The point, for the 946,326th time is that people get elected to office by currying the favor of powerful interest groups. They don’t get elected for their excellence as political philosophers.Congress has consistently failed to solve some serious problems with the cost, effectiveness, and safety of pharmaceuticals. In part, this failure results from the pharmaceutical industry convincing legislators to define policy problems in ways that protect industry profits. By targeting campaign contributions to influential legislators and by providing them with selective (...) information, the industry manages to displace the public’s voice in developing pharmaceutical policy. (shrink)

The profession of medicine is predicated upon an ethical mandate: first do no harm. However, critics charge that the medical profession’s culture and its public health mission are being undermined by the pharmaceutical industry’s wide-ranging influence. In this article, we analyze how drug firms influence psychiatric taxonomy and treatment guidelines such that these resources may serve commercial rather than public health interests. Moving beyond a conflict-ofinterest model, we use the conceptual and normative framework of institutional corruption to examine how organized (...) psychiatry’s dependence on drug firms has distorted science. We suggest that academic-industry relationships have led to the corruption of the evidence base upon which accurate diagnosis and sound treatment depend. We describe the current dependency corruption and argue that transparency alone is not a solution — and sometimes even produces iatrogenic effects. Furthermore, we argue that the corruption of the evidence base for diagnostic and practice guidelines renders obsolete the traditional informed consent process, and we offer suggestions for reforming this process. (shrink)

The Food and Drug Administration authorizes the marketing of a drug only for uses that the manufacturer has demonstrated to be safe and effective, based on evidence from at least two clinical trials. However, the FDA does not regulate the practice of medicine, so physicians may prescribe drugs in any manner they choose. Prescribing drugs in ways that deviate from the uses specified in the FDA-approved drug label, package insert, and marketing authorization is referred to as off-label prescribing. This occurs (...) when physicians prescribe a drug for a therapeutic purpose other than the one approved by the FDA; treat patients in a different age cohort or gender than the population on which it was tested; or prescribe a different dose, for a different duration of use, or a different mode of administration than indicated on the label. (shrink)

To sell a new drug, pharmaceutical companies must discover a compound, run clinical trials to test its efficacy and safety, get it approved by regulatory bodies, produce the drug, and market it. As this process brings the drug through so many hands, there are risks of many kinds of corruption. The pharmaceutical industry has recently gone from being one of the most admired industries to being described by the majority of Americans as “dishonest, unethical, and more concerned with profits than (...) with individual and public health.” Legal scholar Marc Rodwin suggested that the pharmaceutical industry can be viewed through the lens of institutional corruption as defined by legal scholar Lawrence Lessig, whereby widespread or systemic practices undermine the main purposes of drug therapy — healing illness, preventing medical problems, and alleviating suffering. Many drugs do serve these goals, yet a significant number of drugs churned out by pharmaceutical companies are ineffective or have dangerous side effects that could have been predicted had the companies conducted the appropriate research. (shrink)

Financial relationships and business transactions between physicians and the health care industry are common. These relationships take a variety of forms, including payments to physicians in exchange for consulting services, reimbursement of physician travel expenses when attending medical device and pharmaceutical educational conferences, physician ownership in life science company stocks, and the provision of free drug samples. Such practices are not intrinsic to medical practice, but as the Institute of Medicine described in its 2009 report, these relationships have the potential (...) to produce positive collaborations that improve patient care and public health, and most physicians view it as “ethically proper to accept items ranging from drug samples to a lucrative consultantship.”However, financial relationships between physicians and pharmaceutical, medical device and biotechnology companies can also create negative influences on physician judgment that compromise patient care and jeopardize the public’s trust. (shrink)

