We conduct an experiment to investigate the joint effects of advisor reassurance and advice source in enhancing the impact of advice on auditors’ whistleblowing propensity. Participants from a Big 4 firm assess the likelihood that a questionable act involving a superior will be reported, both before and after receiving advice. We manipulate, between-participants, the advice source and advisor reassurance on the firm’s policy on whistleblower protection, holding constant the advice recommendation. Our study is underpinned by the premise that moral agents (...) may require an impetus to do the right thing in the form of advice whose effects may vary by its source and nature. Results are consistent with our hypothesis. Specifically, while auditors’ propensity to report a questionable act increases after receiving advice, the increase is significantly higher when the advice is received with reassurance on whistleblower protection than without reassurance, with the effect of reassurance being greater when the advice is from an authoritative source than from a non-authoritative source. These results underscore the importance of advice in promoting whistleblowing and demonstrate how the impact of advice is jointly determined by its source and reassurance on whistleblower protection. (shrink)

This work empirically tests the concept of the ‘whistleblowing triangle,’ which is modeled on the three factors encapsulated by the fraud triangle, in the Indonesian context. Anchored in the proposition of an original research framework on the whistleblowing triangle and derived hypotheses, this work aims to expand the body of knowledge on this topic by providing empirical evidence. The sample used is taken from audit firms affiliated with both the big 4 and non-big 4 companies operating in Indonesia. The results (...) of analysis using the PLS-PM method found a significant relationship between the components of the whistleblowing triangle and the intention of blowing the whistle. We found that financial incentives are the most significant predictor of auditors’ intention to blow the whistle in Indonesia. Other components, such as opportunity and rationalization, also play an important role in supporting auditors’ intention to blow the whistle. Our findings also suggest that related pressures are the top priority for audit firms in Indonesia to consider in increasing whistleblowing intention. We expand the previous literature on whistleblowing which has been derived from the components of the fraud triangle :28–56, 2016; Smaili and Arroyo in J Bus Ethics, https://doi.org/10.1007/s10551-017-3663-7, 2017) by adding empirical evidence. (shrink)

This article originally advances the field of organizational whistleblowing by empirically investigating the suitability of the four elements of the fraud diamond as a means to understand the intention to disclose wrongdoing through virtual channels. This article also makes a contribution on the theme of whistleblowing as it relates to customers, an under-studied, however, relevant stakeholder in this field. The main findings of the article are as follows: the four elements of the fraud diamond as they relate to whistleblowing—a combination (...) of pressure, financial incentive, opportunity and rationalization, and capability—can explain the intentions behind customer reports of wrongdoing; online social media channels are customers’ preferred means of whistleblowing; the elements of opportunity and capability are strongly correlated with the use of social media as a method of disclosing wrongdoing; and virtual channels can be useful for whistleblowers in order to avoid potential retaliation. Unique managerial and academic implications of these research findings are also discussed, extending the layers of knowledge on whistleblowing in organizations. (shrink)