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Truthmakers, Moral Responsibility, and an Alleged Counterexample to Rule A

Michael Robinson

Erkenntnis 81 (6):1333-1339 (2016)

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Hyperintensionality and Normativity.Federico L. G. Faroldi - 2019 - Cham, Switzerland: Springer Verlag.details Presenting the first comprehensive, in-depth study of hyperintensionality, this book equips readers with the basic tools needed to appreciate some of current and future debates in the philosophy of language, semantics, and metaphysics. After introducing and explaining the major approaches to hyperintensionality found in the literature, the book tackles its systematic connections to normativity and offers some contributions to the current debates. The book offers undergraduate and graduate students an essential introduction to the topic, while also helping professionals in related (...) Download Export citation Bookmark 7 citations
Rule A.P. Roger Turner & Justin Capes - 2018 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 99 (4):580-595.details Rule A: if it's metaphysically necessary that p, we may validly infer that no one is even partly morally responsible for the fact that p. Our principal aim in this article is to highlight the importance of this rule and to respond to two recent challenges to it. We argue that rule A is more important to contemporary theories of moral responsibility than has previously been recognized. We then consider two recent challenges to the rule and argue that neither challenge (...) Download Export citation Bookmark 7 citations
Transferring Non-Responsibility.Pedro Merlussi & Gabriel de Andrade Maruchi - 2019 - Ethic@: An International Journal for Moral Philosophy 18 (3):285–298.details The Direct Argument argues for the claim that determinism and moral responsibility are incompatible. The most controversial assumption of the argument is the thought that "not being responsible for" transfers across conditionals: if no one is (even partially) morally responsible for the fact that p is true, and no one is (even partially) morally responsible for the fact that p ⸧ q is true, then no one is (even partially) morally responsible for the fact that q is true. Here we (...) Download Export citation Bookmark 1 citation
Does the Direct Argument Beg the Question?Justin Capes - 2022 - American Philosophical Quarterly 59 (1):81-96.details The direct argument is among the most prominent arguments for the incompatibility of determinism and moral responsibility. Some critics of the argument have accused it, or certain defenses of its central premise, of begging the question. This article responds to that accusation. Download Export citation Bookmark 1 citation
The direct argument is a prima facie threat to compatibilism.Ori Beck - 2020 - Synthese 199 (1-2):1791-1817.details In the early 1980’s van Inwagen presented the Direct Argument for the incompatibility of determinism with moral responsibility. In the course of the ensuing debate, Fischer, McKenna and Loewenstein have replied, each in their own way, that versions of the Direct Argument do not pose even a prima facie threat to compatibilism. Their grounds were that versions of the Direct Argument all use the “Transfer NR” inference rule in a dialectically problematic way. I rebut these replies here. By so doing, (...) Download Export citation Bookmark 1 citation
O Argumento Direto pelo Incompatibilismo.Gabriel Maruchi - unknowndetails Nesta monografia, discutirei o Argumento Direto pelo incompatibilismo. Incompatibilismo ´e a tese de que responsabilidade moral ´e incompat´ıvel com o determinismo nomol´ogico. De ma- neira simplificada, o argumento ´e o seguinte: N´os n˜ao somos respons´aveis pelo passado e pelas leis da natureza. Se o determinismo for verdadeiro, nossas ac¸ ˜oes s˜ao consequˆencia do passado e das leis da natureza. Portanto, se o determinismo for verdadeiro, n˜ao somos respons´aveis por nossas ac¸ ˜oes. Defendo ao longo da monografia que o Argumento Direto (...) Download Export citation Bookmark

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