In an interesting essay published in this journal Jonathan Floyd has recently argued (Citation2009) that, contrary to widespread opinion, political philosophy is not too a‐historical, for historical facts cannot ground timeless political principles. In the following I would like to reply to his theses showing that the authors he criticises aim in fact to show that our historical situation gives us a decisive clue as to the tasks that philosophical theory has to address; that philosophical argumentation rests on normative beliefs (...) that we expect our audience to take for granted, and that these beliefs are historically embedded. Finally, although the historicity of normative beliefs has been often used to reject universalism, current scholarship includes important attempts to combine historicity and universalism. (shrink)

Among those who know Yehuda's work, the term “two-tier thinking” is usually associated with a problematic relativist position. But “two-tier thinking” is not a name for a philosophical argument; it is best understood, I think, as a term designating certain conditions of knowledge: universal, or modern, or perhaps only postmodern conditions, but in any case, they are generalizations derived from anthropological and psychological observations on matters of facts. This is how things actually work in the sphere of knowledge: Western intellectuals (...) and scientists tend to acknowledge that their truth claims and certainly their normative claims are incompatible with other claims that stem from other belief systems, frameworks of thought or genres of discourses, and there is no final, impartial instance of judgment to adjudicate between the incompatible claims and the conflicting systems. Lack of “final,” impartial judgment does not hinder people from taking their truth claims seriously and acting as realists within the world constituted by their particular belief systems — tier 1. But when they come to reflect upon it, as some of them do, sometimes, they acknowledge the context-dependence of this realism and the fact that there is no way to make good on its claim to universality; theirs, they know, is but one particular “belief system,” or “genre of discourse,” among many. (shrink)

. This paper questions nearly every major point Christina Lafont makes about “the validity of social norms” and their relation to moral realism and Kantian constructivism. I distinguish realisms from theories of objective or subjective knowledge, then from cognitivism. Next, I distinguish Kant and constructivism from Rawls' political constructivism. Finally, I propose clues for an alternative theory of moral constructivism.

Rorty's assessment of the origins of the analytic/continental divide is discussed and criticized on several grounds. Rorty's plea in favour of the philosophical quietism implicit in the pragmatists' dismissal of metaphysics rests on an uncritical faith in scientific progress. To emphasize the tensions implicit in the ideal of progress a novel interpretation of the significance of Faust's encounter with Sorge (Care) is offered and compared with Heidegger's construal of Sorge in Sein und Zeit . A better understanding of the analytic/continental (...) divide is gained if we concentrate on the impact of Nazism and Fascism on the philosophical tradition with which philosophers living on the Continent had to come to terms after the Second World War. In this respect Adorno's attitude to progress in general and to philosophy in particular is very instructive and can be usefully contrasted with Rorty's dismissal of metaphysics. (shrink)

The move to Postmodernism in argumentation is often predicated on the rejection of the formal basis of argument in logic. While this rejection may be justified, and is widely discussed in the literature, the loss of logic creates problems that a Postmodern theory of argument must address without recourse to logic and its attendant modernist assumptions. This essay argues that conceiving of argument in terms ofpractices will address the key problematics of Postmodernism without abandoning those features of argumentation that make (...) it an important social, cultural and political practice. Implications for both theory and pedagogy are discussed. (shrink)

The most important sources of contemporary American literary theory are neither the linguistics-based movement of French structuralism, as the term 'poststructuralism' implies, nor a 'modernity' that has been superseded, as the term 'postmodernism' implies, but rather a modernist tradition of aesthetics shaped by eighteenth- and early nineteenth-century German romanticism and idealism, movements that culminated in the work of Heidegger during the Weimar period between the World Wars and afterward, exercising an increasingly dominant influence on French theorists after World War II, (...) from Sartre through Derrida, and subsequently on the development of poststructuralism and postmodernism during the 1970s and 1980s in the United States. This essay strives to put well-accepted facts and issues within what Wittgenstein called a 'perspicuous' perspective. Although it is common to observe that deconstruction shares with Romanticism certain very general features, the same judgment is not often applied to deconstruction's semiotic account of language as a system of arbitrary signs without positive values. The essay's claim, by contrast, is that romanticist, especially German influences, operating in complementary relation with influences from the English and French Enlightenments, provided the cultural and conceptual milieu in which literary theory's distinctively modern, characteristically ontological, and anti-metaphysical view of language developed. (shrink)

The paper is aimed at discussing two interpretations of pragmatism in a broader framework of general rules of philosophical interpretation. J. Habermas' and R. Rorty's uses of pragmatism are considered in detail and confronted with general assumptions of pragmatic philosophy. It is shown that in both cases the original ideas of pragmatism are changed in order to fit the philosophies of interpreters. The paper ends with discussion of a possibility of applying the rule of interpretative charity and dialogue to philosophical (...) analyses. Key Words: communication • dialogue • interpretation • postmodernism • pragmatism • tradition • transcendentalism. (shrink)