Switch to: References

Citations of:

Cognitive Emergence

Philosophy of Science 64 (S4):S346-S358 (1997)

Add citations

You must login to add citations.
  1. Reductionism and the Irreducibility of Consciousness.John R. Searle - 1997 - In Ned Block, Owen Flanagan & Guven Guzeldere (eds.), The Nature of Consciousness: Philosophical Debates. MIT Press.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   8 citations  
  • Recent Work in the History and Philosophy of Chemistry.Jeffry L. Ramsey - 1998 - Perspectives on Science 6 (4):409-427.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • What shall we do with emergence? A survey of a fundamental issue in the metaphysics and epistemology of science.Sami Pihlström - 1999 - South African Journal of Philosophy 18 (2):192-210.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  • (1 other version)Emergence, Not Supervenience.Paul Humphreys - 1997 - Philosophy of Science 64 (S4):S337-S345.
    I argue that supervenience is an inadequate device for representing relations between different levels of phenomena. I then provide six criteria that emergent phenomena seem to satisfy. Using examples drawn from macroscopic physics, I suggest that such emergent features may well be quite common in the physical realm.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   53 citations  
  • Diachronic Emergence as Transubstantiation.Peter Wyss - 2023 - Philosophia 51 (3):1745-1762.
    Diachronic emergence has recently been characterised as transformation. This aims to capture the thought that the entities that emerge are radically new or different. Transformation is hence closely linked with a central (but rarely raised) challenge for all emergentists: how to account for the identity and individuation of entities involved in emergence. With this challenge in view, I develop and probe four interpretations of transformation: addition, replacement, fusion, and transubstantiation. Of those, transubstantiation provides the most plausible response to the challenge (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • Cognitive scientific realism.Fritz Rohrlich - 2001 - Philosophy of Science 68 (2):185-202.
    Our cognitive capabilities force us into a description of the world by levels. But theories on different levels result in descriptions that differ qualitatively. Therefore, the resulting incommensurability requires ontological bridges between such theories. These are obtained uniquely when the equations of the reduced theory are compared with a suitable limit of the equations of the reducing theory. Four case studies from theoretical physics and astronomy support this claim, two for theories of composites and two for non-composites (field theories). These (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   6 citations