The theory of mind that medieval philosophers inherit from Augustine is predicated on the thesis that the human mind is essentially self-reflexive. This paper examines Peter John Olivi's (1248-1298) distinctive development of this traditional Augustinian thesis. The aim of the paper is three-fold. The first is to establish that Olivi's theory of reflexive awareness amounts to a theory of phenomenal consciousness. The second is to show that, despite appearances, Olivi rejects a higher-order analysis of consciousness in favor of a same-order (...) theory. The third and final is to show that, on his view, consciousness is both self-intimating and infallible. (shrink)

My aim in this paper is to advance our understanding of medieval approaches to consciousness by focusing on a particular but, as it seems to me, representative medieval debate. The debate in question is between William Ockham and Walter Chatton over the existence of what these two thinkers refer to as “reflexive intellective intuitive cognition”. Although framed in the technical terminology of late-medieval cognitive psychology, the basic question at issue between them is this: Does the mind (or “intellect”) cognize its (...) own states via higher-order (or “reflexive”) representational states? Their debate is representative both because it highlights the central dialectical issues and alternatives at play in medieval discussions of consciousness generally and because it showcases the two main types of approach to consciousness one finds in the later medieval period, namely, those that explain consciousness in terms of intentionality (typically, higher-order intentionality), and those that understand consciousness as a non-intentional, sui-generis mode of awareness. (shrink)

Pedro de João Olivi sustenta que a atenção intencional tem de ser posta como a condição para o desempenho ativo do ato cognitivo perceptual. A intencionalidade é um componente natural da apreensão sensorial. Em Olivi, ela requer que a alma tenha uma natureza ativa, pois o desempenho intencional é precípuo à alma e é independente de elementos representacionais intermediários, como as species. Olivi não reduz o ato cognitivo ao modo de ação ativo ou passivo, mas adiciona a causa terminativa como (...) uma função do objeto na produção do ato. A terminação, então, é crucial para mostrar como a atenção cognitiva é classificada como intencional. Por fim, este artigo sustenta que a atenção intencional como a condição pré-experiencial garante o acesso imediato aos objetos do mundo exterior. (shrink)