The paper explores Plato’s Statesman in the perspective of its philosophical unity and autonomy. The relevance of this approach arises from the problem posed by the traditional readings of the Statesman – the developmental and unitarian. Both methods interpret the Statesman in the context of Plato’s major political dialogues of, the Republic and the Laws, thus preventing the exposing of the internal theoretical coherence of the dialogue. Hence this paper focuses on the analysis of the main political themes of the (...) dialogue – conflict, statesmanship, and political knowledge – and their relations to each other. By discussing the emergence of the political and its importance for conceptualizing political practice, as well as by indicating the structural elements of statesmanship, the author of the paper argues that the Statesman contains a coherent and internally completed political theory. (shrink)

Plato is commonly considered a metaphysical dualist conceiving of a world of Forms separate from the world of particulars in which we live. This paper explores the motivation for postulating that second world as opposed to making do with the one we have. The main objective is to demonstrate that and how everything, Forms and all, can instead fit into the same world. The approach is exploratory, as there can be no proof in the standard sense. The debate between explaining (...) Plato’s ontology with a single world and requiring a two-world model to make sense of the same thing is typically about scouring the Platonic corpus for evidence and turning to Aristotle for help where we need it. The aim here is to dig deeper than what either of them, or anyone else, has said or implied about the number or worlds, searching instead for any insight that might be gained from the way Forms are supposed to exist versus what we ourselves might understand by existence. Although the paper is, at its most basic level, about the existence of the Forms, the intention is not to prove that they exist, nor to evaluate the proofs and objections already on record, but to consider how they might exist and what follows if they do. Dialogue toward consensus on why we think the Forms exist, and why we think they do not, could perhaps provide a smoother “second sailing” in waters where we have been unable to agree whether they do and where they would if they did. (shrink)

A commentary on the Symposium as a challenge and a gift to Athens. I begin with a reflection on three dates: 416 bce, the date of Agathon’s victory party, c. 400, the approximate date of Apollodorus’ retelling of the party, and c. 375, the approximate date of the ‘publication’ of the dialogue, and I argue that Plato reminds his contemporary Athens both of its great poetic and legal and scientific traditions and of the historical fact that the way late fourth (...) century Athens appropriated them in some way led to the city’s demise at the turn of the century; thus the dialogue is Plato’s challenge to his contemporary Athens to recognize and overcome its flawed relation to its cultural resources. Heard in this way, the key moments are Aristophanes’ implied critique of Pausanias and Eryximachus and Socrates’ implied critique of Aristophanes and Agathon. Proceeding by a close reading, I argue that Plato exposes, for those moved to rise to his challenge, the failure of his great predecessors to conceive the divine in a way that, worthy of the height and otherness divinity requires, can provide substantive orientation for the burgeoning new reason that animates the city’s culture. (shrink)

The article tries to prove that the famous formula "epekeina tês ousias" has to be understood in the sense of being beyond being and not only in the sense of being beyond essence. We make hereby three points: first, since pure textual exegesis of 509b8–10 seems to lead to endless controversy, a formal proof for the metaontological interpretation could be helpful to settle the issue; we try to give such a proof. Second, we offer a corollary of the formal proof, (...) showing that not only self-predication of the form of the Good, but of any form is not possible, that is: no form of F has the form of F. Third, we apply Spinoza’s distinction between an ens imaginarium and a chimaera to Plato’s Idea of the Good. (shrink)

Despite Diotima’s irresistible virtues and attractiveness across the millennia, she spells trouble for philosophy. It is not her fault that she has been misunderstood, nor is it Plato’s. Rather, I suspect, each era has made of Diotima what it desired her to be. Her malleability is related to the assumption that Plato invented her, that she is a mere literary fiction, licensing the imagination to do what it will. In the first part of my paper, I argue against three contemporary (...) ‘majority views’ about Diotima that I regard as false. The first is that we can be certain she is fictional;1 a second is that Diotima is our best evidence for Plato’s feminism; the third, that she is Plato’s mouthpiece for the higher mysteries in the Symposium. After I have set aside what I regard as false, I proceed in the second half of my paper to develop Diotima’s positive contribution to philosophical psychology, her naturalistic account of the psyche as mortal, unified, and developmental. Whether the view Plato assigns to her is one that he held I do not pretend to know; but it is a powerful, defensible, and coherent view that inspired positive aspects of Freudian psychology in the twentieth century. Freud’s insight, in fact, makes clear how erōs can be developed in relation to the bad as well as the good. (shrink)

