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  1. The Subject in Neuropsychology: Individuating Minds in the Split‐Brain Case.Elizabeth Schechter - 2015 - Mind and Language 30 (5):501-525.
    Many experimental findings with split-brain subjects intuitively suggest that each such subject has two minds. The conceptual and empirical basis of this duality intuition has never been fully articulated. This article fills that gap, by offering a reconstruction of early neuropsychological literature on the split-brain phenomenon. According to that work, the hemispheres operate independently of each other insofar as they interact via the mediation of effection and transduction—via behavior and sensation, essentially. This is how your mind and my mind interact (...)
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  • Robinson on my views: A correction.Roland Puccetti - 1977 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 28 (2):171.
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  • (1 other version)Split‐Brains and Singular Personhood.John D. Greenwood - 1993 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 31 (3):285-306.
    In this paper it is argued that the experimental data on commissurotomy patients provide no grounds for denying the singular personhood of commissurotomy patients. This is because, contrary to most philosophical accounts, there is no “unity of consciousness” discriminating condition for singular personhood that is violated in the case of commissurotomy patients, and because no contradictions arise when singular personhood is ascribed to commissurotomy patients.
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  • (1 other version)Split brains and singular personhood.John D. Greenwood - 1993 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 31 (3):285-306.
    In this paper it is argued that the experimental data on commissurotomy patients provide no grounds for denying the singular personhood of commissurotomy patients. This is because, contrary to most philosophical accounts, there is no “unity of consciousness” discriminating condition for singular personhood that is violated in the case of commissurotomy patients, and because no contradictions arise when singular personhood is ascribed to commissurotomy patients.
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  • Reflexive Positioning and Culture.Siu-lan Tan & Fathali M. Moghaddam - 1995 - Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour 25 (4):387-400.
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