Overcoming corruption and authoritarian government in developing countries is hampered by global institutional arrangements. In particular, international borrowing and resource privileges, which entitle those exercising power in a country to borrow in its name and to effect legally valid transfers of ownership rights in its resources, can be obstacles to achieving democracy. These international conventions greatly increase the incentives toward attempts at coups d'état, especially in countries with a large resource sector. In exploring how this problem might be highlighted and (...) addressed, it is essential to understand that affluent societies have a great interest in upholding the prevailing institutional arrangements: Their banks benefit from their international lending and, far more importantly, their firms and people benefit greatly from cheap resource supplies. Institutional reform is more likely, then, to come from the developing countries.Thus, fledgling democracies may be able to improve their stability through constitutional amendments that bar future unconstitutional governments from borrowing in the country's name and from conferring ownership rights in its public property. Such amendments would render insecure the claims of those who lend to, or buy from, dictators, thus reducing the rewards of coups d'état. This strategy might be resisted by the more affluent societies, but such resistance could perhaps be overcome if many developing countries pursued the proposed strategy together, and if some moral support emerged among the citizenries of affluent societies. (shrink)

This paper introduces a novel account of freedom of dissociation, construed as the “right to a fair exit.” It defines freedom of dissociation as the right to end an association without excessive and undue costs. This novel account contrasts with the classic right of exit that some liberal philosophers have theorized as the bedrock of associational freedom. The original right of exit is first and foremost concerned with the protection against excessive exit costs, while the right to a fair exit (...) broadens its scope to include undue costs as well. State policy should aim at monitoring and resourcing exit not only to ensure that leavers have adequate exit options, but also that the costs of exit are fairly divided between parties. This account illuminates a range of cases, such as divorce, dissolution of employment contracts, and contested exits from religious associations. (shrink)

Political philosophy has difficulties to cope with the complexity and variety of state-religions relations. ‘Strict separationism’ is still the preferred option amongst liberals, deliberative and republican democrats, socialist and feminists. In this article, I develop a complex typology based on comparative history and sociology of religions. I summarize my reasons why institutional pluralist models like plural establishment or non-constitutional pluralism are attractive not only for religious minorities but for religiously deeply diverse societies in general. Most attention is paid defending associative (...) democracy, the most flexible and open variety of institutional pluralism, against realist objections that group representation is incompatible with liberal democracy, that it leads to stigmatization and bureaucratization, that it strengthens undemocratic leaders, that it leads to an ossification of the status quo, and, most importantly, that it is inherently divisive undermining social cohesion and political unity. In my refutation of these objections I try to show that it helps to integrate minority religions into liberal democratic policies compatible with reasonable pluralism and to prevent religious and political fundamentalism. (shrink)

Across countries, governments are urging civil society, in particular charitable and non-profit associations, to take up a part of the social burden, and to produce and provide critical human services and social goods, either independently or on governments' behalf. This type of privatization, or public–private partnership, is encouraged by many on grounds of pluralism and liberty, as empowering individuals and their associations. In this paper, I aim to provide a liberty-based normative argument against privatization. A common view, supported by both (...) conservatives and classical liberals, is that the more social responsibility is left or delegated to civil society, the more civil society will flourish. I contend, by contrast, that when political societies rely on civil society to provide critical goods and services, individuals' freedom of association is threatened. The consequence of privatization is a multiple loss, in terms of individual freedom, value pluralism and the expressive character of civil society. (shrink)