The paradigm of rights, established throughout the academic, policy and migrant activism arenas, governs the protection of vulnerable migrant workers against abuse. To what extent this approach has achieved social justice for the migrant worker in the current global political economy climate is, however, uncertain. In analyzing the use of rights in migrant activism in Hong Kong, this paper shows the limitation of rights in the migrant experience at the same time as it shows how a new paradigm based on (...) the Capablities Approach could provide a more appropriate framework from which to achieve social justice for the migrant worker. (shrink)

This chapter describes a philosophical approach to theorizing justice, mapping out some main strands of the tradition leading up to contemporary political philosophy. We first briefly discuss what distinguishes a philosophical approach to justice from other possible approaches to justice, by explaining the normative focus of philosophical theories of justice – that is, a focus on questions not about how things actually are, but about how things ought to be. Next, we explain what sorts of methods philosophers use to justify (...) theories of justice. Following this, in the longest section, we highlight major questions about justice that have drawn the attention of philosophers, and indicate how competing conceptions of justice have arisen from differing answers to these questions. The goal here is not to answer but to elucidate some of the larger questions about justice, as well as to establish a framework for understanding and distinguishing different kinds of claims about justice and some of the relations between them. (shrink)

This chapter describes how philosophical theorizing about justice can be connected with empirical research in the social sciences. We begin by drawing on some received distinctions between ideal and non-ideal approaches to theorizing justice along several different dimensions, showing how non-ideal approaches are needed to address normative aspects of real-world problems and to provide practical guidance. We argue that there are advantages to a transitional approach to justice focusing on manifest injustices, including the fact that it enables us to set (...) aside some reasonable disagreements about justice. The ‘bottom-up’ approach we advocate, for which we borrow Wolff’s term ‘real-world political philosophy’, is an empirically-informed normative analysis that attends to specific, identifiable injustices, and thus is partial, though not isolationist. We illustrate our approach by considering how different models of the nature of disability suggest different kinds of remedy for injustices faced by persons living with disabilities. We reflect on the nature and significance of vulnerabilities, and we assess the role of public opinion in normative theorizing, suggesting a particular significance for the opinions and experiences of marginalized groups. We finally reflect on the relevance of European legal and institutional frameworks for theorizing justice in Europe. (shrink)

Justice and Vulnerability in Europe contributes to the understanding of justice in Europe from both a theoretical and empirical perspective. It shows that Europe is falling short of its ideals and justice-related ambitions by repeatedly failing its most vulnerable populations. Interdisciplinary and expert contributors search for the explanations behind these failing ambitions, through analysis of institutional discourse, legal debate and practice and the daily experiences of vulnerable populations, such as those dependent on social care and welfare. By setting tentative criteria (...) for justice as 'participatory parity', in line with the insights of the political philosopher Nancy Fraser, the book challenges European policy makers to re-define redistributive, recognitive and representative justice. (shrink)

In her recent pamphlet Special Educational Needs: a new look (2005) Mary Warnock has called for a radical review of special needs education and a substantial reconsideration of the assumptions upon which the current educational framework is based. The latter, she maintains, is hindered by a contradiction between the intention to treat all learners as the same and that of responding adequately to the needs arising from their individual differences. The tension highlighted by Warnock, which is central to the debate (...) in special and inclusive education, is also referred to as the ‘dilemma of difference’. This consists in the seemingly unavoidable choice between, on the one hand, identifying children's differences in order to provide for them differentially, with the risk of labelling and dividing, and, on the other, accentuating the ‘sameness’ and offering common provision, with the risk of not making available what is relevant to, and needed by, individual children. In this paper, I argue that the capability approach developed by Amartya Sen provides an innovative and important perspective for re-examining the dilemma of difference in significant ways. In particular, I maintain that reconceptualising disability and special needs through the capability approach makes possible the overcoming of the tension at the core of the dilemma of difference, whilst at the same time inscribing the debate within an ethical, normative framework based upon justice and equality. (shrink)

In her recent pamphlet Special Educational Needs: a new look (2005) Mary Warnock has called for a radical review of special needs education and a substantial reconsideration of the assumptions upon which the current educational framework is based. The latter, she maintains, is hindered by a contradiction between the intention to treat all learners as the same and that of responding adequately to the needs arising from their individual differences. The tension highlighted by Warnock, which is central to the debate (...) in special and inclusive education, is also referred to as the ‘dilemma of difference’. This consists in the seemingly unavoidable choice between, on the one hand, identifying children’s differences in order to provide for them differentially, with the risk of labelling and dividing, and, on the other, accentuating the ‘sameness’ and offering common provision, with the risk of not making available what is relevant to, and needed by, individual children. In this paper, I argue that the capability approach developed by Amartya Sen provides an innovative and important perspective for re-examining the dilemma of difference in significant ways. In particular, I maintain that reconceptualising disability and special needs through the capability approach makes possible the overcoming of the tension at the core of the dilemma of difference, whilst at the same time inscribing the debate within an ethical, normative framework based upon justice and equality. (shrink)

This paper contributes to debates regarding the normative justification of basic income (BI) via a critical reevaluation of Philippe Van Parijs’ ‘real-libertarian’ theory. Van Parijs’ work constitutes the most ambitious attempt within the literature to ground a justification of BI within a systematic normative framework. In this paper I argue that key elements of his framework should form part of any progressive justification of BI. Specifically, his linking of the principle of ‘real freedom for all’ with the policy mechanism of (...) the ‘highest sustainable basic income.’ I take issue with Van Parijs’ treatment of compensation for unequal internal endowments based on the criterion of ‘undominated diversity’ and I reject the ‘external resources’ approach to justifying the funding of a substantial BI, including Van Parijs’ ‘jobs as assets’ argument. I introduce the concept of ‘total social productivity’ as a means of understanding the production and reproduction of society in a manner that anchors the justification of BI in a commitment to a ‘deep form of social reciprocity.’ Finally, I suggest that BI be framed as a ‘pragmatic-utopian reform.’. (shrink)

Liberal egalitarianism is commonly criticized for being insufficiently sensitive to status inequalities and the effects of misrecognition. I examine this criticism as it applies to Ronald Dworkin’s ‘equality of resources’ and argue that, in fact, liberal egalitarians possess the resources to deal effectively with recognition-type issues. More precisely, while conceding that the distributive principles required to realize equality of resources must apply against a particular institutional background, I point out, following Dworkin, that among the principles guiding this background is a (...) ‘principle of independence,’ and that this principle, properly interpreted, requires government to protect people against the disadvantageous effects of wrongful prejudicial discrimination. Moreover, I give an account of wrongful prejudice which is grounded in a particular interpretation of the abstract egalitarian principle Dworkin requires for a government to be legitimate and which goes a long way toward acknowledging status inequalities. Finally, I suggest other resources within the theory for responding to residual problems of recognition not addressed by the principle of independence. (shrink)