Dialogo filosofijos mąstytojų Rosenzweig‘o ir Levino darbų esmė – mirties bedugnės ir asmens tapatumo santykis. Rosenzweig‘as niekį laiko galutiniu kantiškojo mąstymo tašku. Mirtis, kaip egzistencinis niekio patyrimas, buvo laikoma kiekvieno žmogaus realybe sudėtingu amžių sandūros laikotarpiu. Rosenzweig‘ui niekis buvo atspirties taškas, permąstant ir siekiant išsaugoti asmens tapatumą. Asmens tapatumas apsaugo nuo niekio, tačiau jis taip pat yra atviras pokyčiams. Savo ankstyvuosiuose tekstuose Levinas daro panašias prielaidas, laikydamas Buvimą asmens tapatumo pradžia. Levinas plėtojo dialektinę fenomenologiją pradėdamas nuo mirties. Asmens tapatumas traktuojamas (...) kaip hipostazė, tačiau Levino darbe „Totalité et Infini“ įvyksta svarbus lūžis – jame asmens tapatumo šaltiniu laikomas troškimas. Buvimas tampa dėmesio centru kaip antroji elementale pusė, o asmens tapatumas suvokiamas kaip atsiskyrimas. (shrink)

The aim of the work is to examine the relationship between the concepts of “immanence” and “politics” in the works of Hegel and Deleuze. Both Hegel and Deleuze are thinkers of immanence and they explicitly think this concept in relation to the problem of political practice. As I show, they attempt to “ground” politics in immanence. The purpose of this work is to prove that there exists an inherent paradox in the undertaking to “ground” politics in immanence. Both philosophers are (...) confronted with a paradox that emerges from this “grounding”. The paradox appears in the form of natural violence. Both authors fail to contain this violence through arguments. In order to show this, I examine the relationship between two further concepts: history and the state. I compare Hegel’s and Deleuze’s formulations of world-history and universal history, tracing the analogies and differences in how they think the relationship of the state to history. Based on the conclusions I then focus on the relationship of politics to immanence. The paradox of natural violence, I show, emerges from the relationship of the state at the “end of history”. (shrink)

This work offers a critical approach to Franz Rosenzweig?s conception of community in The Star of Redemption based on Helmuth Plessner?s political anthropology. First, it presents Plessner?s critique of social radicalism and of the apoliticism of the German spirit, and its parallelism with the Jewish spirit. Second, it delves into the passage from Hegel und der Staat to The Star in a communitarian key. Third, it dwells on the difference between community of blood and community of faith in Rosenzweig, together (...) with his theological-political translation into the distinction between the eternal people and the peoples of the world. Last, as a conclusion, it makes manifest the apoliticism of the Rosenzweigian proposal, and therefore, its incapacity to give an answer to the political problem in Weimar, of which its catastrophic consequences Rosenzweig did not know. (shrink)

Die Idee des modernen Verfassungsstaats beruht auf dem Akt der freiheitlichen Selbstbestimmung aller Bürger*innen. Insofern bildet er die ethische Institution schlechthin. Denn wo das Volk die Parameter der Freiheit bestimmt, da gilt es, das Wesen der Freiheit selbst zu begreifen. Bleibt dieses Begreifen aus, wird der Gründungsakt zur gewesenen Freiheit und die Verwaltung des Staats zur Expert*innensache. Doch wo bleibt da die kreative Freiheit? Diese Frage macht eine Kritik der ethischen Institution notwendig. Dabei zeigt Thies Münchow in Anschluss an Kant (...) und Hegel den integralen Zusammenhang von Ethik und Politik auf und nimmt zuletzt eine Neubestimmung der politischen Theologie vor. (shrink)

The article takes critiques of the entanglement of law with violence as a point of departure for exploring the possibility of a ‘tertium of law’. It thereby seeks to overcome the dichotomous basic assumptions that see law as always oscillating between an apology for violence on the one hand, and a utopia of reason on the other. The text analyses the possibility of this ‘tertium’, a ‘legal force’ beyond legal violence and legal reason, in four steps, drawing on the work (...) of Jacques Derrida and authors of the first generation of the Frankfurt School, in particular on Theodor Adorno and Walter Benjamin. It argues that in a first step law needs to be dissociated from the State. The violence of law, however, does not stem solely from law’s ties with State power. Law itself is violent even where it is not State law. The second step of legal critique thus needs to consist in the commemoration of legal violence, followed by a third that demands the transformation of violence to force. These three instances of critique are the precondition for a last and essential step according to which a critique of law must facilitate the transcendence of legal violence by taking law and its promise of justice at its word in order to turn this promise against law itself. (shrink)

This work offers a critical approach to Franz Rosenzweig’s conception of community in The Star of Redemption based on Helmuth Plessner’s political anthropology. First, it presents Plessner’s critique of social radicalism and of the apoliticism of the German spirit, and its parallelism with the Jewish spirit. Second, it delves into the passage from Hegel und der Staat to The Star in a communitarian key. Third, it dwells on the difference between community of blood and community of faith in Rosenzweig, together (...) with his theological-political translation into the distinction between the eternal people and the peoples of the world. Last, as a conclusion, it makes manifest the apoliticism of the Rosenzweigian proposal, and therefore, its incapacity to give an answer to the political problem in Weimar, of which its catastrophic consequences Rosenzweig did not know. (shrink)

U Rozencvajgovom tekstu?Das?lteste Systemprogramm des deutschen Idealismus. Ein handschriftlicher Fund?, iznenadjuje nepostojanje komentara jednog od najmisterioznijih fragmenata tog kratkog dvostranog rukopisa koji je Rozencvajg otkrio 1914. godine u Pruskoj drzavnoj biblioteci u Berlinu. Rozencvajg detaljno analizira svaki njegov deo dokazujuci cinjenicu da rukopis kojim je napisan ovaj dokument ne podrazumeva da je Hegel i autor tog teksta, potpuno stavljajuci u drugi plan onaj slavan, sasvim anarhistican i radikalan fragment o drzavi. Dakle, moje pitanje je zasto izostaje Rozencvajgova argumentacija o Selingovom (...) razumevanju drzave ili preciznije, kako su Selingovi stavovi o drzavi inkorporisani i transformisani u tekstovima Franca Rozencvajga? Kako Rozencvajg upotrebljava ove fragmente i zasto nigde ne tematizuje Selingove refleksije o drzavi ili Selingovo revolucionarno ucenje o drzavi, kako ga naziva u pomenutom tekstu? (shrink)

This paper is a reconstruction of Levinas’ reading of Hegel and his understanding of violence. Combining Franz Rosenzweig’s reflections which concern the sick philosopher and Hegel’s state, as well as Derrida’s interpretation of the different attributes of violence, our aim is also to give full evidence of Derrida’s critical reading of Levinas. The first part illustrates the various classifications of the figures of violence from the different periods of Hegel’s life and the traces that these figures have left in Levinas’ (...) texts beginning with ‘Liberté et commandement’ in 1953. In the second part we discuss Hegel’s well-known analogy from his Rechtsphilosophie on sovereignty and the organism—that is to say the parallel reading of some paragraphs of Naturphilosophie too—and the relation between totality and violence, in Levinas’ ‘ontology as allergy’ and in Derrida’s autoimmunology. (shrink)