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A case study in neuroethics: the nature of moral judgment

In Judy Illes (ed.), Neuroethics: Defining the Issues in Theory, Practice, and Policy. Oxford University Press (2005)

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Mózg z moralnego punktu widzenia. Postulat neurobiologicznej „rekalibracji etyki”.Barbara Chyrowicz - 2020 - Diametros 17 (63):1-33.details Z propozycją rekalibracji etyki i zastąpienia jej neuroetyką wystąpiła Patricia S. Churchland. Churchland twierdzi, że im bardziej rozumiemy szczegóły funkcjonowania naszego systemu nerwowego, tym bardziej jesteśmy przekonani co do tego, że przyjmowane przez nas standardy moralnego działania są uwarunkowane neurobiologicznie. Od roku 2002 termin „neuroetyka” funkcjonuje jako nazwa nowej subdyscypliny etyki. Wymienia się w niej dwa zasadnicze działy: etykę neuronauki i neuronaukę etyki. Pierwszy dotyczy zasadniczo moralnych problemów związanych z zastosowaniem osiągnięć neuronauk, przedmiotem drugiego: neuronauki etyki, jest wpływ, jaki wiedza (...) Download Export citation Bookmark
Criminal Responsibility and Neuroscience: No Revolution Yet.Ariane Bigenwald & Valerian Chambon - 2019 - Frontiers in Psychology 10.details Since the 90’s, neurolaw is on the rise. At the heart of heated debates lies the recurrent theme of a neuro-revolution of criminal responsibility. However, caution should be observed: the alleged foundations of criminal responsibility (amongst which free will) are often inaccurate and the relative imperviousness of its real foundations to scientific facts often underestimated. Neuroscientific findings may impact on social institutions, but only insofar as they also engage in a political justification of the changes being called for, convince populations, (...) Download Export citation Bookmark 10 citations
(1 other version)From desire to subjective value: what neuroeconomics reveals about naturalism.Daniel F. Hartner - 2014 - Erasmus Journal for Philosophy and Economics 7 (1):1.details Philosophers now regularly appeal to data from neuroscience and psychology to settle longstanding disputes between competing philosophical theories, such as theories of moral decision-making and motivation. Such naturalistic projects typically aim to promote continuity between philosophy and the sciences by attending to the empirical constraints that the sciences impose on conceptual disputes in philosophy. This practice of checking philosophical theories of moral agency against the available empirical data is generally encouraging, yet it can leave unexamined crucial empirical assumptions that lie (...) Download Export citation Bookmark
(1 other version)From Desire to Subjective Value: On the Neural Mechanisms of Moral Motivation.Daniel F. Hartner - 2014 - Erasmus Journal for Philosophy and Economics 7 (1):1-26.details Increasingly, empirically minded moral philosophers are using data from cognitive science and neuroscience to resolve some longstanding philosophical questions about moral motivation, such as whether moral beliefs require the presence of a desire to motivate. These empirical approaches are implicitly committed to the existence of folk psychological mental states like beliefs and desires. However, data from the neuroscience of decision-making, particularly cellular-level work in neuroeconomics, is now converging with data from cognitive and social neuroscience to explain the processes through which (...) Download Export citation Bookmark
Existentialism as Biology.Ronald de Sousa - 2010 - Emotion Review 2 (1):76-83.details Existentialism is compatible with a broadly biological vision of who we are. This thesis is grounded in an analysis of “concrete” or “individual” possibility, which differs from standard conceptions of possibility in that it allows for possibilities to come into being or disappear through time. Concrete possibilities are introduced both in individual life and by major transitions in evolution. In particular, the advent of ultrasociality and of language has enabled human goals to be formulated in partial independence from the vestigial (...) Download Export citation Bookmark

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