This inaugural handbook documents the distinctive research field that utilizes history and philosophy in investigation of theoretical, curricular and pedagogical issues in the teaching of science and mathematics. It is contributed to by 130 researchers from 30 countries; it provides a logically structured, fully referenced guide to the ways in which science and mathematics education is, informed by the history and philosophy of these disciplines, as well as by the philosophy of education more generally. The first handbook to cover the (...) field, it lays down a much-needed marker of progress to date and provides a platform for informed and coherent future analysis and research of the subject. -/- The publication comes at a time of heightened worldwide concern over the standard of science and mathematics education, attended by fierce debate over how best to reform curricula and enliven student engagement in the subjects There is a growing recognition among educators and policy makers that the learning of science must dovetail with learning about science; this handbook is uniquely positioned as a locus for the discussion. -/- The handbook features sections on pedagogical, theoretical, national, and biographical research, setting the literature of each tradition in its historical context. Each chapter engages in an assessment of the strengths and weakness of the research addressed, and suggests potentially fruitful avenues of future research. A key element of the handbook’s broader analytical framework is its identification and examination of unnoticed philosophical assumptions in science and mathematics research. It reminds readers at a crucial juncture that there has been a long and rich tradition of historical and philosophical engagements with science and mathematics teaching, and that lessons can be learnt from these engagements for the resolution of current theoretical, curricular and pedagogical questions that face teachers and administrators. (shrink)

In this paper, I argue that, contrary to common opinion, a counterexample against a philosophical theory does not amount to conclusive evidence against that theory. Instead, the method of counterexamples allows for the derivation of a disjunction, i.e., ‘either the theory is false or an auxiliary assumption is false’, not a negation of the target theory. This is so because, whenever the method of counterexamples is used in an attempt to refute a philosophical theory, there is a crucial auxiliary assumption (...) that needs to be taken into account. The auxiliary assumption is that making intuitive judgments in response to hypothetical cases about the subject matter in question (e.g., knowledge or proper names) is a good method for finding out truths about that subject matter. Without good reasons to think that this assumption is warranted, the negation of a philosophical theory whose content is alleged to be in conflict with the content of an intuition cannot be justifiably derived using an argument that employs the method of counterexamples. (shrink)

It is the continuity between epistemology and empirical science that the naturalism in contemporary philosophy of science emphasizes. After its individual and social dimensions, the philosophy of scientific practice takes a stand on naturalism in order to observe complex scientific activities through practice. However, regarding the naturalism’s problem of normativity, the philosophy of scientific practice today has deconstructed more than it has constructed.

Computational modeling plays an increasingly important explanatory role in cases where we investigate systems or problems that exceed our native epistemic capacities. One clear case where technological enhancement is indispensable involves the study of complex systems.1 However, even in contexts where the number of parameters and interactions that define a problem is small, simple systems sometimes exhibit non-linear features which computational models can illustrate and track. In recent decades, computational models have been proposed as a way to assist us in (...) understanding emergent phenomena. (shrink)

The anti-exceptionalist debate brought into play the problem of what are the relevant data for logical theories and how such data affects the validities accepted by a logical theory. In the present paper, I depart from Laudan's reticulated model of science to analyze one aspect of this problem, namely of the role of logical data within the process of revision of logical theories. For this, I argue that the ubiquitous nature of logical data is responsible for the proliferation of several (...) distinct methodologies for logical theories. The resulting picture is coherent with the Laudanean view that agreement and disagreement between scientific theories take place at different levels. From this perspective, one is able to articulate other kinds of divergence that considers not only the inferential aspects of a given logical theory, but also the epistemic aims and the methodological choices that drive its development. (shrink)

It is generally accepted among philosophers of science that hypothesis testing is a key methodological feature of science. As far as philosophical theories of confirmation are con...

