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  1. R and Relevance Principle Revisited.Eunsuk Yang - 2013 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 42 (5):767-782.
    This paper first shows that some versions of the logic R of Relevance do not satisfy the relevance principle introduced by Anderson and Belnap, the principle of which is generally accepted as the principle for relevance. After considering several possible (but defective) improvements of the relevance principle, this paper presents a new relevance principle for (three versions of) R, and explains why this principle is better than the original and others.
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  • Pure semantics and applied semantics.B. J. Copeland - 1983 - Topoi 2 (2):197-204.
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  • A theorem in 3-valued model theory with connections to number theory, type theory, and relevant logic.J. Michael Dunn - 1979 - Studia Logica 38 (2):149 - 169.
    Given classical (2 valued) structures and and a homomorphism h of onto , it is shown how to construct a (non-degenerate) 3-valued counterpart of . Classical sentences that are true in are non-false in . Applications to number theory and type theory (with axiom of infinity) produce finite 3-valued models in which all classically true sentences of these theories are non-false. Connections to relevant logic give absolute consistency proofs for versions of these theories formulated in relevant logic (the proof for (...)
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  • Completeness and conservative extension results for some Boolean relevant logics.Steve Giambrone & Robert K. Meyer - 1989 - Studia Logica 48 (1):1 - 14.
    This paper presents completeness and conservative extension results for the boolean extensions of the relevant logic T of Ticket Entailment, and for the contractionless relevant logics TW and RW. Some surprising results are shown for adding the sentential constant t to these boolean relevant logics; specifically, the boolean extensions with t are conservative of the boolean extensions without t, but not of the original logics with t. The special treatment required for the semantic normality of T is also shown along (...)
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  • The logical form of perception sentences.John Bacon - 1979 - Synthese 41 (2):271 - 308.
    The perceptual logic of j hintikka and r thomason is imbedded in a more general framework of quantification over individual-concepts. two intensional predicates for physical individuation and perceptual individuation are required in place of thomason's two variable-sorts. objectual perception of x by s is then definable as "for some y there is a perceptually individuated object z, in fact identical with x, such that s perceives that y is z.".
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  • Routley’s formulation of transparency.B. H. Slater - 1992 - History and Philosophy of Logic 13 (2):215-224.
    Routley?s Formula says, for instance, that if it is believed there is a man then there is something which is believed to be a man. In this paper I defend the formula; first directly, but then by looking at work by Gensler and Hintikka against it, and at the original work of Routley, Meyer and Goddard for it. The argument ultimately reduces to a central point about the extensionality of objects in Routley, Meyer and Goddard?s intensional system, i.e. in its (...)
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  • Universal semantics?Richard Routley - 1975 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 4 (3):327 - 356.
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  • E is a conservative extension of eī.Robert K. Meyer & Richard Routley - 1974 - Philosophia 4 (2-3):223-249.
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