Switch to: References

Citations of:

Emotion, higher-order syntactic thoughts, and consciousness

Edmund T. Rolls

In Lawrence Weiskrantz & Martin Davies (eds.), Frontiers of consciousness. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 131--167 (2008)

Add citations

You must login to add citations.

Perceiving an exclusive cause of affect prevents misattribution.Kirsten I. Ruys, Henk Aarts, Esther K. Papies, Masanori Oikawa & Haruka Oikawa - 2012 - Consciousness and Cognition 21 (2):1009-1015.details Affect misattribution occurs when affective cues color subsequent unrelated evaluations. Research suggests that affect misattribution decreases when one is aware that affective cues are unrelated to the evaluation at hand. We propose that affect misattribution may even occur when one is aware that affective cues are irrelevant, as long as the source of these cues seems ambiguous. When source ambiguity exists, affective cues may freely influence upcoming unrelated evaluations. We examined this using an adapted affect misattribution procedure where pleasant and (...) Download Export citation Bookmark 3 citations
What are Emotional States, and Why Do We Have Them?Edmund T. Rolls - 2013 - Emotion Review 5 (3):241-247.details An approach to emotion is described in which emotions are defined as states elicited by instrumental reinforcers, that is, by stimuli that are the goals for action. This leads to a theory of the evolutionary adaptive value of emotions, which is that different genes specify different goals in their own self-interest, and any actions can then be learned and performed by instrumental learning to obtain the goals. The brain mechanisms for emotion in brain regions such as the orbitofrontal and anterior (...) Download Export citation Bookmark 3 citations
Neural Computations Underlying Phenomenal Consciousness: A Higher Order Syntactic Thought Theory.Edmund T. Rolls - 2020 - Frontiers in Psychology 11.details Problems are raised with the global workspace hypothesis of consciousness, for example about exactly how global the workspace needs to be for consciousness to suddenly be present. Problems are also raised with Carruthers's version that excludes conceptual representations, and in which phenomenal consciousness can be reduced to physical processes, with instead a different levels of explanation approach to the relation between the brain and the mind advocated. A different theory of phenomenal consciousness is described, in which there is a particular (...) Download Export citation Bookmark 1 citation
Mind causality : a computational neuroscience approach.Edmund T. Rolls - forthcoming - Frontiers in Computational Neuroscience.details A neuroscience-based approach has recently been proposed for the relation between the mind and the brain. The proposal is that events at the sub-neuronal, neuronal, and neuronal network levels take place simultaneously to perform a computation that can be described at a high level as a mental state, with content about the world. It is argued that as the processes at the different levels of explanation take place at the same time, they are linked by a non-causal supervenient relationship: causality (...) Download Export citation Bookmark 1 citation
A Higher-Order Theory of Emotional Consciousness.Joseph LeDoux & Richard Brown - 2017 - Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America 114 (10):E2016-E2025.details Emotional states of consciousness, or what are typically called emotional feelings, are traditionally viewed as being innately programed in subcortical areas of the brain, and are often treated as different from cognitive states of consciousness, such as those related to the perception of external stimuli. We argue that conscious experiences, regardless of their content, arise from one system in the brain. On this view, what differs in emotional and non-emotional states is the kind of inputs that are processed by a (...) Download Export citation Bookmark 36 citations

1