What is the research for in the society? We may imagine the professionals engaged in these activities, shall we say, university professors, researchers in the public and private institutions, and even the lay inventors at home or in the neighborhood. The research is related with some of knowledge or ideas, which, however, should be creative and original. It is the main function of those professionals, and can develop in dissemination of the findings produced by research. It frontiers the knowledge of (...) humans which enables a better view of world and generates the public welfare. The scholars are often those professionals who are required or in some cases, squeezed to produce an original contribution to the specific field of academy. As the society develops, we now require a scientific knowledge beyond the plain understanding of the nature and society. The scientific knowledge is qualified of some elements, i.e., evidence-based, universal frame to be applied, sense of understanding, pragmatic in comprehension or application, more persuasion on theory, paradigm, typologies, intersubjectivity, empirical relevance and so. It informs a philosophy of humans, makes them conscientious and knowledgeable, as well as enhances a professional performance for not only their field but also other disciplines. For example, the criminal justice system borrows the idea or information confirmed by other disciplines, psychology and sociology notably. What is the Durham rule in the excuse of culpability? The scope of rule could not enjoy a persuasion if not to be supported by the works of psychologists. The scientific knowledge perhaps could recourse its most salient dynamism in coupling with an economic exploitation. A cultivation of knowledge to serve the economic use and its industrialization reveals it’s competitive edge in the society. The kind of concepts, information age, e-technology, and intellectual property rights are leading the present time of narrative as we see routinely. May new laws, and new concept of e-education or e-government, GMO products as well as the travel of universe in the near future also follow that the updated profile of scientific knowledge on the engineering and natural science contributed to expand our horizon of subsistence. (shrink)

This paper discusses a recent opposition between the influential dynamic semantic account of presupposition projection and a recent Gricean-pragmatic theory. The Gricean-pragmatic theory is partly motivated by an influential ob- jection to dynamic semantics based on the compatibility of dynamic systems with connectives and operators exhibiting deviant projection behaviors. By identifying key features of the role of prediction and explanation in semantics, it is argued that the objection is based on a mistaken conception of the involve- ment of empirical foundations (...) in semantic theories. The paper shows that the dynamic paradigm does not suffer from either predictive or explanatory inad- equacy. The chapter concludes that while it is too early to decide in favor of either approach, the Gricean alternative to dynamic semantics cannot be seen as motivated by a flaw in the latter theories. (shrink)

Explaining phenomena is a primary goal of science. Consequently, it is unsurprising that gaining a proper understanding of the nature of explanation is an important goal of science education. In order to properly understand explanation, however, it is not enough to simply consider theories of the nature of explanation. Properly understanding explanation requires grasping the relation between explanation and understanding, as well as how explanations can lead to scientific knowledge. This article examines the nature of explanation, its relation to understanding, (...) and how explanations are used to generate scientific knowledge via inferences to the best explanation. Studying these features and applications of explanation not only provides insight into a concept that is important for science education in its own right, but also sheds light on an aspect of recent debates concerning the so-called consensus view of nature of science (NOS). Once the relation between explanation, understanding, and knowledge is clear, it becomes apparent that science is unified in important ways. Seeing this unification provides some support for thinking that there are general features of NOS of the sort proposed by the consensus view and that teaching about these general features of NOS should be a goal of science education. (shrink)