Why, when confronted with policy alternatives that could improve patient care, public health, and the economy, does Congress neglect those goals and tailor legislation to suit the interests of pharmaceutical corporations? In brief, for generations, the pharmaceutical industry has convinced legislators to define policy problems in ways that protect its profit margin. It reinforces this framework by selectively providing information and by targeting campaign contributions to influential legislators and allies. In this way, the industry displaces the public's voice in developing (...) pharmaceutical policy. Unless citizens mobilize to confront the political power of pharmaceutical firms, objectionable industry practices and public policy will not change. Yet we need to refine this analysis. I propose a research agenda to uncover pharmaceutical influence. It develops the theory of dependence corruption to explain how the pharmaceutical industry is able to deflect the broader interests of the general public. It includes empirical studies of lobbying and campaign finance to uncover the means drug firms use to: (1) shape the policy framework adopted and information used to analyze policy; (2) subsidize the work of political allies; and (3) influence congressional voting. (shrink)

Two insights of psychology on which we would like to draw are that people react to law in more complex ways than rational-choice models assume and that good people sometimes do bad things. With that starting point, this article provides a behavioral perspective on some of the factors that policymakers seeking to reduce the level of misconduct in the pharmaceutical industry should consider. Effective regulation and enforcement need to address the following questions: Who are the regulation's targeted actors — researchers (...) or executives? Are the regulations directed toward research or marketing activities? Is the misconduct a product of explicit rational choice or implicit processes of which the actor is unaware? Is it reasonable to address all types of misconduct using the same approach? Certain misconduct — particularly by researchers — is due to automatic, intuitive, and unconscious decisions and needs to be addressed through different means than those used to address misconduct due to controlled, deliberate decisions. This article therefore recommends using different sorts of regulation depending on the context. It suggests more tailored enforcement mechanisms that will be sensitive to the pharmaceutical researchers’ unique work motivations and to their awareness or lack of awareness of their own misconduct. (shrink)

The possibility that industry is exerting an undue influence on the culture of medicine has profound implications for the profession's public health mission. Policy analysts, investigative journalists, researchers, and clinicians have questioned whether academic-industry relationships have had a corrupting effect on evidence-based medicine. Psychiatry has been at the heart of this epistemic and ethical crisis in medicine. This article examines how commercial entities, such as pharmaceutical companies, influence psychiatric taxonomy and treatment guidelines. Using the conceptual framework of institutional corruption, we (...) show that organized psychiatry's dependence on drug firms has led to a distortion of science. We describe the current dependency corruption and argue that transparency alone is not a solution. We conclude by taking the position that the corruption of the evidence base in diagnostic and practice guidelines has compromised the informed consent process, and we suggest strategies to address this problem. (shrink)

Prescribing drugs for uses that the FDA has not approved — off-label drug use — can sometimes be justified but is typically not supported by substantial evidence of effectiveness. At the root of inappropriate off-label drug use lie perverse incentives for pharmaceutical firms and flawed oversight of prescribing physicians. Typical reform proposals such as increased sanctions for manufacturers might reduce the incidence of unjustified off-label use, but they do not remove the source of the problem. Public policy should address the (...) cause and control the practice. To manage inappropriate off-label drug use, off-label prescriptions must be tracked in order to monitor the risks and benefits and the manufacturers’ conduct. Even more important, reimbursement rules should be changed so that manufacturers cannot profit from off-label sales. When off-label sales pass a critical threshold, manufacturers should also be required to pay for independent testing of the safety and effectiveness of off-label drug uses and for the FDA to review the evidence. Manufacturers should also finance, under FDA supervision, programs designed to warn physicians and the public about the risks of off-label drug use. (shrink)

Financial ties between physicians and pharmaceutical companies are pervasive and controversial. However, little is known about how patients perceive such ties. This paper describes an experiment examining how a national sample of U.S. adults perceived a variety of financial relationships between physicians and drug companies. Each respondent read a single scenario about a hypothetical physician and his financial ties to the pharmaceutical industry; scenarios varied in terms of payment type of and amount. Respondents then evaluated the physician on several dimensions (...) . Findings revealed that perceptions of the physician were more strongly influenced by payment type than by payment amount. Specifically, respondents were quite critical of doctors who owned drug company stock or received industry payments for meals and lodging, but were more forgiving of physicians who received free drug samples or consulting fees . Interestingly, physicians who received no payments, while seen as honest, were also viewed by some respondents as inexperienced or uninformed about new treatments. Implications for public policy and future research are discussed. (shrink)