Llegados al final del periplo para definir al rey y al político, el Forastero y el joven Sócrates se encuentran en un callejón sin salida; no han podido determinar el perfil de cada uno de ellos. La narración del mito será la enmienda del método utilizado hasta ahora, i.e. la diéresis o división, que los ha llevado a una situación aporética. El Forastero muestra que se han cometido dos errores a lo largo del recorrido: el primero ha sido confundir lo (...) humano con lo divino; el segundo, de más envergadura, no establecer claramente la manera cómo el rey y el político podían ser el gobernante de la ciudad entera. Éste es uno de los pasajes más relevantes del Político de Platón, pues en él se realiza una reflexión sobre la naturaleza del error cometido. (shrink)

This article considers the function and value of the mythos in Plato's Statesman. As first, I recall the context of the story and its function within the framework of diairetic inquiry about the definition of the real politician. Secondly, I point out that the formulation of the myth is based on a series of traditional stories to which a historical-reconstructive method is applied. I then highlight the ways of reasoning used by the characters in order to reconstruct a rational and (...) plausible account from the mythical tradition. Finally, I try to show that the story, even though it cannot reach the truth of the most stable objects of knowledge, displays a certain degree of plausibility, based on the internal coherence, on the respect of a series of principles admitted as true and, eventually, on its correspondence with the mythical tradition. (shrink)

The Parmenides poses the question for what entities there are Forms, and the criticism of Forms it contains is commonly supposed to document an ontological reorientation in Plato. According to this reading, Forms no longer express the excellence of a given entity and a Socratic, ethical perspective on life, but come to resemble concepts, or what concepts designate, and are meant to explain nature as a whole. Plato’s conception of dialectic, it is further suggested, consequently changes into a value-neutral method (...) directed at tracing the interrelation of such Forms, an outlook supposedly documented in certain passages on method from the Sophist and the Statesman as well. -/- The article urges that this reading is untenable. For in the Parmenides the question for what entities one should posit Forms is left open, and the passages on method from the Sophist and Statesman neither encourage a non-normative ontology nor a value-neutral method of inquiry. What the three dialogues encourage us to do is rather to set common opinions about the relative worth and value of things aside when conducting ontological inquiries; and this attitude, the article concludes, demonstrates a close kinship, rather than a significant difference, between Plato’s Socrates and his Eleatic philosophers. (shrink)

El presente artículo defiende que, en el _Político_, Platón investiga sistemáticamente la índole metafórica del _logos_: quienes hablamos y nos entendemos hablando no podemos dejar de hacer comparaciones, poner ejemplos o servirnos de modelos o paradigmas, cada vez que estamos entendiendo algo, tanto si nos damos cuenta de ello como si no. En particular, el llamado “método de las divisiones” necesita de los ejemplos para que le sirvan de guía en el descubrimiento de las diferencias y las semejanzas. De hecho, (...) este carácter metafórico del _logos _se descubre en el intento de dar caza al político, que estructura el diálogo de comienzo a fin. La principal dificultad a la que es preciso hacer frente en dicha búsqueda se debe a que, ya desde el inicio, la caza del político se está dejando guiar subrepticiamente por un ejemplo que desorienta a sus perseguidores: el paradigma del pastor. Por ello hace falta dar tantas vueltas y recomenzar de nuevo varias veces la persecución, pues el ejemplo que oriente la búsqueda ha de hacerse explícito y ha de ser además un buen ejemplo, un ejemplo que permita entender. Pero, así reconducida, como la búsqueda de un buen paradigma para entender qué es la política, la caza del político plantea algunos problemas, relacionados con el vínculo entre _logos _y semejanza. Este artículo se centra en uno de ellos: la dificultad de explicar qué es un ejemplo y la consiguiente necesidad de proponer algo tan paradójico como un ejemplo de ejemplo. (shrink)

Després del centre de El polític, dedicat a la justa mesura, el diàleg imposa el «retorn al polític» i ja no se separarà més d’aquesta comesa. Es procedirà, en primer lloc a depurar les arts concausants; després se separaran les diferents menes de servidors de la ciutat, per tal d’arribar a veure que els rivals del polític conformen un conjunt de difícil separació. Caldrà, abans de prosseguir amb la divisió, atendre als tipus de règim polític per veure quin paper hi (...) juga el saber polític. El resultat d’aquest primer moment del retorn al polític pren la figura de la descoberta dels fonaments de la ciutat. (shrink)