What is the research for in the society? We may imagine the professionals engaged in these activities, shall we say, university professors, researchers in the public and private institutions, and even the lay inventors at home or in the neighborhood. The research is related with some of knowledge or ideas, which, however, should be creative and original. It is the main function of those professionals, and can develop in dissemination of the findings produced by research. It frontiers the knowledge of (...) humans which enables a better view of world and generates the public welfare. The scholars are often those professionals who are required or in some cases, squeezed to produce an original contribution to the specific field of academy. As the society develops, we now require a scientific knowledge beyond the plain understanding of the nature and society. The scientific knowledge is qualified of some elements, i.e., evidence-based, universal frame to be applied, sense of understanding, pragmatic in comprehension or application, more persuasion on theory, paradigm, typologies, intersubjectivity, empirical relevance and so. It informs a philosophy of humans, makes them conscientious and knowledgeable, as well as enhances a professional performance for not only their field but also other disciplines. For example, the criminal justice system borrows the idea or information confirmed by other disciplines, psychology and sociology notably. What is the Durham rule in the excuse of culpability? The scope of rule could not enjoy a persuasion if not to be supported by the works of psychologists. The scientific knowledge perhaps could recourse its most salient dynamism in coupling with an economic exploitation. A cultivation of knowledge to serve the economic use and its industrialization reveals it’s competitive edge in the society. The kind of concepts, information age, e-technology, and intellectual property rights are leading the present time of narrative as we see routinely. Many new laws, and new concept of e-education or e-government, GMO products as well as the travel of universe in the near future also follow that the updated profile of scientific knowledge on the engineering and natural science contributed to expand our horizon of subsistence. With this crucial importance, the author attempts to file some thoughts on the research and society. (shrink)

There are three theories of luck in the literature, each of which tends to appeal to philosophers pursuing different concerns. These are the probability, modal, and control views. I will argue that all three theories are irreparably defective; not only are there counterexamples to each of the three theories of luck, but there are three previously undiscussed classes of counterexamples against them. These are the problems of lucky necessities, skillful luck, and diachronic luck. I conclude that a serious reevaluation of (...) the role of luck in philosophy is called for. (shrink)

The primary purpose of this paper is to argue that biologists should stop citing Karl Popper on what a genuinely scientific theory is. Various ways in which biologists cite Popper on this matter are surveyed, including the use of Popper to settle debates on methodology in phylogenetic systematics. It is then argued that the received view on Popper—namely, that a genuinely scientific theory is an empirically falsifiable one—is seriously mistaken, that Popper’s real view was that genuinely scientific theories have the (...) form of statements of laws of nature. It is then argued that biology arguably has no genuine laws of its own. In place of Popperian falsifiability, it is suggested that a cluster class epistemic values approach (which subsumes empirical falsifiability) is the best solution to the demarcation problem between genuine science and pseudo- or non-science. (shrink)

How can we disentangle the neural basis of phenomenal consciousness from the neural machinery of the cognitive access that underlies reports of phenomenal consciousness? We can see the problem in stark form if we ask how we could tell whether representations inside a Fodorian module are phenomenally conscious. The methodology would seem straightforward: find the neural natural kinds that are the basis of phenomenal consciousness in clear cases when subjects are completely confident and we have no reason to doubt their (...) authority, and look to see whether those neural natural kinds exist within Fodorian modules. But a puzzle arises: do we include the machinery underlying reportability within the neural natural kinds of the clear cases? If the answer is ‘Yes’, then there can be no phenomenally conscious representations in Fodorian modules. But how can we know if the answer is ‘Yes’? The suggested methodology requires an answer to the question it was supposed to answer! The paper argues for an abstract solution to the problem and exhibits a source of empirical data that is relevant, data that show that in a certain sense phenomenal consciousness overflows cognitive accessibility. The paper argues that we can find a neural realizer of this overflow if assume that the neural basis of phenomenal consciousness does not include the neural basis of cognitive accessibility and that this assumption is justified by the explanations it allows. (shrink)

The status of philosophy is contingent upon the civilizations that embrace or undermine its importance. Such status is never fully understood, nor clear, due in part to its inutility. In a goal-oriented world, philosophizing is pointless if it does not produce material results. One point of philosophy though is not only to recognize, but promote activities which are uniquely human and which therefore artificial intelligence could not possibly simulate. Improvisation, as one such activity, can reveal the importance of philosophy as (...) a discipline by maintaining the relevance of subjectivity. In order to justify the presence of philosophy in the university, one important way is to have philosophy maintain the notion that the mental cannot be reduced to the material or physical. Consequently, phenomenology in philosophy’s defense becomes more relevant the more we realize that philosophy is threatened by the interdependency of materialism, A.I. research, and the corporatization of the university. (shrink)