Conflicts of interest in health and medicine have been the source of considerable public and professional debate. Much of this debate has focused on financial, rather than non-financial COI, which is a significant lacuna because non-financial COI can be just as influential as financial COI. In an effort to explore the nature and effects of non-financial, as well as financial COI, we conducted semi-structured interviews with eleven Australian medical professionals regarding their experiences of, and attitudes towards, COI. We found that (...) this group of medical professionals saw non-financial interests—most notably the pursuit of status and respect and the avoidance of stigma—as potentially conflicting with other important interests. (shrink)

Conflict of interests in medicine are typically taken to be financial in nature: it is often assumed that a COI occurs when a healthcare practitioner’s financial interest conflicts with patients’ interests, public health interests, or professional obligations more generally. Even when non-financial COIs are acknowledged, ethical concerns are almost exclusively reserved for financial COIs. However, the notion of “interests” cannot be reduced to its financial component. Individuals in general, and medical professionals in particular, have different types of interests, many of (...) which are non-financial in nature but can still conflict with professional obligations. The debate about healthcare delivery has largely overlooked this broader notion of interests. Here, we will focus on health practitioners’ moral or religious values as particular types of personal interests involved in healthcare delivery that can generate COIs and on conscientious objection in healthcare as the expression of a particular type of COI. We argue that, in the healthcare context, the COIs generated by interests of conscience can be as ethically problematic, and therefore should be treated in the same way, as financial COIs. (shrink)

The pharmaceutical industry plays an increasingly dominant role in healthcare, raising concerns about “conflicts of interest” on the part of the medical professionals who interact with the industry. However, there is considerable disagreement over the extent to which COI is a problem and how it should be managed. Participants in debates about COI have become entrenched in their views, which is both unproductive and deeply confusing for the majority of medical professionals trying to work in an increasingly commercialized environment. We (...) used a modified meta-narrative review method to analyse debates about COI in the academic and grey literature. We found two Discourse Models: The Critical Discourse Model sees COI in health and biomedicine as a major problem that both can and should be addressed, while the Defensive Discourse Model argues that current efforts to control COIs are at best unnecessary and at worst harmful. Each model is underpinned by profoundly differing views about how society should be organized—in particular whether market forces should be encouraged or curtailed—and how the dangers associated with market forces should be managed. In order to make any headway, academics and policymakers must recognize that these debates are underpinned by profoundly differing worldviews. (shrink)

Clinical trials in medicine often derive their financial support from the manufacturer of a device or pharmaceutical, but one must view with caution trial designs that allow an interested sponsor to terminate data collection.

Growing recognition in both the psychological and management literature of the concept of “good people” has caused a paradigm shift in our understanding of wrongful behavior: Wrongdoings that were previously assumed to be based on conscious choice—that is, deliberate decisions—are often the product of intuitive processes that prevent people from recognizing the wrongfulness of their behavior. Several leading scholars have dubbed this process as an ethical “blind spot.” This study explores the main implications of the good people paradigm on the (...) regulation of employees’ conflicts of interest. In two experiments, we examined the efficacy of traditional deterrence- and morality-based interventions in encouraging people to maintain their professional integrity and objectivity at the cost of their own self-interest. Results demonstrate that while the manipulated conflict was likely to “corrupt” people under intuitive/automatic mindset, explicit/deliberative mechanisms had a much larger constraining effect overall on participants’ judgment than did implicit measures, with no differences between deterrence and morality. The findings demonstrate how little is needed to compromise the employees’ ethical integrity, but they also suggest that a modest explicit/deliberative intervention can easily prevent much of the wrongdoing that may otherwise result. (shrink)