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  1. Do Different Groups Have Different Epistemic Intuitions? A Reply to Jennifer Nagel1.Stephen Stich - 2012 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 87 (1):151-178.
    Intuitions play an important role in contemporary epistemology. Over the last decade, however, experimental philosophers have published a number of studies suggesting that epistemic intuitions may vary in ways that challenge the widespread reliance on intuitions in epistemology. In a recent paper, Jennifer Nagel offers a pair of arguments aimed at showing that epistemic intuitions do not, in fact, vary in problematic ways. One of these arguments relies on a number of claims defended by appeal to the psychological literature on (...)
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  • Attention, ritual glitches, and attentional pull: the president and the queen.C. Jason Throop & Alessandro Duranti - 2015 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 14 (4):1055-1082.
    This article proposes an analysis of a ritual glitch and resulting “misfire” from the standpoint of a phenomenologically informed anthropology of human interaction. Through articulating a synthesis of some of Husserl‘s insights on attention and affection with concepts and methods developed by anthropologists and other students of human interaction, a case is made for the importance of understanding the social organization of attention in ritual encounters. An analysis of a failed toast during President Obama’s 2011 State Visit to the United (...)
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  • (1 other version)Folk Theory of Mind: Conceptual Foundations of Human Social Cognition.Bertram F. Malle - 2005 - In Ran R. Hassin, James S. Uleman & John A. Bargh (eds.), The New Unconscious. Oxford Series in Social Cognition and Social Neuroscience. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 225-255.
    The human ability to represent, conceptualize, and reason about mind and behavior is one of the greatest achievements of human evolution and is made possible by a “folk theory of mind” — a sophisticated conceptual framework that relates different mental states to each other and connects them to behavior. This chapter examines the nature and elements of this framework and its central functions for social cognition. As a conceptual framework, the folk theory of mind operates prior to any particular conscious (...)
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  • (1 other version)Folk theory of mind: Conceptual foundations of social cognition.Bertram F. Malle - 2003 - In [Book Chapter] (in Press). pp. 225-255.
    The human ability to represent, conceptualize, and reason about mind and behavior is one of the greatest achievements of human evolution and is made possible by a “folk theory of mind” — a sophisticated conceptual framework that relates different mental states to each other and connects them to behavior. This chapter examines the nature and elements of this framework and its central functions for social cognition. As a conceptual framework, the folk theory of mind operates prior to any particular conscious (...)
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  • The social ontology of intentions.Alessandro Duranti - 2006 - Discourse Studies 8 (1):31-40.
    This article addresses the issue of how to develop a theory of interpretation of social action that takes into consideration culture-specific claims about intentions while simultaneously allowing for a pan-human, universal dimension of intentionality. It is argued that to achieve such a goal, it is necessary to agree on a basic definition of intentionality and on the conditions that allow for its investigation. After briefly discussing the limitations of applying an ‘narrow’ notion of intention to the analysis of other languages (...)
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