’objectif du présent essai consiste à présenter une brève analyse comparative de cette image épistémologique (ou post-cartésienne) ainsi que de la perspective herméneutique que lui oppose notre auteur. En ce sens, nous comparerons tour à (...) tour six aspects déterminants de ces deux conceptions : le caractère « apodictique », « médiationnel », « désengagé », « désignatif », « dépassionné » et « procédural » de la première et le caractère « ad hominem », « immergé », « situé », « expressif », « passionné » et « substantiel » de la seconde. Nous éclairerons en outre les enjeux complexes de cette critique par quelques remarques introductives et conclusives. | : Charles Taylor’s main philosophical project presents itself as a critique of the “epistemological picture” of rationality. This critique is put forward in the name of a new understanding of reason, more sensitive to its transcendental and historical finitude. We herein propose a short comparative analysis of this epistemological (or post-cartesian) picture and Taylor’s hermeneutical perspective. To this effect, we will compare six essential aspects of these two conceptions : the “apodictic”, “mediational”, “disengaged”, “designative”, “dispassionate”, and “procedural” character of the former, and the “ad hominem”, “immerged”, “situated”, “expressive”, “passionate”, and “substantial” character of the latter. We will also try to shed light on these complex issues by some introductive and conclusive remarks. (shrink)

Las influencias de Tolstói, James y Kierkegaard explican varias de las peculiaridades de la filosofía de la religión de Wittgenstein. Pero, a la vez, insinúan sus límites, porque el tratamiento wittgensteiniano de la religión y lo divino como algo fundamentalmente expresivo, patético, decisionista, termina resultando alérgico a argumentos, creencias y evaluaciones. Wittgenstein, así, permite apreciar con gran vivacidad las experiencias y los lenguajes religiosos, lo que es útil para la psicología, la sociología, la literatura y aun la teología, pero no (...) es de igual manera sofisticado filosóficamente, pues sus tendencias fideístas lastran su intelección de las religiones con insuficiencias fenomenológicas, epistemológicas, metafísicas y político-morales. (shrink)