Invalidation from healthcare practitioners is an experience shared by many patients, especially those marginalized or living with contested conditions (e.g., chronic pain, fibromyalgia, etc.). Invalidation can include not taking someone’s testimony seriously, imposing one’s thoughts, discrediting someone’s emotions, or not perceiving someone’s testimony as equal and competent. Epistemic injustices, that is, the disqualification of a person as a knower, are a form of invalidation. Epistemic injustices have been used as a theoretical framework to understand invalidation that occurs in the patient-healthcare (...) provider relationship. However, to date, the different recommendations to achieve epistemic justice have not been listed, analyzed, nor compared yet. This paper aims at better understanding the state of the literature and to critically review possible avenues to achieve epistemic justice in healthcare. A systematic and critical review of the existing literature on epistemic justice was conducted. The search in four databases identified 629 articles, from which 35 were included in the review. Strategies to promote epistemic justice that can be applied to healthcare are mapped in the literature and sorted in six different approaches to epistemic justice, including virtuous, structural, narrative, cognitive, and partnership approaches, as well as resistance strategies. These strategies are critically appraised. A patient partnership approach based on the Montreal Model, implemented at all levels of healthcare systems, seems promising to promote epistemic justice in healthcare. (shrink)

Being able to measure informed choice represents a mechanism for service evaluation to monitor whether informed choice is achieved in practice. Approaches to measuring informed choice to date have been based in the biomedical hegemony. Overlooked is the effect of epistemic positioning, that is, how people are positioned as credible knowers in relation to knowledge tested as being relevant for informed choice. To identify and describe studies that have measured informed choice in the context of prenatal screening and to describe (...) epistemic positioning of pregnant people in these studies. Online databases to identify papers published from 2005 to 2021. The PRISMA-ScR checklist guided data collection, analysis and reporting. Secondary analysis that considered hermeneutics (e.g., knowledge that was tested, study design) and testimony (e.g., population descriptors) developed a priori. Twenty-nine studies explored the measurement of informed choice. None reported that pregnant people were involved in the design of the study. Two studies reported pregnant people had some involvement in the design of the measurement. Knowledge tested for informed choice included technical aspects of screening, conditions screened and mathematical concepts. Twenty-seven studies attributed informed choice to population descriptors (e.g., race/ethnicity, age, education). Population descriptors were reified as characteristics of epistemic credibility for informed choice obtained. For example, when compared to a high school qualification, a tertiary qualification was a statistically significant characteristic of informed choice. When compared by race, white people were found to be significantly more likely to make an informed choice. Additional demographic descriptors such as age, language spoken, faith and previous pregnancies were used to further explain differences for informed choice obtained. Explanations about underlying assumptions of population descriptors were infrequent. Using population descriptors in the biomedical hegemony as explanatory variables for informed choice can position (groups of) people as more, or less, epistemically credible. Such positioning could perpetuate epistemic injustices in practice leading to inequitable access to healthcare. To better uphold (pregnant) people as credible knowers population descriptors should instead be contextual (and contextualising) variables. For example, as indicators of social privilege. Further, making room for ways of knowing that go beyond the biomedical hegemony requires the development of epistemically just ‘measures’ through intentional, inclusive design. (shrink)

Both stigma and discrimination, defined as a lack of knowledge of and a sense of discomfort in providing care to lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, queer, intersex, and + (LGBTQIA+) migrants, was found to manifest in a sample of LGBTQIA+ migrants who received nursing care in a recent study. The study concluded that nurses continue to have a limited understanding of the experiences of LGBTQIA+ migrants in the Canadian context, and that LGBTQIA+ migrants continue to have troubling 'care' experiences with nurses. (...) Miranda Fricker has developed the concept of epistemic injustice drawing on feminist philosophy and social epistemology. Epistemic injustice refers to unfair treatment of a person by judging them as 'not a knower' in a communicative situation. For example, in a few circumstances when LGBTQIA+ migrants were admitted to psychiatric units due to suicide ideations as a direct result of identifying as a LGBTQIA+ migrants, the medical and nursing team responded with 'They are in Canada now. It is safe here!' and 'So, you are [LGBTQIA + ]! What's the big deal?' These unjust statements reflect an epistemic situation in which the hearer is negating what was heard, that is, that the speaker's intersecting identities of LGBTQIA+ and new immigrant has directly led to suicide ideation. The concept of epistemic injustice helps to frame this situation as one where the care provider is not doing justice to the needs of LGBTQIA+ migrants. This article draws on the narrative of an LGBTQIA+ migrant who is not recognised as a credible source of knowledge about their own lives and needs in the context of Canadian nursing care. Epistemic injustice helps to understand how stigma and discrimination is produced in this community by the very nursing profession who ostensibly want to help them. (shrink)