Early defenders of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights invoked species hierarchy: human beings are owed rights because of our discontinuity with and superiority to animals. Subsequent defenders avoided species supremacism, appealing instead to conditions of embodied subjectivity and corporeal vulnerability we share with animals. In the past decade, however, supremacism has returned in work of the new ‘dignitarians’ who argue that human rights are grounded in dignity, and that human dignity requires according humans a higher status than animals. Against (...) the dignitarians, I argue that defending human rights on the backs of animals is philosophically suspect and politically self-defeating. (shrink)

Developments in fields as diverse as biotechnology, animal cognition, and computer science have cast serious doubt on the common belief that human beings are unique and that only they should have dignity and basic rights. A movement referred to as ‘new dignitarianism’ has recently reclaimed human dignity to fend off the threats to human uniqueness that it perceives to arise from these developments. This ‘new’ dignitarianism, however, is not new at all. Drawing on a debate between two Enlightenment philosophers, this (...) article shows that dignitarianism has already surfaced in the eighteenth century as the negative image of another movement: naturalism. Building on this historical account, I propose to understand dignitarianism and naturalism as opposing ideal-types on a normative spectrum. Doing so allows us to see a thus-far neglected problem, which I call the Zero-Sum Problem: any gains a concrete theory makes by approximating one ideal-type, it loses by moving away from the other. I end by showing how accepting this fact is a first step to more practically viable theories that attempt to find a middle ground between the two ideal-types. (shrink)

Ricœur propone que la clínica médica y la fenomenología se entrecruzan en la semiología de los signos del sufrir. Ello solo se manifiesta si se alcanza alguna las características fundamentales del sufrimiento, que habrá que determinar. Este camino permite descifrar el lugar del sufrimiento en la ciudad por medio de su vínculo con una estética de lo sublime. Siendo el sufrimiento una experiencia, la consideración de su relación con una teoría de lo sublime no solo es legítima, sino ineludible. Eso (...) obliga a entenderlo como algo más que un hecho individual y a definirlo como de interés público. Nos detendremos en algunos escalones del sufrimiento, como son: el sufrimiento prolongado en un contexto médico, el sufrimiento animal, la tortura y el suicidio, cuando su sentido es conmover a la ciudad. Lo público puede recomponerse si se admite el sufrimiento como uno de sus intereses. (shrink)

Animals populate our artistic and philosophical discourses in critical ways. From Jacques Derrida's or Karen Barad's cat, to Donna Haraway's dog, to the fish in Lucien Castaing-Taylor and Véréna Paravel's Leviathan, these animals feature heavily in discussions regarding limits – the limits of the human and thus its relation with non-humans, but also the limits of knowledge itself. Cute or dangerous, real or fantasised, dead or alive: in this article, I juxtapose the various ways that such animals confront us with (...) what Jacques Derrida describes as “the point of view of the absolute other”. Similarly, recent texts stage encounters with animals – thus distributing agency towards a larger variety of beings, carving out space for a previously excluded non-human other. Yet these encounters are mediated in profoundly different ways. In researching how encounters with the animal are differentially inflected and “defracted” respective to the medium in which they are staged, this article invokes questions of form and style within the critical dialogue that attempts to centre non-human animals. Highlighting how formal decisions are not accidental, but rather integral, to the praxis of the philosophy of animality, this article aims to draw attention to how specific forms and styles allow for a moment of contact with a non-human other. To this end, this article examines three oft-cited encounters: Derrida's encounter with his cat, an intense stare with a fish in Leviathan, and Barad's inflection of Schrödinger's cat. This juxtaposition gives insight into the limits of certain styles of producing thought and critically reflects on these works in their discussion of non-human life and agency. (shrink)