The prominence of the island city of Corcyra in Thucydides’ history of the Peloponnesian War presents a puzzle. It appears in the opening of the work in a conflict with its mother city Corinth, after which representatives of both Corinth and Corcyra deliver speeches at Athens. Further conflict between the two cities follows, with Athens supporting Corcyra. Later on, Thucydides depicts two unusually graphic episodes ofstasisat Corcyra. This prominence is surprising, given that the historian himself explicitly states that the initial (...) set of events involving the island does not in fact represent the beginning of the war, and that the Corcyreanstasisis not the first in the war, and that, as has been often observed, it is not even particularly remarkable or influential in it. In what follows, I seek to clarify Thucydides’ use of the island first by exploring ancient views of Corcyra's ‘predecessor’, Homer's Phaeacia, and by arguing that perceptions of the mythical place mirror and reinforce beliefs about its successor Corcyra. An interpretation of Phaeacia as a representative of excess luxury, weakness and friendlessness requires an aggressive reading of Homer. As Rose and others have made clear, however, this position is defensible even if not all readers may choose to accede to it. A significant strand of ancient opinion seems to have adopted a similar attitude as well, perhaps projecting a fifth-century prejudice identified by Rusten back onto Corcyra's Homeric forerunner. In the second part of this paper, I argue that this background influences Thucydides’ presentation of Corcyra, and that the historian emphasizes the story of the island in order to illustrate a pattern of extravagant wealth followed by civic collapse that would have been readily recognizable to an ancient audience. The fact that Thucydides’ Corcyra-story traces all the stages of this process, from a nod to Homeric opulence through pre-war selfishness to wartime collapse, effectively explains his conspicuous use of the city. (shrink)

This paper proposes a general analysis of the structure and imagery of the Salmacis epigram, a late Hellenistic verse inscription recently found in Bodrum which relates the foundation of Halicarnassus and lists the achievements of the city's authors. Focusing on the first part of the poem, I argue that the epigram can be seen to trace a complex symbolic map of the city in space and time. On a first level of reference the poem's episodes of foundation are consistently represented (...) as the aitia of ritual events. Superimposed on the catalogue of foundation episodes is a catalogue of the ritual events that commemorated them, and our epigram uses this level of reference to ground its portrait of Halicarnassus in the contemporary ritual life of the polis. In this way the poem is able to locate the city in the space of cult and to inscribe the linear time of primordial origins in the recurrent present of ritual practice. On a complementary level of reference, finally, the different episodes of foundation also function as so many statements of kinship—every founder effectively ties the city to another region and another people. As a parallel to the local space of ritual, then, the combination of these statements of kinship is made to locate the city in the wider space of ethnic geography. Behind a seemingly simple catalogic form, the Salmacis epigram actually combines two levels of reference to achieve a significant and multifaceted representation of a late Hellenistic city's cultural memory. (shrink)

This essay considers episodes in which phenomena like war and civil strife affected, changed, and revealed the identity of the polis. Even if framed by an understanding of the Peloponnesian War and the imperialistic logic and destiny of Athens, Thucydides' History still provides us with narratives that illuminate the particular history of “minor” poleis, each with its specific events, turning points, and dynamics. Through analysis of Thucydides' historical material, this essay focuses on Plataea, Corcyra, and Mytilene and discusses the notion (...) of the polis in relation to space and in the context of time, thereby testing Aristotle's question—too soon dismissed—about the separation of a community from the space of its city. (shrink)

In his account of the events leading up to the outbreak of the Peloponnesian War, Thucydides tells us that in 435b.c.the Epidamnians decided to transfer their allegiance from Corcyra to Corinth in accordance with the Delphic oracle, whereupon the Corinthians agreed to support Epidamnus against their own colony Corcyra. One of the reasons given is that the Corinthians hated the Corcyraeans for their contempt for their mother city, as ‘in their common festivals they would not allow them the customary privileges (...) of founders, at their sacrifice they did not give priority to Corinthians [as other colonies did]’ (οὔτε γὰρ ἐν πανηγύρεσι ταῖς κοιναῖς διδόντες γέρα τὰ νομιζόμενα οὔτε Κορινθίῳ ἀνδρὶ προκαταρχόμενοι τῶν ἱερῶν ὥσπερ αἱ ἄλλαι ἀποικίαι). Precisely what the dispute was and what the word προκατάρχεσθαι means have not been convincingly explained by commentators. (shrink)

Attempting to apply the logic of conflict analysis developed by Thucydides to the chaotic spasms and clashes triggered by the collapse of the Soviet Union might appear inappropriate to many classical scholars, and entirely artificial to most Eurasian security experts. However, the two strategic landscapes, though separated by a period of some 2400 years, share a number of common features, and the ideas of the ancient strategic analyst may prove helpful for discovering structure in the chaotic violence of more recent (...) times. The notion of the ‘strategic dilemma’—one that Thucydides never used but is credited with inventing—lies at the centre of this investigation, which seeks to test the applicability of the notion in three distinctive settings: in a bipolar confrontation; in conflict manipulation by a third party; and in secessionist conflicts. The article suggests that, as an instrument of political analysis, the security dilemma tends to overpredict conflicts and essentially comes out as a trap of self-fulfilling ‘worst-case’ expectations, so that nowadays—much as in ancient Greece—whenever a security dilemma determines a political decision, disaster follows. (shrink)

This paper presents the case for reading the Hephaisteion as a temple planned and begun by the Philaid family early in the fifth century. It was originally designed to give a house to Hephaestus in Athens after the successful campaign of Miltiades brought the island of Lemnos, traditionally the home of Hephaestus, under Athenian control. Work on the temple was interrupted by the death of Miltiades but resumed in the wake of Cimon’s successful northern ventures. The strong association of Miltiades (...) and Cimon with the strategic islands of the northern Aegean suggests that the correct interpretation of the Hephaisteion’s east frieze is the expulsion of the Pelasgians from Athens. Their punishment is interpreted here as a mythological analogue for the annexation of the Pelasgians’ island, Lemnos. Evidence from the island demonstrates that the Athenian cleruchs on Lemnos were eager to distinguish themselves from the Lemnians. The Pelasgian episode enabled them to demonstrate this, and to emphasize their Athenian identity. (shrink)