This essay unpacks a seeming paradox: a concept used to formulate, promote, and legitimate oppressive ideologies—a concept used to formulate mistaken, because they were typological, biological theories about human diversity—is, it seems, the same concept that now promises to deliver wonderful, socially sensitized, innovative results in social and genetic epidemiology. But how could that be? How could scientists expect a concept as problematic as ordinary race to deliver useful scientific results? I propose that there is a process for retranslating Ballungen (...) race concepts in appropriate ways to make them fit and work within social scientific and bioscientific contexts. (shrink)

ABSTRACT A key selling point of pharmacogenetics is the genetic stratification of either patients or diseases in order to target the prescribing of medicine. The hope is that genetically ‘tailored’ medicines will replace the current ‘one‐size‐fits‐all’ paradigm of drug development and usage. This paper is concerned with the relationship between difference and justice in the use of pharmacogenetics. This new technology, which facilitates the identification and use of difference, has, we shall argue, the potential to lead to injustice either by (...) the inappropriate use of difference or through the inappropriate failure to use difference. We build on empirical data from a detailed study of the range of options for the development of pharmacogenetics to present a consideration of the ethical issues that surround patient and disease stratification. In it we explore the ways in which the use of pharmacogenetics may lead to the creation of new, genetically stratified, forms of difference and new forms of injustice based on these divisions. We also examine the ways in which existing forms of difference and social stratification may interact with the use of pharmacogenetics. In conclusion, we suggest how an understanding of these ethical issues could usefully inform future policy discussions. (shrink)

The characters of tragedy are in some sense responsible for their errors. However, given their ignorance of the consequences of their actions, it seems that they ought not be held responsible by others for what they have done. This is a paradox. The way to resolve the paradox is to distinguish two kinds of agent responsibility: accountability and culpability. Being accountable is primarily a private affair, whereas being culpable entails the possibility of just punishment.