Rodger et al have interestingly argued that xenotransplantation should, if possible, entail the use of genetic pain disenhancement to prevent otherwise unavoidable pain in ‘donor’ animals.1 Their argument relies on the empirical assumption that xenotransplantation offers a realistic solution to organ shortage, and that, due to the recent clinical developments and the lack of human donors, it will thus continue for the foreseeable future. We argue below that other options should be prioritised over xenotransplantation, and that so-called ‘non-sentientist’ harms are (...) undervalued in discussions on disenhancement. We do not challenge the empirical claim made by the authors. That is, xenotransplantation research might continue for the foreseeable future since organ demand is increasing. However, we disagree with the priority given to xenotransplantation over other solutions that are more morally desirable. We argue that, if we comply with the 3R principles (Replacement, Reduction, and Refinement of the use of animals in research) and follow a minimal welfarist reasoning (to which the authors seem to adhere), then (1) the principle of replacement demands the use of non-animal alternatives if possible and (2) there are alternative solutions that lead to morally better consequences. Schematically, there are …. (shrink)

Rodger et al argue for the disenhancement of animals intended for xenotransplantation; that is, the transference of tissues or organs from one species to another. The crux of their claim is that the conditions necessary to facilitate xenotransplantation will be hostile to those subjected to them. Thus, to minimise the suffering of living under such conditions, ‘ethically defensible xenotransplantation should entail the use of genetic disenhancement if it becomes possible to do so and if that pain and suffering cannot be (...) eliminated by other means.’1 In other words, if we can eliminate or meaningfully reduce the suffering of animals destined for xenotransplantation by obliterating their experiential capacity and lacking a less contentious method to achieve the same result, we should do so. When isolated, this argument is compelling. Suffering is terrible and should be avoided. Additionally, when we have the option to reduce another’s suffering—be that human, animal or otherwise—there are strong prima facie arguments that we should do so. This point is reinforced when we collectively are responsible for that suffering, as would be the case with xenotransplantation, and it is true regardless of how justified we are in causing that suffering. Thus, on the restrictive terms of Rodger et al ’s argument, I agree with them. We should eliminate, or if not possible, reduce, suffering wherever we can, and this applies to animals too. Having said that, when situated in the xenotransplantation context, issues with their proposal …. (shrink)

Rodger et al 1 argue that ‘ethically defensible xenotransplantation should entail the use of genetic disenhancement if it is demonstrated that’ the pain and suffering of donor pigs ‘cannot be eliminated by other means’. The phrase ‘genetic disenhancement’ refers to genetic manipulation that would produce an animal that is either less able or entirely unable to experience pain and suffering. (The phrase is euphemistic because, on one possible reading, it suggests the removal of an existing enhancement, rather than what it (...) actually is, namely a diminishment relative to the species norm.) The authors acknowledge that genetic ‘disenhancement’ is not a ‘morally ideal ‘solution’, but argue that ‘it is morally better to prevent unavoidable pain until a viable non-animal alternative becomes available’ (p. 1). In advancing this argument, they explicitly state that they make no assumption that xenotransplantation is, in principle, morally permissible. They take no stand on that issue, which is beyond the scope of their paper. They assume only that ‘ (1) xenotransplantation research will inevitably continue and (2) causing pain and suffering requires sufficient justification’ (p. 1). However, in the absence of an assumption that xenotransplantation is, in principle, morally permissible, the authors have not established their …. (shrink)