The thesis is a philosophical analysis of the consumption based capital asset pricing model, investigating in particular its epistemological and methodological foundations. Financial markets are integral parts of advanced and developing economies. They matter because they channel unspent household income into banks’ savings accounts and assets such as bonds and stocks. Financial economists have traditionally taken interest in the pricing mechanism that underlies this capital allocation. The consumption based capital asset pricing model is a prominent effort to describe, explain and (...) predict such prices. It tells a story of investors’ trade-off between consumption now and later and which portfolio of assets to hold. The CCAPM based narrative intuitively makes sense, and the chosen methodology involving theoretical assumption, mathematical models and empirical tests follows the professions’ standards of good scientific practise. But does CCAPM’s research programme provide knowledge for use? My thesis seeks to answer this question in a novel way. Instead of embarking on yet another asset pricing research project, I let Philosophy of Science inform my analysis. Following a “primer” introducing essential CCAPM topics and notations, I discuss, in turn, its theoretical foundation, mathematical model, and empirical test results from a philosophy of science perspective. I find that a few fundamental principles and several auxiliary assumptions combine to develop a simplified, partial and idealized theory of investors, financial markets and assets. The model reflects and represents this theory but also makes narrow claims that are distances away from the real situations they target. Unsurprisingly, ideal model assertions fail standard statistical tests of significance. I conclude that mathematical deductive modelling rooted in orthodox, a priori based fundamental principles create ideal and fictional settings that limit their scope and portability. The development of even more granular models within this orthodox paradigm that searches for “event regularities” will not render the desired knowledge for use. The real situations are possibly too complex to be captured in simplified assumptions, ideal theories and mathematical structures. Novel methodological and ontological approaches to asset pricing are in demand. Hence, claims about tendencies in the real data might replace the current focus on point-forecasts. (shrink)

The article distinguishes between subjectivist and objectivist interpretations of scientific method, links subjectivism with good reasons, and argues its uselessness for our understanding of science. It applies the distinction to the method of falsification, explains why objectivism regards falsification to be conjectural, immune to the Duhem–Quine thesis, and immune to the problem of underdetermination. It confronts the falsifying mode of inference with the fallacy of begging the question and with the paradox of inference, and suggests how modus tollens helps scientists (...) to find out that a tested theory is false, in spite of the fact that the falsity of the theory is asserted in its premises. (shrink)

In this response to 32 commentators, I start by clarifying the overflow argument. I explain why the distinction between generic and specific phenomenology is important and why we are justified in acknowledging specific phenomenology in the overflow experiments. Other issues discussed are the relations among report, cognitive access, and attention; panpsychic disaster; the mesh between psychology and neuroscience; and whether consciousness exists.

This paper provides arguments to philosophers, scientists, administrators and students for why science students should be instructed in a mandatory, custom-designed, interdisciplinary course in the philosophy of science. The argument begins by diagnosing that most science students are taught only conventional methodology: a fixed set of methods whose justification is rarely addressed. It proceeds by identifying seven benefits that scientists incur from going beyond these conventions and from acquiring abilities to analyse and evaluate justifications of scientific methods. It concludes that (...) teaching science students these skills makes them better scientists. Based on this argument, the paper then analyses the standard philosophy of science curriculum, and in particular its adequacy for teaching science students. It is argued that the standard curriculum on the one hand lacks important analytic tools relevant for going beyond conventional methodology—especially with respect to non-epistemic normative aspects of scientific practice—while on the other hand contains many topics and tools that are not relevant for the instruction of science students. Consequently, the optimal way of training science students in the analysis and evaluation of scientific methods requires a revision of the standard curriculum. Finally, the paper addresses five common characteristics of students taking such a course, which often clash with typical teaching approaches in philosophy. Strategies how best to deal with these constraints are offered for each of these characteristics. (shrink)

