I this paper, I address the question of why it is important to inquire into the epistemic blameworthiness of the consumers of disinformation. In response, I defend the claim, recently challenged by A. Worsnip, that this question is relevant for the second question of how the problem of disinformation should be effectively dealt with. Against Wornsip’s explicit argument to the contrary, I defend an account of epistemic blameworthiness from which it follows that the strategy of endeavouring to educate blameworthy disinformation (...) consumers holds promise. Moreover, I defend the claim that the blameworthiness of disinformation consumers is also relevant for the question of whether attempting to educate them, above and beyond an effective strategy, would be a fair way to fix the problem. In the final part, I address the complication that unfair educational strategies may still prove useful, and so be all-things-considered justified, if better alternatives are not available. (shrink)