For many women experiencing motherhood for the first time, the message they receive is clear: mothers who do not breastfeed ought to have good reasons not to; bottle feeding by choice is a failure of maternal duty. We argue that this pressure to breastfeed arises in part from two misconceptions about maternal duty: confusion about the scope of the duty to benefit and conflation between moral reasons and duties. While mothers have a general duty to benefit, we argue that this (...) does not imply a duty to carry out any particular beneficent act. Therefore, the expectation that mothers should breastfeed unless they have sufficient countervailing reasons not to is morally unwarranted. Recognising the difference between reasons and duties can allow us to discuss the benefits of breastfeeding and the importance of supporting mothers who wish to breastfeed without subjecting mothers who bottle feed to guilt, blame and failure. (shrink)

Health institutions recommend that young infants be exclusively breastfed on demand, and it is widely held that parents who can breastfeed have an obligation to do so. This has been challenged in recent philosophical work, especially by Fiona Woollard. Woollard’s work critically engages with two distinct views of parental obligation that might ground such an obligation—based on maximal benefit and avoidance of significant harm—to reject an obligation to breastfeed. While agreeing with Woollard’s substantive conclusion, this paper (drawing on philosophical discussion (...) of the ‘right to rear’) argues that there are several more moderate views of parental obligation which might also be thought to ground parental obligation. We first show that an obligation to breastfeed might result not from a general obligation to maximally benefit one’s child, but from what we call ‘choice-specific’ obligations to maximise benefit within particular activities. We then develop this idea through two views of parental obligation—the Dual Interest view, and the Best Custodian view—to ground an obligation to exclusively breastfeed on demand, before showing how both these more moderate views fail. Finally, we argue that not only is there no general obligation to breastfeed children, but that it is often morally right not to do so. Since much advice from health institutions on this issue implies that exclusive breastfeeding on demand is the best option for all families, our argument drives the feeding debate forward by showing that this advice often misrepresents parents’ moral obligations in potentially harmful ways. (shrink)

ABSTRACTGiven its intimate relationship with the human body and its environment, biotechnology innovation, and more particularly stem cell research innovations as a part thereof, implicate diverse social and moral/ethical issues. This paper explores some of the most important and controversial moral concerns raised by human embryonic stem cell research , focusing on concerns relating to the wellbeing of the embryo and the wellbeing of society . It then considers how and whether these concerns are dealt with in regulatory instruments in (...) Argentina, a southern developing country, examining in particular whether the values underlying these concerns have been translated into practical and effective rules reflective of the primary moral positions advanced. It concludes that Argentina's current state of stem cell research governance fails to consistently reflect the moral positions that have formed and is inadequate given Argentina's activity in this field. (shrink)

In the late twentieth century the United States experienced a wave of cases concerning compelled obstetric interventions, cases which attracted much legal and philosophical interest. Behind and alongside them, however, lies a little known strand of authorities which concerns a parent wishing to refuse life-sustaining treatment and a hospital seeking to prevent this on the basis of the State's interest in protecting innocent third parties, usually the patient's dependent minor children. This issue appears to be unique to the United States. (...) Although the leading case in point was influential in cases concerning compelled obstetric intervention, it has received little examination in its own right. This is a shame, since it spawned an intriguing line of cases worthy of reflection today. (shrink)

Approaches to supporting autonomy in medicine need to be able to support complex and sensitive decision-making, incorporating reflection on the patient's values and goals. This should involve deliberation in partnership between physician and patient, allowing the patient to take responsibility for her decision. Nowhere is this truer than in decisions around pregnancy and Caesarean section where maternal autonomy can seem to directly conflict with foetal interests. Medical and societal expectations and norms such as the expectations of a ‘mother’, constraints of (...) making decisions in an emergency, and the role of technology in viewing the foetus as a separate patient and surgery as a guarantor of results can all act to limit a woman's autonomy. In considering decisions about Caesarean section, maternal interests in bodily integrity can be dismissed as being less important than the foetus's own interests and the mother's duties to it, despite the inherent risks and impacts of such a major surgical procedure... (shrink)