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No Nonsense Neuro-law

Neuroethics 4 (3):195-203 (2010)

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  1. More on the Conceptual and the Empirical: Misunderstandings, Clarifications, and Replies. [REVIEW]Michael S. Pardo & Dennis Patterson - 2010 - Neuroethics 4 (3):215-222.
    At the invitation of the Editors, we wrote an article (entitled, “Minds, Brains, and Norms”) detailing our views on a variety of claims by those arguing for the explanatory power of neuroscience in matters of law and ethics. The Editors invited comments on our article from four distinguished academics (Walter Glannon, Carl Craver, Sarah Robins, and Thomas Nadelhoffer) and invited our reply to their critique of our views. In this reply to our commentators, we correct some potential misunderstandings of our (...)
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  • The Ethical Implications of Considering Neurolaw as a New Power.Daniel Pallarés-Dominguez & Elsa González Esteban - 2016 - Ethics and Behavior 26 (3):252-266.
    Caution is one of the orienting principles of neuroscience’s advance in different social spheres. This article shows the importance of maintaining caution in the area of neurolaw because of its risk of becoming a new power that is free from ethical discussion. The article’s objective is to note the principal ethical implications and limitations of neurolaw in light of six cases in which neuroscientific evidence was used in distinct ways. This study seeks to examine the precautions that should be taken (...)
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  • Is Neurolaw Conceptually Confused?Neil Levy - 2014 - The Journal of Ethics 18 (2):171-185.
    In Minds, Brains, and Law, Michael Pardo and Dennis Patterson argue that current attempts to use neuroscience to inform the theory and practice of law founder because they are built on confused conceptual foundations. Proponents of neurolaw attribute to the brain or to its parts psychological properties that belong only to people; this mistake vitiates many of the claims they make. Once neurolaw is placed on a sounder conceptual footing, Pardo and Patterson claim, we will see that its more dramatic (...)
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