The modern rationalist idea of rule of law, and modern rationalism in general, owes much to Plato and to Platonism. However, Plato’s stance towards the laws of the city is all but clear. On the one hand, we have the seemingly ‘totalitarian’ Plato of the Republic, a dialogue which defends the absolute authority of philosophical wisdom over all prescriptions that are ensuing from existing cities and their laws. On the other hand, we have the ‘more liberal-democratic’ Plato of the Laws, (...) a dialogue which promotes a combination of philosophical wisdom with rule of law. This ambivalence as to the issue of laws permeates one of the most enigmatic of Plato’s works, the Politicus, a dialogue that was written after the Republic and before the Laws. The present essay rejects both the ‘totalitarian’ and the ‘liberal-democratic’ understanding of Plato’s stance towards the laws of the city. The author defends the thesis that laws in the Politicus do not constitute a static Form that works against or with philosophical wisdom and/or democratic self-legislation, but a factor that generates a series of inescapable philosophical and political ambivalences. This approach corresponds with many of the findings of the so-called ‘post-modern jurisprudence’. That is, it brings to the fore the immanent aporias of philosophical dialectics, it emphasises the irreducible un-decidability between violence and consent as foundational elements of the law, and it stresses the adiakrisia between the poisonous and the healing effects of laws as regards the attainment of conditions of social and political justice. (shrink)

In the Statesman, Plato seems to be advocating that in the absence of a true king who will rule independently of laws, the next best thing as far as just rule is concerned is to ad here rigidly to existing laws, whatever they are. The rule of the true king is given as an example of virtuous rule in the sense that virtue politics or jurisprudence holds that laws cannot always deal justly with particular cases. But Plato’s view of what (...) we must do when there are no true kings forthcoming seems to preclude a virtue theoretical understanding of politics and laws. In this paper I will investigate the view that the image of the true king, who relies on written laws for convenience only, provides a model for a more realistic appeal to virtue in jurisprudence, that is, a respect of laws that is compatible with equity, in the sense understood by Aristotle.Čini se da Platon u Državniku zagovara shvaćanje prema kojemu u odsutnosti istinskog kralja koji će vladati neovisno o zakonima druga najbolja stvar, što se tiče pravedne vladavine, jest strogo pridržavanje postojećih zakona, što god oni bili. Uloga istinskog kralja navodi se kao primjer vrle vladavine u tom smislu što politika ili jurisprudencija koje se zasnivaju na vrlini drže da zakoni ne mogu uvijek pravedno izlaziti na kraj s pojedinačnim slučajevima. No čini se da Platonovo shvaćanje toga što moramo činiti kada ne postoje istinski kraljevi sprječava razumijevanje politike i zakonâ koje se zasniva na teoriji vrline. U ovom članku ispitujem shvaćanje prema kojemu slika istinskog kralja, koji se na pisane zakone oslanja samo iz praktičnih razloga, pruža model za realističnije pozivanje na vrlinu u jurisprudenciji, to jest poštivanje zakonâ koje je spojivo s nepristranošću u onom smislu u kojem to razumije Aristotel. (shrink)

In Plato’sStatesman, the Eleatic Stranger leads Socrates the Younger and their audience through an analysis of the statesman in the service of the interlocutors’ becoming “more capable in dialectic regarding all things” (285d7). In this way, the dialectical exercise in the text is both intrinsically and instrumentally valuable, as it yields a philosophically rigorous account of statesmanship and exhibits a method of dialectical inquiry. After the series of bifurcatory divisions in theSophistand earlyStatesman, the Stranger changes to a non-bifurcatory method of (...) dividing to account for the statesman, but does not explain the reason for this change. I argue that the change is prepared by the elements discussed in the digression from 277a2 to 287b2. Here the Stranger makes use of four concepts that are crucial for understanding this change: the notion ofparadigm, the paradigms ofcareandthe weaver, and the notion ofdue measure. I claim that the notion of paradigm clarifies the nature of dialectical inquiry, care and weaving act as paradigms appropriate to dialectical practice, and an account of due measure offers insight into the constitutive ratios that govern the structuring of kinds pursued through dialectical inquiry. I suggest that the non-bifurcatory method is intended to articulate knowledge in the strictest sense, or knowledge of the forms, presenting a method of inquiry into being and its structure that will foster the turning of the soul from things to forms that Socrates describes in theRepublic. (shrink)