In the paper, I distinguish between the semantic and the “direct” approach to event ontology. The first approach, employed by D. Davidson, starts with logical analysis of natural language. This analysis uncovers quantification over the domain of events. Thus, we have ontological commitment to events and, at the same time, also a suggestion of how to view their nature. The second approach, used by J. Kim and D. Lewis, deals with events “directly”, i.e. not by analyzing language first. Events are (...) postulated because they are useful in other theories and their nature is adjusted to the needs of these theories. In the paper, I analyze both approaches and outline their problems and advantages. I conclude that we should conditionally prefer the latter approach on methodological grounds. This preference is based on the assumption that submitting hypotheses to tests seems to be a crucial part of metaphysical methodology. Since the “direct” approach to event ontology allows for more testing, it should be preferred over the semantic approach. (shrink)

Článek poukazuje na problém, do jaké míry je smysluplné rozlišovat přírodní vědy, sociální vědy a humanitní vědy, respektive co mají tyto vědy společného potud, pokud je lze skutečně nazývat vědou. Jde o následující otázky: Jaký je rozdíl mezi humanitními a sociálními vědami? Je možné vést ostrou demarkační linii mezi humanitními a přírodními vědami a jejich metodami? Co vlastně opravňuje dotyčný systém výpovědí k tomu nazývat se vědou? Je osudem humanitních věd "kvantitativní smrt" či je naopak možné vedle hi-tech úspěšných exaktních (...) věd považovat humanitní vědy za nepostradatelné know-how pro přežití lidské společnosti? Odpovědi na tyto otázky se budou opírat o definici sociální vědy Maxe Webera, požadavek autonomie metod humanitních věd klasické hermeneutiky, univerzální hermeneutiku Hans-Georga Gadamera, scientistický návrh novopozitivismu a v neposlední řadě o řešení problému hodnotové neutrality vědy Hanse Alberta. (shrink)

Taking its clues from Popperian philosophy of science, cladistics adopted a number of assumptions of the empiricist tradition. These include the identification of a dichotomy between observation reports and theoretical statements and its subsequent abandonment on the basis of the insight that all observation reports are theory-laden. The neglect of the ‘context of discovery’, which is the step of theory (hypothesis) generation. The emphasis on coherentism in the ‘context of justification’, which is the step of evaluation of the relative merits (...) of alternative theories. The appeal to a total evidence approach in phylogenetic inference. And finally, a silence about causation, which results in an instrumentalist approach to phylogeny reconstruction. This paper explores how these empiricist assumptions are embedded in phylogenetic systematics, and why these assumptions are problematic for cladists (or any taxonomists). (shrink)

It is the continuity between epistemology and empirical science that the naturalism in contemporary philosophy of science emphasizes. After its individual and social dimensions, the philosophy of scientific practice takes a stand on naturalism in order to observe complex scientific activities through practice. However, regarding the naturalism’s problem of normativity, the philosophy of scientific practice today has deconstructed more than it has constructed.

Empirical science, such as psychology and neuroscience, employ diverse methods to develop data driven models and explanations for complex phenomena. In research on the self, differences in these methods produce different depictions of persons. Research in developmental psychology highlights the role of intuitive beliefs, such as psychological essentialism and intuitive dualism, in individuals’ singular, cohesive, and stable sense of self. On the other hand, research in neuroscience highlights the de-centralized, distributed, multitudes of neural networks in competition making selves, with arguments (...) around whether the interpretation of these data imply that the self is somehow fundamental and special to human functioning. In this paper, I explore these discrepant pictures of the self to advance understanding about personhood. Specifically, I suggest that these divergent pictures of self from psychology and neuroscience have the potential to inform philosophical and theological discussions around personhood by anchoring models of persons in empirical views of persons. Likewise, I explore the opportunity for philosophy and theology to inform and enhance scientific research on the self by critiquing scientific bias and construct development as well as highlighting potential limits in understanding selves with empirical models. (shrink)