Many experimental findings with split-brain subjects intuitively suggest that each such subject has two minds. The conceptual and empirical basis of this duality intuition has never been fully articulated. This article fills that gap, by offering a reconstruction of early neuropsychological literature on the split-brain phenomenon. According to that work, the hemispheres operate independently of each other insofar as they interact via the mediation of effection and transduction—via behavior and sensation, essentially. This is how your mind and my mind interact (...) with each other, however, giving rise to the intuition that a split-brain subject has two minds. (shrink)

Science is full of surprises. Fortunately, most of these surprises are small. A scientist, for example, might make an unexpected discoverey, but the discovery simply adds new data in support of an old theory. Or perhaps the discovery will endanger an existing theory, but one which has only local import. In cases like these, the existing theory will be modified, or perhaps even rejected; but the research tradition which surrounds the local theory will remain, by and large, unaffected and will (...) continue on.Small surprises are welcomed within science; they are part of the daily grist. Science needs them in order to advance in an orderly fashion. (shrink)

Science is full of surprises. Fortunately, most of these surprises are small. A scientist, for example, might make an unexpected discoverey, but the discovery simply adds new data in support of an old theory. Or perhaps the discovery will endanger an existing theory, but one which has only local import. In cases like these, the existing theory will be modified, or perhaps even rejected; but the research tradition which surrounds the local theory will remain, by and large, unaffected and will (...) continue on.Small surprises are welcomed within science; they are part of the daily grist. Science needs them in order to advance in an orderly fashion. (shrink)

Contrary to received opinion among philosophers, psychologists, and neuroscientists, conscious duality as a principle of brain organization is neither incoherent nor demonstrably false. The present paper begins by reviewing the history of the theory and its anatomical basis and defending it against the claim that it rests upon an arbitrary decision as to what constitutes the biological substratum of mind or person.

Many have claimed that split-brain patients are actually two persons. I maintain that both the traditional separation argument and the more recent sophistication argument for the two persons interpretation are inadequate on conceptual grounds. An autonomy argument is inadequate on empirical grounds. Overall, theoretical and practical consequences weigh heavily in favor of adopting a one person interpretation.

In this paper it is argued that the experimental data on commissurotomy patients provide no grounds for denying the singular personhood of commissurotomy patients. This is because, contrary to most philosophical accounts, there is no “unity of consciousness” discriminating condition for singular personhood that is violated in the case of commissurotomy patients, and because no contradictions arise when singular personhood is ascribed to commissurotomy patients.

In this paper it is argued that the experimental data on commissurotomy patients provide no grounds for denying the singular personhood of commissurotomy patients. This is because, contrary to most philosophical accounts, there is no “unity of consciousness” discriminating condition for singular personhood that is violated in the case of commissurotomy patients, and because no contradictions arise when singular personhood is ascribed to commissurotomy patients.